Conferences, Videos & Testimony
Ending the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons: Background Information and Key Questions
by David Albright, Lauren Barbour, Corey Gay, Todd Lowery
January 25, 1999
Prepared for the Fissile Material Information Workshop Co-sponsored by the Institute for Science and International Security and the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva 25-26 January 1999, Geneva, Switzerland Table of Contents Introduction Acknowledgments About the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Key Terms I. Key Nuclear Explosive Materials What Are Isotopes? Fissionable Isotopes Uranium 235 Uranium 233 Plutonium isotopes Neptunium 237 Americium Other isotopes Tritium II. Production of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Plutonium Production Irradiation of Reactor Fuel Spent Fuel Reprocessing HEU Production Table II.1: Plutonium half-lives, and weapon-grade and reactor-grade isotopic concentrations at given fuel discharges Appendix Reactors for Electricity Generation III. Nuclear Fuel Cycles Civil Nuclear Fuel Cycles Front end of the Fuel Cycle Back end of the Fuel Cycle Military Plutonium Nuclear Fuel Cycles Figure III.1: "Once-Through" Fuel Cycle for Low-Enriched Uranium Reactors Figure III.2: "Closed" Fuel Cycle Figure III.3: N Reactor Nuclear Fuel Cycle Appendix Figure III.A.1: Savannah River Production Reactor Fuel Cycle IV. Scope of the Treaty Basic Obligations and Definitions Definition of Fissile Material Definition of Production of Fissile Material Civil Activities Military Activities Selected Existing Proposals U.S. Proposal Australian Proposal Pakistani Proposal Egyptian Proposal V. Treaty Verification Goals and Options Key Verification Questions to be Resolved in Negotiations Materials Subject to Verification Facilities Subject to Verification Implementation and Termination of Verification Measures Definition of a Violation Declarations or Transparency Measures Types of Inspections National Technical Means Transfers of Stocks to Other States Non-proscribed Military Activities Verification Agency Existing Verification Systems Existing Civil Nuclear Inspection Regimes National Technical Means Non-routine Inspections VI. World Inventories of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Table VI.1: Estimated Global Fissile Material Inventories, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Table VI.2: Production and Status of Military Stocks of Fissile Material, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Table VI.3: Unirradiated Civil Plutonium, 1996 declarations in tonnes Table VI.4: Fissile Material Declared Excess as of July 1997, in tonnes Table VI.5: U.S., Russian Military Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium, in tonnes Figure VI.6: World-Wide Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium Estimates, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Figure VI.7: World-Wide Inventory of Plutonium, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Figure VI.8: Unirradiated Civil Plutonium Holdings in Country, 1996 declaration in tonnes Figure VI.9: Military Stocks of Plutonium in Nuclear Weapon States, De Facto Nuclear Weapon States, and North Korea, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Figure VI.10: World-Wide Inventory of Weapon-Grade Uranium Equivalent, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes Figure VI.11: Weapon-Grade Uranium Equivalent in Nuclear Weapon States and De Facto Nuclear Weapon States, end of 1997 central estimates in tonnes VII. Reducing Stockpiles of Military Fissile Material Providing More Information Reducing Military Fissile Material Stocks Declaring and Placing Excess Materials Under International Verification Disposition of Excess Fissile Material
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