Complete listing of ISIS’s proposals on all subjects
Issues to be Considered for Addition to the 1997 Chairman’s Working Paper
April 23, 1998 rev.1
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
For more information, contact: Corey Gay (202) 547-2696
Issues to be Considered for Addition to the Chairman’s Working Paper
Note: This paper is comprised of proposals which are not included in the Chairman’s Working Paper from the 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting of the States parties to the NPT. This should in no way imply support for, or opposition to, the specific points included in that document.
Chapeau
* The 2000 Review Conference will review and evaluate progress on each of the articles of the Principles and Objectives document adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It will decide whether to modify the Principles and Objectives document.
* Recognize that if states parties identify initiatives which require work or discussion beyond the time allotted at the Prepcom meetings, the convening of intercessional bodies or working groups may be instrumental to achieving the goals of the Prepcoms before the 2000 Review Conference. The intercessional bodies should report to the Prepcom, or to the Review Conference if no Prepcom has been scheduled before then.
* States parties and committee chairpersons will make every effort to make the NPT Review process more open and transparent. Meetings will be open unless the Chairperson rules that an open meeting would significantly interfere with the work of that meeting.
Middle East
* Recognize that confidence building measures taken by states in the Middle East are important steps toward the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region, an initiative called for in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Examples of confidence building measures include: mutual visits to safeguarded facilities, information sharing, and cooperative technical evaluations of a regional verification regime.
* Recognize that Iraq’s full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715 represents a significant step towards achieving a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.
* Recognize the value and lessons of progress in other regions on achieving nuclear weapon free zones or greater universality of the NPT.
* Support regional cooperation on nuclear safety and/or nuclear waste management issues as a step toward the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.
* Encourage creation of a safeguards clean laboratory in the Middle East as a step toward the creation of a regional verification system.
* All parties hope for renewed progress on the Middle East peace process.
* Recognize that the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) process is a useful forum to discuss the achievement of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.
* Regrets that states in the Middle East still view possession of weapons of mass destruction as elements of their security.
* As part of the peace process, countries with unsafeguarded facilities should take steps to unilaterally halt production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive purposes.
Universality
* States welcome the steps taken by Brazil to move toward ratification of the NPT.
* Encourage India and Pakistan to engage in a process of confidence building in order to improve their regional security environment and lay the basis for their eventual accession to the NPT.
Non-Proliferation
* Members of NATO are urged to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear weapon states’ territory.
* States parties welcome the continued implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and to cooperate with the IAEA in verifying the completeness of its initial declaration of nuclear material.
* States support Iraq’s full and effective implementation of Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715, and urge its full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Disarmament
* As a confidence building measure, states parties urge the NWS to report individually and on a regular basis to the CD and the NPT Prepcom on the steps they have taken toward fulfilling their article VI commitments.
* States urge support for the proposal in the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiation in the Conference.
* States recommend the formation of an informal P5 nuclear disarmament discussion committee in the NPT review context.
* States recognize the FMCT obligation in the P&O’s document.
* States welcome any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation forward, including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification, implementation, and existing stocks.
* States recognize that the stringent international controls over nuclear materials and technologies needed today are little different from those which would be required for total nuclear disarmament. Therefore, policies should be created as if total nuclear disarmament were about to occur, irrespective of its feasibility or desirability.
* States recognize that the CTBT does not include an explicit commitment by the weapon states to halt development of new or modified nuclear weapon designs. States parties urge the NWS not to develop new, advanced, or militarily significant nuclear weapons under a CTBT.
* States urge the nuclear weapons states to take further steps to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile materials, in particular to:
- 1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess and place this material under international safeguards; 2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval) use, and the amount declared excess; 3) declare the forms in which fissile materials are held; their quantity and location; and their manner of storage; and 4) provide information about status and location of facilities involved in HEU production and Pu separation.
* States urge the nuclear weapon states to determine to the greatest accuracy possible their total production of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval purposes.
* Nuclear weapon states are urged to make a commitment not to increase the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons.
* NWS are invited to consider separating warheads from delivery systems and placing both into secure storage under international monitoring.
* States are urged to limit the number of `subcritical’ nuclear experiments they conduct, and to carry out all such experiments in a transparent manner, with monitoring by international inspectors.
* States parties will declare that all production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes has ceased, and declare all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes.
* Encourage early conclusion of START III. Urge US and Russia to begin negotiations on further steps to reduce arsenals. Urge US and Russia to include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
* Urge the United States and Russia to continue the strategic arms reduction process and initiate negotiations to verifiably reduce nuclear arsenals to roughly 1000 warheads at the earliest possible time, and include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
* Urge the five nuclear weapon states to inititate transparency discussions with a view to multilateralizing force reduction negotiations.
* Urge the five nuclear weapon states to initiate multilateral negotiations to verifiably reduce nuclear arsenals to a few hundred warheads at the earliest possible time, and include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
* Emphasize the necessity that verifiable warhead dismantlement be an integral part of all bi- and multi-lateral nuclear disarmament efforts.
* States recognize that the vast majority of military fissile material is not declared excess, and are not under safeguards.
* To facilitate negotiations of nuclear disarmament, states urge the deepening of bilateral cooperative measures between Russia, the United States, other countries and international organizations aimed at raising standards of material protection control and accountancy (MPC&A), and at managing nuclear weapon dismantlement and the safe storage and disposition of weapon materials.
* States are encouraged to pursue agreements concerning the transparency, verification and management of excess military stocks of fissile material.
* States are urged to discuss a disposition strategy that would largely eliminate excess stocks of HEU and plutonium over the next 20-30 years, and that would curtail the unnecessary production of new stocks of HEU and separated plutonium.
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
* States parties urge the parties involved in the drafting of future NWFZs to engage in appropriate negotiation with the NWS before opening the treaty and its protocols for signature. This measure should help ensure the drafting of a protocol which is fully endorsed by the NWS.
Safeguards
* Member states welcome the approval of the strengthened safeguards model protocol. States are encouraged to implement this protocol as soon as possible.
* States welcome the steps taken by countries possessing civil stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium to make these stocks more transparent. States urge stronger measures to be undertaken by all states possessing these stocks, including:
- 1) disclosing quantities of Pu and HEU in spent fuel, and in as yet undischarged fuel from reactors, 2) disclosing amounts of separated Pu and HEU in fresh and irradiated form, 3) disclosing amounts of fissile materials held abroad, and the portion of these in spent fuel or unirradiated separated form,
* States support the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including measures to further enhance the detection of undeclared nuclear weapons activities in the non-nuclear weapons states, and the extension of IAEA safeguards or verification to all non-military facilities and materials in the nuclear weapon states and non-NPT countries.
Peaceful Uses
* States recognize the right of NNWS to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, NNWS should commit themselves to pursuing technologies which are the most proliferation resistant and have the lowest risk of serious safety or environmental problems.
* Member states encourage countries to pursue regional cooperation options for safety and storage or disposal of nuclear materials
* States recognize that the NPT was written when nuclear power generation was a new and largely untried energy source. States acknowledge that other forms of clean and renewable energy may be more appropriate for development considering the safety, environmental, and proliferation risks associated with nuclear power.
* All states are urged to adopt the IAEA’s recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC-225 rev 3.
* States parties that are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials are urged to undertake a review of the Convention at the earliest possible time, with a goal of strengthening the Convention’s provisions and extending the Convention to include nuclear materials in process, storage, and domestic transport.
* States are urged to pursue an effective and universal system of trade regulation consistent with the further development of nuclear power production.
‹ Back