Reports
Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report — November 2024
by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
November 21, 2024
Download PDFBackground
● This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) quarterly report, dated November 19, 2024, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This report also includes some of the highlights from the IAEA’s parallel report, Iran NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Findings
● Iran can produce more weapon-grade uranium (WGU) since the IAEA’s last report in August due to increased stocks of enriched uranium and an enlarged advanced centrifuge capacity.
● Iran’s stocks of enriched uranium and its centrifuge capacity combined are sufficient to make enough WGU, taken as 25 kilograms (kg) of WGU per weapon, for almost ten nuclear weapons in one month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.
● With Iran’s growing enrichment experience and using only a portion of its stock of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) and only four advanced centrifuge cascades, Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in one week or less. This breakout could be difficult for the IAEA to detect promptly, if Iran delayed inspectors’ access.
● With careful planning in advance and placement of all the stocks of 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), it could produce enough WGU for four nuclear weapons in about two weeks and enough for six in a month.1 By the end of the second month, it could make enough WGU for nine nuclear weapons. If Iran used only less than five percent enriched uranium as feed, it would need about 1.5 months to make enough WGU for a nuclear weapon. If it used only natural uranium, it would need about five and a half months to produce enough WGU for a single weapon. The installation of more IR-6 centrifuge cascades at Fordow, as planned, would worsen the situation.
● The IAEA pointedly admonishes Iran, stating: “The production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear weapon State to do so, adds to the Agency’s concerns.”
● As of November 16, Iran put in “preparatory measures aimed at stopping the increase of its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235”, per Director General Rafael Grossi’s request. The specific wording implies that the change would be easily reversible, and a cap would not affect recent breakout timelines nor prevent them shortening in the future due to expected continued production of near 20 percent enriched uranium and additional deployment of advanced centrifuges. While stopping is always appreciated, this act does not warrant any rewards, such as holding back on a Board of Governors resolution that addresses Iran’s safeguards violations.
● The IAEA’s efforts to verify Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran’s decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors. After repeated calls by the IAEA that Iran reconsider this inappropriate, political act, including in a June 2024 Board of Governors censure resolution, Iran offered to consider the acceptance of four new experienced inspectors, although they cannot be any of the experienced inspectors de-designated previously.
● As of October 26, 2024, the net overall enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment and all chemical forms, had increased by 852.6 kg, from 5751.8 to 6604.4 kg (Uranium mass or U mass).
● As of October 26, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 182.3 kg (as measured in U mass) or 269.7 kg (hex mass). This represents a net increase in the stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 17.6 kg (U mass) since the previous reporting period.
● With total production of 60 percent enriched uranium at 17.6 kg (U mass) during this reporting period, the average production rate of 60 percent HEU was about 7.6 kg (U mass) per month, or 0.255 kg (U mass) per day, less than the average rate during the previous reporting period but still higher than the monthly average rates deduced from the February and May 2024 reports earlier this year. At this rate, Iran can produce about 93 kg of 60 percent HEU (U mass) annually.
● Iran continued to produce 60 percent HEU from 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) feed in two pairs of interconnected advanced centrifuge cascades at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and at the below-ground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). The FFEP pair includes two IR-6 centrifuge cascades, one of which is easily modifiable to change operations and enrich uranium to higher levels.
● As of October 26, Iran had an IAEA-estimated stock of 839.2 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium (U mass and in the form of UF6), equivalent to 1241.4 kg (hex mass), representing an increase of 25.3 kg (U mass). Iran also had a stock of 27.2 kg (U mass) of 20 percent enriched uranium in other chemical forms.
● The average production rate of 20 percent enriched uranium at the FFEP was 16.3 kg (hex mass) per month or 11 kg (U mass) per month, lower than the previous reporting period.
● Iran now has nearly 11,700 advanced centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow, where most are deployed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).
