

Verifiable, Irreversible,
Cooperative Dismantlement
of the DPRK's Nuclear
Weapons Program:
Basic tasks and concepts

David Albright, ISIS

January 13, 2004

Priorities for Dismantling?

- Plutonium program, including any plutonium stocks and associated facilities.
- Nuclear weaponization program, including any nuclear weapons and associated facilities.
- Any uranium enrichment programs, including any enriched uranium and associated facilities.

Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement of DPRK's Nuclear Program

- Dismantling DPRK's nuclear program involves several tasks.
- This presentation discusses four key tasks.
- Despite being interrelated, these tasks can be accomplished in parallel or in any order.
- Negotiations will need to determine the exact tasks and their order of implementation.

Task I: Plutonium

- This task includes plutonium production, separation, storage, waste activities and facilities.
- It aims to verifiably, irreversibly halt plutonium production and separation activities.
- The verification organization will need to verify DPRK statements about its plutonium.
- The United States wants DPRK to allow for the removal of plutonium and irradiated fuel.
- This task will also involve dismantling key sites and long-term monitoring.

Task II: Uranium Enrichment

- This task focuses on the dismantlement of any uranium enrichment activities and the facilities to research, develop, test, and make centrifuges.
- It would involve the irreversible verified dismantlement of uranium enrichment programs, the conversion of certain activities, and the on-going, long-term monitoring of non-banned, continuing activities.

Task III: Nuclear Weaponization

- This task focuses on any nuclear weapons and the means to research, develop, test, and manufacture them.
- It involves the verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons.
- It also irreversibly, verifiably dismantles the set of facilities involved in researching, developing, testing, and manufacturing nuclear weapons.
- It involves the conversion of certain activities and on-going monitoring of non-banned activities.

Tasks IV: Safeguards Agreement

- This task involves the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and the advanced safeguards protocol.

Who Verifies Dismantlement?

- The verification organization will need to be determined through negotiations. Different models for the verification organization may be needed to accomplish different tasks.

Models for the Verification Organization

- There are many candidates for the verification organization, including:
 - A specific organization created by the United States and other acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS)
 - “IAEA Plus.” It would involve the IAEA safeguards department supplemented by assistance from key member states. Variants of this model have been used in South Africa, Iran and Libya.
 - A bilateral or regional inspection agency.

Models (cont.)

- The acknowledged nuclear weapon states (P5), may have a special role in verifying the dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and associated production complex.
- The IAEA is responsible for verifying that the DPRK is in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Who Dismantles?

- DPRK would voluntarily dismantle its nuclear programs in cooperation with the verification agency in a manner that results in high confidence that the program no longer exists.
- DPRK would conduct the actual dismantlement, and the verification organization would verify that the dismantlement has occurred.

Necessary DPRK Commitments to Verification

- A policy of full transparency and cooperation;
- Permit broad access;
- Provide detailed declarations;
- Allow access to records, including program documents, procurement data, and possibly personnel records;
- Allow interviews with program staff and officials;
- Permit environmental sampling at declared sites and elsewhere.

Conclusion

- The set of verification tasks is large, but they can be achieved in a reasonable time frame.
- Success will depend on North Korea's cooperation and its belief that its vital interests are served by these verification arrangements
- The United States will need to settle on realistic verification arrangements and not insist on overly demanding verification requirements.