ISIS’s proposals to expand fissile material controls
April 22, 1998
Fissile Material Proposals to be Considered for Addition to the 1998 Chairman’s Working Paper
At the end of the 1997 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting (Prepcom), the Prepcom Chairman, Ambassador Pasi Patokallio, issued a working paper. This paper was divided into two principal sections: points of general agreement among the parties, and proposals made by country delegations on which there was not agreement. These country proposals are included in paragraph 4 of the Chairman’s Working Paper.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a Washington D.C.-based, non-profit research organization, believes that this `basket of ideas’ under paragraph 4, which the NPT parties began to compile in 1997, should be expanded to include all vital issues before the parties concentrate on reaching agreement on specific language.
To this end, ISIS has carefully analyzed the Chairman’s Working Paper, and drafted a set of proposals expressing positions not yet included under paragraph 4. The attached document lists ISIS’s specific proposals addressing fissile material control issues. This document should in no way imply support for, or opposition to, the specific points already included in the Chairman’s working paper.
For ease of reference, this document is organized into sections (identified by bold, underlined headings) which are parallel to the structure of the 1997 Chairman’s Working Paper. Because fissile material controls are addressed under disarmament, safeguards, and peaceful uses, these sections are all included. Under each section heading, proposals are divided according to broad themes (identified by italicized headings).
We hope your delegation will give these fissile material control proposals careful consideration. ISIS staff will be available both before and during the Prepcom to explain the rationale behind the proposals, or to elaborate further on the ideas behind them.
Please contact Corey Gay in Washington DC at (202) 547-2696, with any questions or comments.
Fissile Material Control Proposals to be Considered for Addition to the 1998 Chairman’s Working Paper
Note to delegates: This paper compiles ISIS’s proposals for fissile material controls, which are not included in the Chairman’s Working Paper from the 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting of the States parties to the NPT. This should in no way imply support for, or opposition to, the specific points included in that document.
Sections parallel to the Chairman’s Working Paper are identified by bold, underlined headings. Under each section heading, proposals are divided according to broad themes which are identified by italicized headings.
Nuclear Disarmament
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
* States recognize the FMCT obligation in the P&O’s document.
* States welcome any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation forward, including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification, implementation, and existing stocks.
Unilateral Declarations of Halts to Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Explosives
* States parties will declare that all production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes has ceased, and declare all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes.
Existing Military Stocks of Fissile Materials
* States urge the nuclear weapons states to take further steps to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile materials, in particular to:
1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess and place this material under international safeguards; 2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval) use, and the amount declared excess;
- 3) declare the forms in which fissile materials are held; their quantity and location; and their manner of storage; and 4) provide information about status and location of facilities involved in highly enriched uranium (HEU) production and plutonium (Pu) separation.
* States urge the nuclear weapon states to determine to the greatest accuracy possible their total production of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval purposes.
* States recognize that the vast majority of military fissile material is not declared excess, and are not under safeguards.
* To facilitate negotiations of nuclear disarmament, states urge the deepening of bilateral cooperative measures between Russia, the United States, other countries and international organizations aimed at raising standards of material protection control and accountancy (MPC&A), and at managing nuclear weapon dismantlement and the safe storage and disposition of weapon materials.
* States are encouraged to pursue agreements concerning the transparency, verification and management of excess military stocks of fissile material.
* States are urged to adopt disposition strategies that would largely eliminate excess stocks of HEU and plutonium over the next 20-30 years, and that would curtail the unnecessary production of new stocks of HEU and separated plutonium.
General
* States recognize that the stringent international controls over nuclear materials and technologies needed today are little different from those which would be required for total nuclear disarmament. Therefore, policies should be created as if total nuclear disarmament were about to occur, irrespective of its feasibility or desirability.
Safeguards
IAEA Safeguards
* Member states welcome the approval of the strengthened safeguards model protocol. States are encouraged to implement this protocol as soon as possible.
* States support the further strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including measures to further enhance the detection of undeclared nuclear weapons activities in the nonnuclear weapons states, and the extension of IAEA safeguards or verification to all non-military facilities and materials in the nuclear weapon states.
Declarations of Civil Fissile Material Stocks
* States welcomes the steps taken by countries possessing civil stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium to make these stocks more transparent. States urge stronger measures to be undertaken by all states possessing these stocks, including:
1) disclosing quantities of Pu and HEU in spent fuel, and in as yet undischarged fuel from reactors, 2) disclosing amounts of separated Pu and HEU in fresh and irradiated form, 3) disclosing amounts of fissile materials held abroad, and the portion of these in spent fuel or unirradiated separated form,
* States parties urge members to conclude an agreement on the management of civil HEU as soon as possible.
Peaceful Uses
Regional Cooperation
* Member states encourage countries to pursue regional cooperation options for safety and storage or disposal of nuclear materials
* States are urged to pursue an effective and universal system of trade regulation consistent with the further development of nuclear power production.
Physical Protection
* All states are urged to adopt the IAEA’s recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC-225 rev 3.
* States parties that are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials are urged to undertake a review of the Convention at the earliest possible time, with a goal of strengthening the Convention’s provisions and extending the Convention to include both civil and military stockpiles of nuclear materials that are in process, storage, and domestic transport.
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