Reports

Status Report: Civil Plutonium Transparency and the Plutonium Management Guidelines

by David Albright and Lauren Barbour

January 1, 2000

In 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549). These guidelines, agreed to by the five declared nuclear weapon states, plus Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, increase the transparency of the management of civil plutonium by publishing annual statements of each country’s holdings of civil plutonium. Although the annual publication of civil holdings has been successful overall in creating more transparency, the declarations by several countries are incomplete. In addition, more countries possessing civil plutonium need to be involved, with the goal to create universal membership and adherence.

Background

In December 1992 the IAEA initiated a series of meetings involving those countries with the largest civil plutonium holdings in order to determine the necessity of international methods of managing plutonium.1 These countries were concerned about the increasing amounts of civil separated plutonium and the large quantities of fissile material that was expected to result from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. One year later, the IAEA convened an unofficial study of ways to manage plutonium. Participants decided that the countries with separated plutonium stocks would agree to methods of plutonium management among themselves rather than to have the IAEA act as mediator. (However, the IAEA has provided a place to meet and published the guidelines and annual declarations.) The nine countries listed above reached agreement in late 1997 on norms for responsible government management of inventories of separated, unirradiated plutonium. The guidelines and the first declarations were published in March 1998. In principle, the guidelines cover all plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities, but focus on the material that poses the most proliferation concern. The guidelines thus cover separated plutonium in storage, in unirradiated mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel elements, in other unirradiated fabricated forms, and in the course of manufacture or fabrication into these items. Although plutonium in spent fuel is not the focus of these guidelines, each country has agreed to publish annual estimates of the amount of plutonium in its spent nuclear fuel. The guidelines also cover plutonium declared excess to military nuclear programs. The guidelines do not cover plutonium that is more than 80 percent plutonium 238, plutonium used in gram quantities, or plutonium on which IAEA safeguards have been terminated or exempted. They do not apply to the management of highly enriched uranium (HEU), but they do recognize the need to manage HEU with the same vigilance as separated plutonium. The guidelines express agreement that civil plutonium should be handled in accordance with major nonproliferation treaties; international agreements or conventions on safety, physical protection, material accountancy and control, and safeguards; and rules on international transfers of civil plutonium.2 The countries also agreed to formulate national strategies on plutonium management, which will consider the risks of proliferation, especially during storage before irradiation or permanent disposal; the need to protect the environment, workers and the public; and the resource value of the material. This strategies are also to take into account the importance of balancing supply and demand, in essence trying to minimize the amount of separated or unirradiated plutonium as soon as practical. A major accomplishment of these guidelines is the agreement by each of these nine nations to publish:

    Occasional brief statements explaining its national strategy for nuclear power and spent fuel, and its general plans for managing national holdings of plutonium; An annual statement of its holding of all plutonium subject to the guidelines; and An annual statement of its estimate of the plutonium contained in its holdings of spent civil reactor fuel.

The Declarations

When the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium were published in the spring of 1998, eight of the nine countries provided declarations of their plutonium holdings as of the end of 1996. A few also provided holdings as of the end of 1995. Only Russia did not provide information on its holdings. In September 1998, Russia provided the IAEA with its holdings as of July 1, 1996.

TABLE 1: Civil Unirradiated Plutonium 1996(a)

-BritainFranceBelgiumGermanyJapanSwitz.(b)RussiaU.S.China
Was INFCIRC/549 declaration for 1996 submitted to the IAEA as of September 17, 1999? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (quantities as of 7/96) Yes Yes
INFCIRC/549, Annex B - - - - - - - - -
1. Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants. 52.1 43.6 0 0 0.6 not submitted 27.2 0 0
2. Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manufacture or fabrication and plutonium contained in unirradiated semi-fabricated or unfinished products at fuel or other fabricating plants or elsewhere. 0.5 11.3 2.6 0.4 3.1 not submitted included in 27.2 above <0.05 0
3. Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere. 2.2 5.0 0.1 2.7 0.9 0.1 0.063 4.6 0
4. Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere. 0 5.5 negligible 1.8 0.4 <0.05 0.87 <40.4 0
Note: - - - - - - - - -
i. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above belonging to foreign bodies. 3.8 30.0 not submitted not submitted 0 0.1 not submitted 0 0
ii. Plutonium in any of the forms in lines 1-4 above held in locations in other countries, therefore not included above. 0.9 0.2 not submitted not submitted 15.1 not submitted not submitted 0 0
iii. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above which is in international shipment prior to its arrival in the recipient State. 0 0 0(c) 0 0 not submitted not submitted 0 0
Notes and Comments
(a) All quantities in tonnes. The term not submitted is used here to indicate that a declaration was left blank; recorded as a – or as not communicated; or otherwise not reported to the IAEA.
(b) In annex C, declarations of the amount of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel, Switzerland declared that it had 6 tonnes of plutonium contained in spent fuel sent for reprocessing and held in locations in other countries. Switzerland reported that this plutonium may be in the form of spent fuel or in any of the separated forms listed in this table.
(c) Belgium reported a – in 1996. This was changed to a 0 in 1997.