● Including the installed IR-1 centrifuges at the FEP, PFEP, and FFEP brings the total number of installed centrifuges to about 19,000. It should be noted that many advanced centrifuges are deployed but not enriching uranium, and the IR-1 centrifuges have a reduced ability to enrich uranium.
● During the reporting period, Iran installed six new IR-2m cascades at Natanz, for a total of 37 IR-2m cascades, 15 of which are currently operating. Iran plans to install a total of 39 IR-2m cascades at Natanz.
● The quantity of Iran’s enriching centrifuges remained roughly the same during this reporting period, at around 13,750 centrifuges.
● Iran has a total installed enrichment capacity of roughly 52,900 SWU/year. Its enriching centrifuge capacity is less, about 31,400 SWU/year.
● Iran’s stockpile of near 5 percent LEU in the form of UF6 increased by 273.3 kg (U mass) from 2321.5 to 2594.8 kg (U mass), or 3838.5 kg (hex mass).
● Iran has not prioritized stockpiling uranium enriched between 2 to 5 percent. This choice is at odds with Iran’s contention that its primary goal is to accumulate 4 to 5 percent enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactor fuel. Instead, Iran has used this stock extensively to produce near 20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium, far beyond Iran’s civilian needs.
● The IAEA again reports that Iran will not start commissioning of the Arak reactor, now called the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), or IR-20, until at least 2025, with operation expected to start in 2026. On October 23, 2024, inspectors did not observe any significant changes at the reactor compared to the situation in the last reporting period. The only new development is that the IAEA has asked Iran to provide an update of the reactor’s design information questionnaire.
● Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) to its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the JCPOA’s additional monitoring arrangements on February 23, 2021. Iran’s actions and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA across a wide range of monitoring issues causes the IAEA to consistently express doubt about understanding key aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Without the AP in place, the IAEA has neither been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran nor received updated declarations from Iran.
● The IAEA reports that it has “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate], which it will not be possible to restore.”
● The IAEA concludes that “Iran’s decision to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring activities has also had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”
● Although the IAEA can ascertain the number of centrifuges deployed at Fordow and Natanz, it cannot know how many more Iran has made and stored or deployed at an undeclared site. A risk is that Iran will accumulate a secret stock of advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a clandestine enrichment plant, which would only need to house a few advanced centrifuge cascades to enrich Iran’s current stock of 60 percent HEU to WGU. At the least, this situation complicates any future verification effort and contributes to uncertainty about the status of Iran’s nuclear activities and facilities.
● Iran is still not implementing modified Code 3.1, despite it being a legal obligation for Iran and the Board having called for Iran to do so in its resolutions.
● The IAEA in its latest assessment on Iran’s compliance with NPT safeguards notes that “outstanding safeguards issues” pertaining to the agency’s multi-year investigation of Iran’s possible nuclear weapons work remain unresolved.
● As in several past Iran NPT safeguards reports, the IAEA has not changed its assessment regarding the presence of undeclared nuclear material and/or activities at four sites – Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, Marivan, and Turquz-Abad. The IAEA concluded that Iran’s nuclear declaration is incomplete, in essence stating that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. The IAEA is still seeking clarifications from Iran in relation to two undeclared locations – Varamin and Turquz-Abad.
● The IAEA continued to conclude that its verification results at the uranium conversion facility demonstrated that uranium involved in former uranium metal production experiments remains unaccounted for and cannot be explained by accountancy measurement errors. No progress was made this fall on resolving this issue, although the IAEA stated its technical assessment of the discrepancy remained unchanged.
● Combined with Iran’s refusal to resolve outstanding safeguards violations and the program’s unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions, the IAEA has a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran’s complex and growing nuclear program. The IAEA’s ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished.
Read the full report as pdf here.
1. After adjusting for greater enriched uranium stocks, this calculation uses the same methodology as in “Technical Note: Iran’s Recent Increase in Enrichment Capacity at the Fordow Enrichment Plant,” by David Albright, June 19, 2024, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/technical-note-irans-recent-increase-in-enrichment-capacity-at-fordow/8. ↩
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