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ISIS Analysis of Main Committee Draft Reports

May 21, 2010

Last Friday, the Main Committees reviewing and debating member state commitments under the articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) released their chairs’ draft reports.  These reports reflect a collection of statements and proposals put together without any effort to achieve consensus.  The hard work on attempting to come to consensus on the language to produce final committee reports to the conference has been taking place during this third week of the review conference.  Governments are debating the language and making compromises and concessions where possible, but there is no guarantee that consensus will result.  It is also important to note that if final consensus documents are achieved, positions are not likely to become stronger than those outlined in these draft reports. 

Prior to the start of the Review Conference, ISIS released its suggested language for a final document covering four key issues:

  • the importance of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty,
  • a strengthened safeguards and compliance system,
  • acknowledging the role that illicit trade plays in nuclear proliferation while improving existing means to detect and prevent such trade, and
  • the need to prevent summary withdrawal from the Treaty under Article X, in particular in cases where a state has recently been found in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards or NPT obligations.

ISIS chose to focus largely on nonproliferation issues during this review conference due to what it viewed as adequate focus by other groups on the disarmament and peaceful use pillars, and a need for global attention on nonproliferation.  The language advocated by ISIS vis-à-vis the above four priorities reflects a higher standard than what appears in the draft reports.  The following analysis is not a criticism of the committee draft reports, but rather an effort to take stock and show where many states were willing to compromise on nonproliferation language.  For comparison, ISIS’s original goals for nonproliferation language are included below with assessments of the language in the draft reports:

 

Main Committee I report:  (with updated Action Plan in Subsidiary Body I report) Main Committee I covers disarmament, with a subsidiary body devoted to practical ways to achieve disarmament and security assurances.

    Language on fissile material security:
  • The draft report appropriately emphasizes the importance of an Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and of starting negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a verifiable FMCT.
  • The report’s suggestion that the UN General Assembly address the matter of the FMCT if the CD cannot agree on a program of work and begin negotiations before the close of the 2011 session is sensible, since the UN General Assembly could determine the best course without relying on consensus.
  • The report’s statement that nuclear weapon states should consider declaring or uphold moratoria on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pending entry into force of an FMCT is a positive step.
  • Language is appropriate that the nuclear weapon states should declare to the IAEA all fissile material no longer needed for military purposes, and place the material under IAEA or other verification arrangement pending irreversible disposition for use in peaceful purposes.
    • Original Goal:  Language on the need for states to declare the status and location of facilities involved in highly enriched uranium (HEU) production and plutonium separation.

 

Main Committee II report:  Main Committee II covers safeguards, regional issues, and nuclear weapon free zones, with a subsidiary body devoted to regional issues and discussion of the 1995 resolution on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons.

    Language on implementation of the Additional Protocol:
  • The report correctly notes that the Additional Protocol is now in force in the majority of states (101 states), including the five nuclear weapon states.
  • The language on the Additional Protocol as a “routine” and “integral” part of the IAEA’s safeguards system, representing the “verification standard” that best fulfils the objectives of Article III is positive.
  • The report positively notes that the Additional Protocol beings security benefits and builds confidence.
  • The draft report “encourages” all states to conclude an additional protocol as soon as possible.
  • Original Goal: Language on making universal ratification of the Additional Protocol a goal which states would attempt to achieve before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
  • The report’s language reaffirms that the Additional Protocol’s safeguards strengthening measures provide the IAEA with enhanced information about states’ nuclear activities and access to locations related to nuclear activities, and increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
    • Original Goal: Language strongly stating that without the Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA cannot carry out its mandate to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.
    Original Goal: Language stipulating that the Additional Protocol is a mechanism underpinning the NPT which helps the IAEA carry out its mandate to promote and encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
  • The report encourages supplier states to consider in their nuclear export decisions whether a recipient state has brought into force an additional protocol.
    • Original Goal:  Language stating that in order to promote the broadest possible adherence to the Additional Protocol and the highest nonproliferation standards, states support calls to make adherence to the Protocol a condition of supply of nuclear supply.
    Language on illicit nuclear trade:
  • The draft report acknowledges the important role of national and international export control frameworks, the central role of transparent controls in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and how export controls create a climate of confidence about nonproliferation.
    • Original Goal: Language about a goal to pursue a future universal system of export controls.
    Original Goal: Language specifically underlining the legitimacy, necessity, and desirability of export controls in preventing acts of nuclear terrorism.
  • The report positively calls upon states to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not assist in the development of nuclear weapons in conformity with their Articles I, II and III obligations.
  • The report acknowledges the important role of guidance by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in helping to set up national export control systems.
    • Original Goal: Language referring to United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 and 1887 which call on states to secure sensitive materials and to standardize controls over and control access to intangible transfers of nuclear weapons-related technology, know-how, and information.
  • The report’s language calls on states to improve their capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories.
    • Original Goal:  Language discussing illicit nuclear trade in dual-use goods nuclear know-how, and intangible transfers.
    Original Goal: Language noting that states agree to institute all appropriate national measures to prevent proliferation shipments and use of their countries for transshipment or diversion, and to prevent the exploitation of their territories by entities and individuals engaged in illicit nuclear trade.
    Original Goal: Language recognizing the problem of transshipment and diversion in countries without export controls or with weak export controls, and noting that it may be necessary for states to impose additional trade controls on sensitive exports heading to countries of diversion concern.
    Original Goal: Language noting that states agree, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions 1540 and 1887, to prevent proliferation financing by implementing modern financial controls and reporting requirements on banks, and for states with an ability to do so to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard.
  • The report’s language calls on states parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building.
    • Original Goal: Language calling on all states to work to address obstacles to bilateral or multilateral cooperation on investigating and prosecuting traffickers.
  • The report’s language supports the IAEA’s work on combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
    • Original Goal:  Language supporting the IAEA’s work in combating illicit nuclear trade in dual-use goods, nuclear know-how, and intangible transfers.
    Original Goal:  Language about the need for governments to share information about illicit nuclear trade with the IAEA.
    Original Goal: Language recognizing the need for the IAEA to establish relationships directly with companies of countries targeted by illicit trafficking schemes, and to work to further such relationships.
    Original Goal:  Language noting that fulfillment of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol in all countries will allow the IAEA to better investigate potential instances of illicit nuclear procurement.

