

APPLYING ABACC EXPERIENCES TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA: POSSIBILITIES AND ACTION PLANS

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In the post-Cold war era, a great deal of attention has been paid by the international society to problems such as control of nuclear weapons in the CIS countries, illegal diversion of fissionable materials and related technologies, and proliferation attempts by rogue states in the third world. International efforts to curb nuclear proliferation have been made in parallel with regional endeavors.

In the international dimension, the following steps deserve to be mentioned: indefinite extension of the NPT; IAEA's firm commitment to strengthen its safeguards system; efforts to make an early conclusion of the CTBT; moves to sign the CUTOFF treaty; and nuclear arms reduction through the START I and II. In the regional dimension, the following arrangements should be noted: mutual confidence building and inspection between Argentina and Brazil; in-depth discussions among the countries in such regions as the Middle East, Africa and the ASEAN to create nuclear weapon free zones; confidence building between India and Pakistan in the nuclear arena; and recent proposals for establishing a multilateral mechanism to enhance nuclear transparency and collaboration in East Asia.

The Iraqi secret nuclear weapon development program alerted the international community to the limitations inherent in the IAEA safeguards system. The Agency's financial and other difficulties contributed to the lack of inspection resources and subsequent restrictions of its verification activities. Under such circumstances, arguments have been raised for strengthening nuclear cooperation on a regional basis and establishing a multilateral safeguards system in specific regions.¹

By agreeing to the Joint Denuclearization Declaration (JDD) which renounces all types of the possession of nuclear weapons, North and South Korea attempted to play an outstanding role for consolidating nuclear nonproliferation norms and rules at a regional level. However, reciprocal inspection negotiations for verifying the compliance of the document have been stalled due to the significant differences of the two sides' positions on how to choose the inspection objects and means.² The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC)—a negotiating forum—has been closed since January 1993.³ The prospects for North-South nuclear dialogue remain uncertain despite relatively successful implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and a historic summit meeting. Under the circumstances, the issue of applying the lessons and experiences between Argentina and Brazil to the two Koreas, which have been overshadowed by the Agreed Framework process, remain salient in terms of facilitating cooperation, building confidence and implementing mutual inspection in the nuclear arena.

In this paper, I ask whether ABACC experiences⁴ are applicable to the Korean peninsula. First, I analyze whether it is meaningful and appropriate to apply the Argentine-Brazilian experiences to North and South Korea. In brief, the answer is that such application is important and should be encouraged to breakthrough the current impasse of the inter-Korean nuclear talks. Based on this conclusion, the second part of the paper proposes this application to be made according to the four distinct steps and presents detail measures to be taken by the two sides at each of these stages. The steps and measures are basically results of projecting Korean situations through the prism of "ABACC experiences."

Possibilities for Applying ABACC Experiences to the Korean Peninsula

A question was put forward of applying ABACC experiences to the Korean peninsula in the 1990s by foreign experts, in particular, from the United States, Argentina and Brazil. They argued that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation process has many lessons for the two Koreas that would be positive if applied to the Peninsula. Their proposals drew attention in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo and Beijing in June 1993 when the first round of high-level talks between the DPRK and the United States was held in New York.⁵ At the talks, as a way to remove international suspicions over its nuclear activities without returning to the NPT, North Korea reportedly made an inter-Korean inspection proposal that allowed the IAEA to participate in the inspection. It was believed that the North's proposal was hinted from the Argentine-Brazilian case.

In the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang promised to remain a party to the NPT. Under this Framework, North Korea has fulfilled its full-scope safeguards obligations to a limited degree and the bone of contention—the special inspection—was allowed to delay for several years. Despite these developments, the lack of inter-Korean nuclear dialogue makes the arguments for applying ABACC experiences to the two Koreas remain highly salient today. In the next section, I analyze the question: why is still necessary and possible to apply ABACC experiences to the Korean peninsula? To this question, there exist both negative and positive opinions.

Anti-Application Views

The views *against* the application of Argentine-Brazilian experiences to the two Koreas are based on the following reasons.

(1) Argentina and Brazil signed the bilateral inspection agreement and the multilateral safeguards agreement only after significant mutual trust had been built through adopting various nuclear CBMs. Therefore, the two countries followed the path of *confidence building first, inspection arrangement later*. On the other hand, North and South Korea signed the JDD and began the reciprocal inspection negotiations without implementing concrete CBMs. Thus, the two Koreas followed a reverse path of *inspection arrangement first, confidence building later*. This inversion means that circumstances in the Korean peninsula differ substantially from South America, reducing the relevance of ABACC experiences.