Table 1 above lists the declarations for plutonium holdings in 1996. As can be seen, most submissions are relatively complete. However, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Russia did not provide information about their holdings of foreign-owned plutonium or the amounts of their plutonium held overseas. Although holdings of plutonium contained in spent fuel are not included in table 1, Germany did not provide information about the amount of plutonium in its spent fuel. Table 2 below lists declared holdings at the end of 1997. Russia and China had not declared their holdings for this date, as of late 1999. In addition, the United States did not do so until mid-September 1999. Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland again omitted information on holdings of foreign-owned plutonium and the amounts held in other countries.

TABLE 2: Civil Unirradiated Plutonium 1997(a)

–BritainFranceBelgiumGermanyJapanSwitz.(b)RussiaU.S.China
Was INFCIRC/549 declaration for 1996 submitted to the IAEA as of September 17, 1999? Yes Yes Yes Yes No(c) Yes No Yes No
INFCIRC/549, Annex B – – – – – – – – –
1. Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants. 57.4 48.4 0 0 5 not submitted – 0 –
2. Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manufacture or fabrication and plutonium contained in unirradiated semi-fabricated or unfinished products at fuel or other fabricating plants or elsewhere. 0.5 12.2 2.8 0.3 3.3 not submitted – <0.05 –
3. Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere. 2.2 6.3 0 3.9 0.8 0.6 – 4.6 –
4. Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere. 0 5.4 negligible 1.8 0.4 0.1 – 40.5 –
Note: – – – – – – – – –
i. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above belonging to foreign bodies. 6.1 33.6 not submitted not submitted 0 <0.05 – 0 –
ii. Plutonium in any of the forms in lines 1-4 above held in locations in other countries, therefore not included above. 0.9 <0.05 0.8 not submitted 19.1 0 – 0 –
iii. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above which is in international shipment prior to its arrival in the State. 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 0 –
Notes and Comments
(a) All quantities in tonnes. The term not submitted is used here to indicate that a declaration was left blank; recorded as a – or as not communicated; or otherwise not reported to the IAEA.
(b) In Annex C, declarations of the amount of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel, Switzerland declared that it had 5 tonnes of plutonium contained in spent fuel sent for reprocessing and held in locations in other countries. Switzerland reported that this plutonium may be in the form of spent fuel or in any of the separated forms listed in this table.
(c) (1) and (ii) were declared in the 1998 White Paper on Nuclear Energy, published by the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, August 31, 1998. All categories were declared in Japans INFCIRC/549 declaration of December 31, 1998.

The situation for 1998 improved in the sense that the IAEA received all the declarations by the end of 1999. However, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland continued to submit incomplete declarations. Table 3 below shows the situation as of January 2000.

TABLE 3: Civil Unirradiated Plutonium 1998(a)

–BritainFranceBelgiumGermany(b)JapanSwitz.(c)RussiaU.S.China
Was INFCIRC/549 declaration for 1996 submitted to the IAEA as of December 31, 1999? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
INFCIRC/549, Annex B – – – – – – – – –
1. Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants. 66.1 52.0 0 0 0.5 not submitted 29.2 0 0
2. Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manufacture or fabrication and plutonium contained in unirradiated semi-fabricated or unfinished products at fuel or other fabricating plants or elsewhere. 0.8 11.8 2.8 0.4 3.2 not submitted not submitted <0.05 0
3. Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere. 2.2 6.8 1.0 4.8 0.8 not submitted 0.2 4.6 0
4. Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere. 0 5.3 negligible 1.3 0.4 <0.05 0.9 40.4 0
Note: – – – – – – – – –
i. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above belonging to foreign bodies. 10.2 35.6 not submitted not submitted 0 <0.05 not submitted 0 0
ii. Plutonium in any of the forms in lines 1-4 above held in locations in other countries, therefore not included above. 0.9 <0.05 1.0 not submitted 24.4 not submitted not submitted 0 0
iii. Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above which is in international shipment prior to its arrival in the State. 0 0 0 0 0 not submitted not submitted 0 0
Notes and Comments
(a) All quantitites in tonnes. The term not submitted is used here to indicate that a declaration was left blank; recorded as a – or as not communicated; or otherwise not reported to the IAEA.
(b) Germany declared a total of 6.6 tonnes of unirradiated plutonium in Germany, and said that the 0.1 tonne difference from the total obrtained by adding lines 2, 3, and 4 is due to rounding.
(c) In Annex C, declarations of the amount of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel, Switzerland declared that it had 5 tonnes of plutonium contained in spent fuel sent for reprocessing and held in locations in other countries. Switzerland reported that this plutonium may be in the form of spent fuel or in any of the separated forms listed in this table.

