ISIS’s nuclear disarmament proposals
April 21, 1998
Nuclear Disarmament Section of Chairman’s Working Paper
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a Washington D.C.-based, non-profit research organization, has analyzed the Chairman’s Working Paper from the 1997 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting (Prepcom). The Working Paper was divided into two principal sections: points of general agreement among the parties, and proposals made by country delegations on which there was not agreement. The Chairman’s Working Paper organizes the country proposals by general topic headings, such as Universality, Non-proliferation, Nuclear Disarmament, and Safeguards.
ISIS believes that the `basket of ideas’ under paragraph 4, which the NPT parties began to compile in 1997, should be expanded to include all vital issues before the parties concentrate on achieving agreement on specific proposals. To this end, ISIS has reorganized the “Nuclear Disarmament” section according to subtopics (denoted by underlined headings), so that the proposals in the Working Paper on a given aspect of disarmament can been compared and analyzed together. Each subsection includes all proposals on that specific topic, and wherever possible, the country which made each proposal is identified at the beginning of each paragraph. In addition, at the end of each topic subsection are proposals in bold lettering, identified as “ISIS.” These are proposals drafted by ISIS, and designed to address aspects of disarmament which are not covered by any country’s submission. These proposals are suggested for consideration by delegates for addition to the Chairman’s Working Paper. ISIS’s suggestions are not the only possible additions, but are intended to make the `basket of ideas’ as complete as possible.
This document should in no way imply support for, or opposition to, the specific points already included in the Chairman’s working paper.
Please contact Corey Gay in Washington DC at (202) 547-2696, with any comments.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Australia: The States parties welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an indispensable step forward on the path to nuclear
disarmament, and as the fulfillment of a principal component of the decision of the 1995 Conference on principles and objectives. The Treaty establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is reflected in its signature by more than 140 States. All States parties aim to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a demonstration of the strength of international support for the Treaty and in order to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.
Canada: We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.
Canada: We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Canada: We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.
PRC: The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are
urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty.
The States parties emphasize the importance of making every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, despite its shortcomings and to prepare the Treaty for implementation in a manner that prevents, to the maximum extent possible, further qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
Japan: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.
EU: The States parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date
[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force:]
, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the Treaty depends.
New Zealand (NZ): The States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. The States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.
South Africa (SA): The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be recorded as one of the goals of the States parties that has been accomplished. Paragraph 4 (a) of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and for its signature and ratification by all the members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
ISIS: States recognize that the CTBT does not include an explicit commitment by the
weapon states to halt development of new or modified nuclear weapon designs. States parties urge the NWS not to develop new, advanced, or militarily-significant nuclear weapons under a CTBT.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
Australia: The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Canada: We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): The States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.
PRC: All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
The States parties emphasize the need to pursue negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Japan: Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.
EU: The States parties call on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.
NZ: The States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. The States parties agree to consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin promptly.
SA: (a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the negotiation of a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.
OR
(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the Conference on Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. All States parties that are members-of the Conference should work actively to achieve that goal.
The States parties support the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as an important step for multilateral action and recognize both the disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of a fissile material cut-off convention.
P5: We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
P5: We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
ISIS: States recognize the FMCT obligation in the P&O’s document.
ISIS: States welcome any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation forward,
including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification, implementation, and existing stocks.
Unilateral Declarations of Military Fissile Material Stocks
Canada: Pending conclusion of such a [FMCT] convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ISIS: States parties will declare that all production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes has ceased, and declare all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes.
Stocks of Military Fissile Material
Canada: Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce
weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Norway: There would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of
weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.
Norway: A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level.
Norway: Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate negotiations on a
“cut-off” treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear disarmament.
Norway: The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:
(a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;
(b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;
(c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;
(d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.
EU: The States parties welcome efforts by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.
Japan: The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.
ISIS: States urge the nuclear weapons states to take further steps to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile materials, in particular to:
1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess and place this material under international safeguards;
2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval) use, and the amount declared excess;
3) declare the forms in which fissile materials are held; their quantity and locations; and their manner of storage; and
4) provide information about status and location of facilities involved in HEU production and Pu separation.
ISIS: States urge the nuclear weapon states to determine to the greatest accuracy possible their total production of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval purposes.
ISIS: States recognize that the vast majority of military fissile material is not declared
excess, and is not under safeguards.
ISIS: To facilitate negotiations of nuclear disarmament, states urge the deepening of
bilateral cooperative measures between Russia, the United States, other countries and international organizations aimed at raising standards of material protection control and accountancy (MPC&A), and at managing nuclear weapon dismantlement and the safe storage and disposition of weapon materials.
ISIS: States are encouraged to pursue agreements concerning the transparency,
verification and management of excess stocks of military fissile material.
ISIS: States support the extension of IAEA safeguards to all non-military facilities and
materials in the nuclear weapon states and non-NPT countries.