(2) Current bilateral relations between Seoul and Pyongyang in the nuclear field are frozen and the chances are slim for any immediate improvement. North Korea has created many practical hurdles in the KEDO's light-water reactor project as well. Worse than all, North Korea's uncooperative and often rude behaviors despite South Korea's sunshine policy make the South's public become frustrated and suspicious of whether genuine cooperation with the North is possible.

(3) North Koreans are not accustomed to revealing themselves to the outside. This characteristic is not surprising as other totalitarian countries have been reluctant to the concepts and practices of openness and transparency, as was observed in arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow. The North's resistance to openness has spawned a passive attitude toward verification in inter-Korean arms control. In the non-aggression section of the Basic Agreement, for example, which provided a legal and institutional framework for improving mutual relations, the two sides agreed on five transparency measures including mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises. Pyongyang refused to exchange observers, however. This stance is indica-

tive of North Korean sensitivities that have grown with the totalitarian system that has dominated North Korea for several decades. Although North Koreans are opening a limited sector of its economy, it is premature to expect similar shifts in the nuclear development area—a key national industry and a symbol of self-reliance with fundamental security dimensions.

(4) For decades, the countries in Latin America sought to establish a regional nuclear weapon free zone. Their efforts culminated in the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty which turned Central and South America into a nuclear weapon free zone. The treaty provided a favorable external environment wherein Argentina and Brazil increased transparency on their nuclear activities and promoted mutual collaboration. In contrast, the Korean peninsula is surrounded by the two nuclear weapon states—Russia and China—and one potential nuclear weapon state—Japan. The two Koreas decided to delegitimize nuclear weapons by signing the JDD, the first major nonproliferation agreement in Northeast Asia. But so far, responses from regional powers to the two Koreas' nonproliferation initiatives have been disappointing. China has continued to modernize its nuclear arsenals; Russia's nuclear arms reduction process is delayed and might be complicated with other issues like missile defenses; Japan is maintaining a large quantity of weapon-usable fissile materials without justification. Compared with South America, therefore, external circumstances around the Korean peninsula are less promising than they were in the case of the ABACC.

(5) Before the mid-1990s, Argentina and Brazil were not parties to the NPT and were even reluctant to admit the validity of international inspections being applicable to their nuclear activities. Although North Korea refused to allow a special inspection to the two undeclared facilities that were argued to be military sites, the two Koreas are both parties to the NPT and recognize the proper role of the IAEA safeguards system. Thus, the Korean peninsula differs from South America where the ABACC was used as an instrument which legitimized Argentine and Brazilian acceptance of inspections over nuclear activities and subsequently became a “political cover”⁶ whereby each acceded to IAEA inspections.

(6) Since the two Koreas are accepting IAEA inspections, in order to apply the ABACC's four party safeguards experiences to the Korean peninsula, the existing full-scope safeguards agreements should be replaced by a new multilateral safeguards arrangement. Substituting two separate safeguards agreements with a combined one inviting the IAEA's participation is an unprecedented event. So the question can be raised whether such transformation of the inspection format is feasible and desirable.

(7) When an ABACC-version inter-Korean inspection organization becomes a prime inspection authority and the IAEA plays a supplementing role as in the Argentine-Brazilian case, the Agency's own inspections to the two Koreas will be reduced. As a consequence, the international community may cast a suspicion over possible bilateral collusion of developing nuclear weapons between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Pro-Application Arguments

Other analysts say that the ABACC system may indeed be applied to the Korean peninsula in spite of these negative reasons. Arguably, the problem raised by the opponents of application can be resolved. Furthermore, there are merits inherent in the application of the ABACC, ignored by opponents. Pro-application views are based on the following points.

(1) South America is fundamentally different from the Korean peninsula in geopolitical and security aspects. Consequently, complete transplant of the experiences in Argentina and Brazil to the

two Koreas will not be possible. But the political, military and security problems caused by nuclear weapon development are generic in their nature and perceived as serious threats by every country, irrespective of its historical or geopolitical circumstances. European experience in conventional arms control has been a prototype in the arms control negotiations between the two Koreas. The political and technical lessons from European arms control negotiations have been widely cited as useful in Korea. Similarly, the lessons and experiences of the ABACC can be used for nuclear cooperation on the Korean peninsula with due considerations of characteristics of the two Koreas.

