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ISIS’s initial findings from the Iran safeguards report

by David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, Andrea Stricker, Paulina Izewicz, and Daniel Schnur

February 19, 2015

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released today its most recent quarterly safeguards report on Iran. ISIS will release a full technical analysis of the report later today, however below are several first-look takeaways.

ISIS’s initial observations include:

1) Iran’s average daily production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has decreased.

2) Iran has not managed to produce 3.5 percent LEU oxide from 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride fed into the Enriched U02 Powder Plant (EUPP). It has fed 2,750 kilograms of such LEU hexafluoride into the process lines but the output remains in intermediate forms of enriched uranium. The reason for not being able to make LEU oxide, as expected, is unknown.

3) Iran has increased the rate of feeding of natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into its advanced centrifuges at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP). The feeding rate is significantly greater than the previous three reporting periods and more than double the rate of the last reporting period. In the advanced centrifuges, after enrichment and the measurement of the enrichment level of the product, the product is remixed with the tails or waste, producing natural uranium.

4) The IR-5 centrifuge located at the PFEP has been disconnected and is unable to enrich uranium without reconnecting the pipework. This disconnection reflects Iran addressing concerns about its enrichment in the centrifuge in the last reporting period. The disconnection provides additional confidence that Iran is abiding by its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action.

5) No progress has been achieved in this reporting period on resolving the IAEA’s concerns on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. In particular, Iran has not proposed any new practical measures to resolve this issue in a fourth step under the IAEA/Iran Framework for Cooperation. It has also not addressed the last two measures in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation that had been agreed upon in May 2014.

6) Suspicious activities continue at the Parchin military site.

The latest IAEA Iran safeguards report for February 19, 2015 is available here.