 

Main Committee III report:  Main Committee III covers peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear security and safety, and institutional issues, with a subsidiary body devoted to institutional issues and responses to withdrawal from the Treaty.

    Language on responding to withdrawal from the Treaty:
  • The draft report calls positively for a written statement three months in advance of withdrawal, specifying extraordinary circumstances that have led a state to withdraw from the Treaty.
  • Language calling on states to collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal in the form of consultations that address legitimate security concerns, utilize regional diplomatic initiatives, and involve the UN Security Council in reviewing notification is positive.
  • The report reaffirms that a withdrawing party would still be liable for breaches of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal, and that nuclear equipment, material, and technology acquired for peaceful purposes prior to withdrawal would remain subject to IAEA safeguards following withdrawal, and rightly calls upon the IAEA Board of Governors to authorize the IAEA to verify compliance of a withdrawing state under its safeguards obligations.
    • Original Goal: Language calling upon states to amend existing comprehensive safeguards agreements or to sign an amending protocol to existing comprehensive safeguards agreements to reflect the perpetuity of safeguards should they decide to withdraw from the NPT.
  • The report calls on nuclear supplier states to consider including clauses for dismantlement or return of supplies in the event of withdrawal.
    • Original Goal: Language covering return clauses on materials or Nuclear Suppliers Group trigger list items produced from, or with the help of, materials, equipment, facilities or technologies originally transferred.
    Original Goal: Language including the right to return for any special nuclear material produced through the use of supplied materials or equipment.

 

Review Conference News Round-Up

Week 3

“No Dates on Disarmament in 2nd Draft Agreement at NPT Conference,” Xinhua, May 20, 2010.

“U.S. Nuclear Talks Risk Collapse Over Middle East Plan,” The Guardian, May 19, 2010.

“Official Says Anti-Nuke Confab ‘Unprecedented’,” Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp., May 19, 2010.

“White House Pushes for Initial Steps Toward Mideast WMD-Free Zone,” Global Security Newswire, May 18, 2010.

“Controversy Will Test NPT Conference,” Lebanon Daily Star, May 17, 2010.

“Half Time at the NPT,” The Guardian, May 16, 2010.

“At UN, Deadline Aired for Abolishing Nuke Weapons,” Associated Press, May 15, 2010.

Week 2

“3 NPT Panels to Present Conference Chairman with Drafts Friday,” Kyodo News, May 13, 2010.

“What Nonnuclear Weapon States Want: Six Key Issues,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2010.

“China Seen Taking Limited Anti-Nuclear Role,” Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2010.

“United States at the NPT: How Far Will the Good Guy Go?” openDemocracy, May 11, 2010.

“France Urges Balance Between Peaceful Nuclear Purposes and Non-Proliferation Efforts,” Xinhua, May 11, 2010.

“‘How Long a Wait?’ Ban Asks About Nuke Test Treaty,” Associated Press, May 8, 2010.

“U.S. Nuke Agenda May Bring Success at Treaty Session,” Associated Press, May 8, 2010.

“Post-Soviet Security Bloc Urges Further Disarmament Efforts,” RIA Novosti, May 8, 2010.

“Fixing the Treaty,” New York Times, May 8, 2010.

See all NPT news >

 

 

 

 

 

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