IAEA Makes Progress on Syria’s Undeclared Past Nuclear Program
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in its latest safeguards report on Syria’s past undeclared nuclear program that environmental sampling at one of three sites “functionally related” to the undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour site, aka Al Kibar reactor, showed the strong presence of uranium particles, produced as a result of chemical processing. This is consistent with the long-standing view that the site, Marj as Sultan, was an important, undeclared uranium conversion and fuel fabrication site. Director General Rafael Grossi in a June 2025 press conference confirmed these earlier findings when he stated that this site was “where uranium conversion, processing, and fuel fabrication for the reactor at Dair Alzour was taking place.”
Iranian Engineering Company CEO Arrested for Allegedly Shipping Sophisticated Electronics from the U.S. to Iran
Iranian national Bahram Ostovari, a U.S. permanent resident since 2020, used two front companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to conceal the identity of Iranian end-users and acquire export-controlled electronics and other items from U.S. suppliers. Under this scheme, the criminal complaint indicates that the primary end-user of these electronics and electrical components was the Iranian railway entity. However, given the success of this operation, Iranian military entities could have easily taken advantage of this or a similar scheme, outfitting programs like the Shahed drone program, which extensively rely on Western electronics.
Iran’s “Kalaye Electric” Centrifuge Site Attacked During the 12-Day-War
Unnoticed publicly until now, Israel attacked during the 12-Day one of Iran’s most important advanced centrifuge research and development sites located on Damavand Road in eastern Tehran. The main operations hall, a smaller workshop, and the corner of a brand-new, three-story building were destroyed. The site was known publicly as the “Kalaye Electric” workshops and in more recent times had been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Additional Protocol from 2016 to about 2021.
Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — September 2025
Our analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) quarterly Iran reports, dated September 3, 2025: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as new findings in the IAEA’s companion report, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Context and commentary are added on aspects omitted from these reports.
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Imagery Shows Sanitization Effort at the Attacked Mojdeh Site a.k.a. the “Lavisan 2” Campus
High-resolution MAXAR Technologies satellite imagery taken on July 3 and August 19, 2025, of the Mojdeh (also known as Lavisan 2) site obtained by the Institute shows a significant effort by Iran to rapidly demolish damaged or destroyed buildings, likely to sanitize any incriminating nuclear weapons research and development activities. The IAEA established a direct connection between Iran’s Amad Plan and the Mojdeh site but was never able to visit the site or interview key associated personnel.
U.S. and Chinese Dual Citizen Engineer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Missile Launch and Detection Technology
During and shortly after his employment at a large U.S. defense contractor, a Chinese-US dual citizen downloaded thousands of export-controlled and proprietary files from the company’s secure server onto multiple hard drives, some of which remain at large. The files included manufacturing specifications and test results for two sophisticated types of sensors used for space-based detection and tracking of threats, suitable for tracking ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program After the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction
It quickly became clear after the 12-Day War that attacks on facilities and persons were so comprehensive that Iran’s capabilities—in terms of facilities, equipment, and expertise to make nuclear weapons—were destroyed. Iran’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program is severely constrained. This diagram lists key, known facilities and assets that were once part of Iran’s program to develop nuclear weapons but are now destroyed or severely damaged.
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David Albright
September 22, 2025
HEU still buried underground, consensus of many, says Rafael Grossi to PBS Newshour. Insightful interview. But it is hard to get a warm feeling that inspections of that HEU and other enriched uranium are going to happen soon
From interview:
Nick Schifrin: Right. So this is the nearly 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium. Do you have any new information to suggest that it was destroyed or was not destroyed?
Rafael Mariano Grossi: No, there is no information as to the status of the material. We think that most of the material is still there...and
Nick Schifrin: Meaning buried underground.
Rafael Mariano Grossi: Yes, yes. And this is the general consensus of many, including in Iran, that the material is still there.
Read the post on Twitter HERE