Verifiable, Irreversible, Cooperative Dismantlement of the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Basic tasks and concepts

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Priorities for Dismantling?

- Plutonium program, including any plutonium stocks and associated facilities.
- Nuclear weaponization program, including any nuclear weapons and associated facilities.
- Any uranium enrichment programs, including any enriched uranium and associated facilities.
Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement of DPRK’s Nuclear Program

• Dismantling DPRK’s nuclear program involves several tasks.
• This presentation discusses four key tasks.
• Despite being interrelated, these tasks can be accomplished in parallel or in any order.
• Negotiations will need to determine the exact tasks and their order of implementation.
Task I: Plutonium

• This task includes plutonium production, separation, storage, waste activities and facilities.
• It aims to verifiably, irreversibly halt plutonium production and separation activities.
• The verification organization will need to verify DPRK statements about its plutonium.
• The United States wants DPRK to allow for the removal of plutonium and irradiated fuel.
• This task will also involve dismantling key sites and long-term monitoring.
Task II: Uranium Enrichment

• This task focuses on the dismantlement of any uranium enrichment activities and the facilities to research, develop, test, and make centrifuges.

• It would involve the irreversible verified dismantlement of uranium enrichment programs, the conversion of certain activities, and the on-going, long-term monitoring of non-banned, continuing activities.
Task III: Nuclear Weaponization

• This task focuses on any nuclear weapons and the means to research, develop, test, and manufacture them.
• It involves the verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons.
• It also irreversibly, verifiably dismantles the set of facilities involved in researching, developing, testing, and manufacturing nuclear weapons.
• It involves the conversion of certain activities and on-going monitoring of non-banned activities.
Tasks IV: Safeguards Agreement

• This task involves the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and the advanced safeguards protocol.
Who Verifies Dismantlement?

• The verification organization will need to be determined through negotiations. Different models for the verification organization may be needed to accomplish different tasks.
Models for the Verification Organization

- There are many candidates for the verification organization, including:
  - A specific organization created by the United States and other acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS)
  - “IAEA Plus.” It would involve the IAEA safeguards department supplemented by assistance from key member states. Variants of this model have been used in South Africa, Iran and Libya.
  - A bilateral or regional inspection agency.
Models (cont.)

• The acknowledged nuclear weapon states (P5), may have a special role in verifying the dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and associated production complex.

• The IAEA is responsible for verifying that the DPRK is in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Who Dismantles?

- DPRK would voluntarily dismantle its nuclear programs in cooperation with the verification agency in a manner that results in high confidence that the program no longer exists.
- DPRK would conduct the actual dismantlement, and the verification organization would verify that the dismantlement has occurred.
Necessary DPRK Commitments to Verification

• A policy of full transparency and cooperation;
• Permit broad access;
• Provide detailed declarations;
• Allow access to records, including program documents, procurement data, and possibly personnel records;
• Allow interviews with program staff and officials;
• Permit environmental sampling at declared sites and elsewhere.
Conclusion

- The set of verification tasks is large, but they can be achieved in a reasonable time frame.
- Success will depend on North Korea’s cooperation and its belief that its vital interests are served by these verification arrangements.
- The United States will need to settle on realistic verification arrangements and not insist on overly demanding verification requirements.