This Week’s RevCon Update: G10 Position Papers
April 16, 2010
ISIS has obtained copies of seven position papers by the Vienna Group of Ten (G10), which have been submitted as recommendations for adoption at the NPT Review Conference. (The Group of 10 include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden). The position papers, summarized below, cover several issues and offer draft language for possible inclusion in a final conference document. For the interested reader, the working paper sections of these documents go much further in laying out what the G10 ultimately hope to achieve in review conference commitments.
• Nuclear Safety: “A demonstrated global record of safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle is a key element for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and…continuous efforts are needed to ensure that all elements of safety culture are maintained at the optimal level.”
States should:
- join the Nuclear Safety Convention if they are commissioning, constructing, or planning nuclear power reactors or considering nuclear power programs;
- apply IAEA safety standards to improve nuclear infrastructures and the protection of nuclear materials in transit; and
- join conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and
- progress efforts to develop and implement disposal and long-term storage solutions for spent fuel and high level radioactive waste.
• Physical Protection and Illicit Trafficking: “…Physical protection and measures to combat illicit trafficking are parts of a national system of nuclear security, the existence of which should be made a precondition for transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology.”
States should:
- apply IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities;
- support the IAEA’s development of the Nuclear Security Series and the role of the IAEA in efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework;
- adopt an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and become party to the convention if they have not done so;
- minimize use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications;
- improve national capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this effort; and
- ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
• Export Controls: “All States Party have [a responsibility] and [are urged] to ensure that their nuclear-related exports to non-nuclear-weapon States do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The Conference should underline:
- export controls are legitimate means of implementing States’ Party obligations under Article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, unsafeguarded fuel cycle activity, or nuclear terrorism
- export controls are central to peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and non-proliferation;
- UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1673, and 1810 require all states to establish national controls and laws over exports, re-exports, transit, and transshipment to prevent proliferation;
- the importance of adopting the Understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with nuclear cooperation;
- the useful role of Nuclear Suppliers Group guidance in setting up national export control policies;
- the need for timely update and review of the IAEA list of items triggering safeguards;
- the need for transparency in export controls;
- paragraph 12 of decision 2 (“Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that supply of fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon states should require as a precondition the application of full scope IAEA safeguards and commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices; and
- a decision that new supply arrangements for the transfer of fissionable material or equipment designed or prepared for processing, use, or production of fissionable material should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of an additional protocol.
• Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: “…Fuel assurance mechanisms can act to support the Treaty’s objectives of facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and addressing global nuclear non-proliferation.”
The Conference affirms:
- fuel assurances can give countries that have chosen to develop or expand nuclear power programs a cost-effective and viable alternative to developing nuclear fuel cycle capabilities of their own, without affecting their rights under the Treaty;
- any assurance mechanism must function under IAEA safeguards and safety standards and be transparent, independent, inclusive, and applied using defined criteria, should not distort the existing market; and
- should address real needs, allowing for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety, security, and non-proliferation conditions;
- reliance on any such mechanism should be voluntary, should not act as an enforced restriction of States’ activities related to the fuel cycle, should operate to clear, apolitical and objective criteria as approved through the IAEA Board of Governors, and should support the rights and obligations of States under the Treaty; and
- states should continue to work on developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
• Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: “[The NPT] fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence that is a precondition for those uses. By aiming to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to nuclear proliferation, the Treaty creates the necessary basis for technological transfer and co-operation.
The Conference should reaffirm:
- the right of States Party to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination;
- benefits can be obtained from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques in the fields referred to in articles II and III in the Statute of the IAEA;
- adherence to, and compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty are the essential basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation and commerce, and implementation of IAEA safeguards makes a vital contribution to the environment for the development of and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
- the essential role of the IAEA in assisting developing States Party in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and recommends that IAEA continue, through its Technical Cooperation Program, to take into account the needs of developing countries, including least developed countries, when planning its future activities.
• Compliance and Verification: “The Treaty [makes an important contribution] to global security and [has] undoubted effectiveness in preventing nuclear proliferation.”
The conference calls for:
- states to submit all relevant nuclear material and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards;
- recognition that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with its safeguards agreements;
- reaffirmation of the importance of acceptance of a safeguards agreement with an Additional Protocol, so that the IAEA can provide credible assurance regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities;
- urging all States Party which have not yet done so conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible;
- welcoming efforts by the IAEA to implement a plan of action to encourage wider adherence to the safeguards system;
- full cooperation with the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies and questions identified by the IAEA to inform annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations;
- welcoming the development of IAEA State-level safeguards implementation and evaluation approaches;
- underscoring the mandate of the UN Security Council to ensure and uphold compliance with the Treaty, and to take appropriate measures in cases of non-compliance; and
- noting the need of the IAEA to receive early design information in order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, and stressing the need for non-nuclear weapon States Party to provide this information on a timely basis.
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: “The Conference reaffirms the essential role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) within the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and therefore its vital relevance to the NPT…[it] was an integral part of the indefinite extension of the NPT.”
The conference calls for:
- the CTBT’s early entry into force is of utmost urgency and importance and reiterates the agreement from the 2000 NPT Review Conference where CTBT’s early entry into force was identified as the first of thirteen practical nuclear disarmament steps;
- concern that thirteen years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT has still not entered into force, and call upon all States, particularly the remaining nine Annex 2 states to sign and/or ratify the treaty, recalling Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) calling on all States to sign and ratify the Treaty;
- welcoming the high-level political support for the CTBT Article XIV (entry into force) Conference held in September 2009 and its adoption of ten specific and practical measures to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT;
- all states to refrain from any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending its entry into force, such as the development of new types of nuclear weapons or their qualitative improvement;
- existing moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions to be maintained and stresses, however, that such moratoria cannot serve as a substitute for ratifying the CTBT; and
- all Parties to support the progress of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the system which will enable the verification of compliance with the CTBT.
Recent News
“Nuclear Progress, but Dangers Ahead,” The Guardian, April 14, 2010.
“Official Views Tehran’s Confab as Good Ground for NPT Review,” Fars News Agency, April 14, 2010.
“Biden Courts the Non-Aligned on Nukes,” Politico, April 12, 2010.
“Malaysia and the Bomb,” ArmsControlWonk.com, April 12, 2010.
“Some Still Doubt Nuclear Terror Threat, Former U.S. Envoy Says,” Global Security Newswire, April 9, 2010.
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