Overall, Britain has been the most prompt and thorough in fulfilling its obligations under INFCIRC/549.3 In addition, for 1997 and 1998, Britain also submitted its civil HEU holdings.

The U.S. declaration for 1996 (with appendices) is quite detailed, including considerable information about the amount of plutonium that the United States has declared excess to defense uses and the quantity of plutonium it has produced or acquired for defense purposes. Although largely not subject to IAEA safeguards, this plutonium is nonetheless declared. The U.S. declaration, however, does not explain the origin of the declared plutonium. ISIS estimates that, based on Department of Energy information, about 4-5 tonnes of the 45 tonnes declared in the 1996 declaration were produced originally in civil power reactors in the United States and Britain. The rest was produced in U.S. government-owned reactors, and almost all of this quantity was produced in production reactors at the Savannah River Site and the Hanford Reservation. Thus, the U.S. declaration does not distinguish between the quantity of separated plutonium that originates from government-owned military reactors and the amount from civil power reactors. Not all nuclear weapon states appear willing to declare excess stocks of military plutonium at this time. The Russian Federation and China indicated in their submissions under INFCIRC/549 that they will include excess military plutonium in their declarations only after this material has been transferred to peaceful uses. A few countries are noticeably absent from INFCIRC/549. India has a program to separate plutonium from civil spent fuel for use as MOX fuel in thermal reactors or breeder reactors. In Europe, Netherlands, Sweden, and perhaps Italy also possess separated plutonium. The Swedish government is considering using its separated plutonium as MOX fuel in its light-water reactors. Netherlands is debating what to do with its separated plutonium, although it may not have any reactors able to use MOX fuel after about 2003. In the declarations, the quantities of separated or unirradiated plutonium are rounded to 100 kilograms and the amounts of plutonium in spent fuel are rounded to 1,000 kilograms. However, values for separated and unirradiated material, particularly of recently separated plutonium, should be accurate to well within a hundred kilograms. One issue affecting the accuracy of the plutonium values is whether the decay of plutonium 241 to americium 241 is factored into the inventory declarations. Plutonium 241, which is an isotope that comprises roughly 10 percent of civil plutonium, has a half-life of 13.2 years. Therefore, it relatively quickly decays to americium 241, reducing the total quantity of plutonium. If not taken into account, plutonium 241 decay would affect the size of older inventories of separated plutonium, such as those in Britain, Russia, and the United States. In addition, the declarations do not specify whether estimates of plutonium in spent fuel account for plutonium 241 decay.

Conclusion

A major problem with the INFCIRC/549 transparency effort is that many countries have not been submitting their declarations in a timely manner. Equally important is the need for countries to submit complete declarations. In 1998, the IAEA was slow to make the declarations publicly available. Britain releases its declaration publicly when it submits its holdings to the IAEA. Other countries should consider this policy. How to declare excess military plutonium under INFCIRC/549 needs clarification. Declaring civil-origin and military-origin plutonium as one quantity can make cross-country comparisons difficult, potentially confusing discussions of management policies for the separation and use of civil plutonium.

The Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium encourages the exchange of information with countries that are willing to implement similar guidelines. Such a step should be taken as soon as possible with Netherlands, Sweden, and perhaps Italy. The first two face contentious internal debates about MOX use. A discussion with India about the guidelines also appears appropriate. The guidelines include a provision for review in “not less than five years” after their publication by the IAEA, or not sooner than 2003. However, some of the challenges facing this important transparency regime should be addressed well before then.

Notes

1 For a first hand summary of the origins of the guidelines, see the remarks of Jim Finucane, “Civil Separated Plutonium Stocks: Planning for the Future,” conference sponsored by the Institute for Science and International Security, March 14, 2000. Back

2 Facets of proper plutonium management are already covered by several international agreements. INFCIRC/549 reconfirms those pledges and develops guidelines for international transfers of plutonium more fully. A country’s commitments to nonproliferation is described in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and INFCIRC/153, while INFCIRC/225 Rev. 3 describes appropriate physical protection of plutonium. Back

3 Although in no way diminishing the UK’s performance under INFCIRC/549, several independent experts and UK non-governmental organizations have noted that British declarations are actually less detailed under INFCIRC/549 than the declarations Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) used to make public. The DTI’s former declarations divided the UK’s civilian plutonium into four different categories. The first section inventoried the plutonium in spent fuel discharged at each British reactor and shipped from these sites. The second section included stocks of plutonium held by BNFL under safeguards, receipts of irradiated spent fuel from overseas, and the spent fuel feed for Sellafield and Thorp reprocessing plants. The third section reported the plutonium the UK Atomic Energy Authority owned or possessed-plutonium for fast reactor programs and under international safeguards. The fourth section reported the imports and the exports of safeguarded separated plutonium and plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuels. Back

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