ISIS: States are urged to adopt disposition strategies that would largely eliminate excess military stocks of HEU and plutonium over the next 20-30 years, and that would curtail the unnecessary production of new stocks of HEU and separated plutonium.
START Process
Canada: We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21
March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.
Canada: The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expect
these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.
Japan: Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce
nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.
[If START II has not been ratified:]
EU: The States parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified as soon as possible and for an early start to negotiations on a START III treaty.
[If START III has not been concluded:]
EU: The States parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations on a START III treaty.
P5: In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents of the
Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki on further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress already achieved.
P5: The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to be welcomed.
Post-START III/Deep Reductions
Canada: We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III.
EU: Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon
States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States parties call for further progress towards global reductions of nuclear arsenals. The States parties urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and all States to continue the determined pursuit of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.
NAM: The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.
Ireland: In the context of the “systematic and progressive efforts” which they have agreed to
pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.
Japan: Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further
encouraged. In the light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled “Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons”, every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.
SA: The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation and the United
States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control. The other nuclear-weapon States should join in the process of structured and verified nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.
The States parties endorse the effectiveness of the step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament and recognize that nuclear disarmament can only take place in a stable international security environment.
ISIS: Encourage early conclusion of START III. Urge US and Russia to begin
negotiations on further steps to reduce arsenals. Urge US and Russia to include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to increase confidence and make reductions irreversible.
ISIS: Urge the United States and Russia to continue the strategic arms reduction process and initiate negotiations to verifiably reduce nuclear arsenals to roughly 1000 warheads at the earliest possible time, and include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
ISIS: Urge the five nuclear weapon states to inititate transparency discussions with a view to multilateralizing force reduction negotiations.
ISIS: Urge the five nuclear weapon states to initiate multilateral negotiations to verifiably reduce nuclear arsenals to a few hundred warheads at the earliest possible time, and include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
Complete Nuclear Disarmament
PRC: An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.
NAM: The States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt a flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear disarmament is further substantially facilitated by the continued easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should thus be fulfilled with determination and without further delay. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament as well as their commitment to the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.
The States parties reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to continue to identify, negotiate and implement further steps necessary to achieve this objective within the shortest possible framework of time.
NZ: The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.
NZ: The nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.
NZ: The States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community’s standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
SA: The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc
committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and negotiations required for a programme of systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate totally nuclear weapons.
Sweden: The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by the Court that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”.
Sweden: The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. The states parties underline the importance that the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.
Sweden: The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.
P5: It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of
international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control
ISIS: States recognize that today’s need for stringent international controls over nuclear materials and technologies is little different from that which would be required for total nuclear disarmament. Therefore, policies should be created as if total nuclear disarmament were about to occur, irrespective of its feasibility or desirability.
ISIS: States recommend the formation of an informal P5 nuclear disarmament discussion
committee in the NPT review context.
ISIS: As a confidence building measure, states parties urge the NWS to report
individually and on a regular basis to the CD and the NPT Prepcom on the steps they have taken toward fulfilling their article VI commitments.
ISIS: States urge support for the proposal in the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear
ISIS: Disarmament to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiation in the Conference.
ISIS: Emphasize the necessity that verifiable warhead dismantlement be an integral part of all bi- and multi-lateral nuclear disarmament efforts.
ISIS: Emphasize the importance to further arms reduction agreements of maintaining accurate, verifiable records of unilateral warhead dismantlement activities.
Nuclear Weapons Alert and Deployment Policies
PRC: The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.
PRC: No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability.
PRC: States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all these
weapons home.
Japan: The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
Russia: The nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only within
their own territories.
P5: We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine.
The States parties would support the objective of increased transparency regarding short-range nuclear weapons in the context of its recommendations on nuclear disarmament.
ISIS: Nuclear weapon states are urged to make a commitment not to increase the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons.
ISIS: NWS are invited to consider separating warheads from delivery systems and placing both into secure storage under international monitoring.
Other International Treaties
PRC: All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to that effect.
[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]
EU: The States parties urge all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.
[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol is not completed:]
EU: The States parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to complete as soon as possible a legally binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty.
EU: The States parties recommend that all regions make major reductions in their level of
conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
Russia: An exchange of views and negotiations should be begun on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments.
Welcoming the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, States parties support the regional or nuclear-weapon-free-zone approach to the provision of legally binding security assurances, as opposed to a global convention.
Other Issues
The States parties recognize that the nuclear arms race between the United States of America and the Russian Federation has ended and that this aspect of article VI has been fulfilled.
P5: We stress the importance of early signature and ratification of the Treaty by all States,
which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an objective we fully share.
ISIS: States are urged to limit the number of `subcritical’ nuclear experiments they
conduct, and to carry out all such experiments in a transparent manner, with monitoring by international inspectors.
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