(2) North and South Korea were mistaken to agree to reciprocal inspections without prior confidence building efforts. The Argentine-Brazilian experiences show the importance of the step-by-step process in enhancing nuclear cooperation between two hostile parties from minor confidence-building measures (CBMs), through strong and extensive CBMs, and finally, to mutual inspections. That is, countries should implement CBMs at the beginning and thereby foster politically favorable environments for negotiating the bilateral inspection. In order to breakthrough the current stalemate, the two Koreas must follow the path of *confidence building first, inspection arrangement later*. This strategy is in parallel with South Korea's conventional arms control principle of *confidence building first, arms reduction later*. Since the North has opened its nuclear activities to the IAEA, Pyongyang has no convincing reasons to object to implementing CBMs between the two Koreas.

(3) The two Koreas made some progress in the reciprocal inspection negotiations with respect to nuclear facilities and materials. The negotiation can reach an acceptable compromise if the two sides withdraw unreasonable demands that cannot be accepted by the other side. Since all nuclear facilities in the Korean peninsula except *the two undeclared sites* are under the IAEA supervision, opening of at least these already-inspected facilities to the other side should be relatively easy to achieve.

(4) Although Northeast Asia is not a nuclear weapon free zone as in Latin America, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is fully supported by the countries in the region. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were also withdrawn from South Korea. By faithfully implementing the JDD, Seoul and Pyongyang can play a leading role for the denuclearization of the Northeast Asian region.⁷ In the long term, therefore, the two Koreas can play in the balance of power game in the region while pursuing multilateral security diplomacy and institutions in which the Koreas could arbitrate conflicts of the region. That the external environment is not auspicious for applying ABACC experiences is true but is not an insuperable obstacle. It can and should be overcome by North and South Korea.

(5) The fact that the two Koreas are NPT members and have accepted IAEA inspections is a very positive factor in the feasibility of applying the ABACC system to the Korean peninsula. Argentina and Brazil had great difficulty in establishing the ABACC system and obtaining international confidence because they had refused to accept the international nonproliferation regime including the IAEA inspection. This aspect of local circumstances in Northeast Asia facilitates an ABACC-type arrangement, and offsets the lack of other favorable factors found in South America but not in Korea.

(6) A country's suspicions over the other side's nuclear activities can be more easily removed by direct inspection using its own personnel and equipments than by the international verification mechanism. While the IAEA's inspection results are confidential, the ABACC's inspection report is distributed to Argentine and Brazilian governments. By permitting neighboring countries to directly access each other's nuclear activities, the regional inspection system can provide the countries and people in the

region with timely and detail information to make sure that illegal diversion of fissile materials does not occur regionally.⁸

(7) If inter-Korean nuclear cooperation increases, it will be advantageous to both sides to unify their nuclear material accounting and control systems. Combining two separate systems will improve efficiencies of their nuclear industries and solidify relations among the nuclear scientists and workers. Furthermore, by achieving Korean unity in the field of science and technology, nuclear collaboration will become a forerunner for ultimate unification. To this end, the ABACC's creation of a common nuclear accounting and inspection system with the participation of the IAEA can be a useful example of the two Koreas.

In summary, applying ABACC experiences to the Korean peninsula could lead to a breakthrough in stalemated bilateral nuclear dialogues; enhance nuclear cooperation and transparency; promote unitization in a technical area of the inter-Korean relations; and facilitate unification in the long term. It follows that the application of Argentine-Brazilian experiences to the two Koreas is important and deserves to be pursued in a constructive manner.

Future Action Plans

At the outset, North and South Korea should adhere to two principles: (1) *confidence building first and inspection arrangement later* and (2) *incremental and step-wise approach*. Thereafter, the two sides should proceed with nuclear cooperation according to the following step-by-step procedures.

In the first stage, they should agree to and implement bilateral nuclear CBMs. In the second stage, the two sides should resume reciprocal inspection negotiations and conclude inspection regulations only for nuclear facilities and materials. In the third stage, the two Koreas should establish a common nuclear accounting and control system and sign a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Finally, North and South Korea, a common inter-Korean inspection organization, and the IAEA should sign a four party inspection agreement and establish a regional nuclear cooperation regime on the Korean peninsula.

The CBM Stage

In the beginning, the two Koreas would reactivate the JNCC and agree on concrete nuclear CBMs. Practicing meaningful CBMs will provide the two Koreas with solid basis for successful implementation of the JDD. Realizing detailed CBMs should have priority over the JDD, however. The negotiation for reciprocal inspections will reopen *after* a certain degree of confidence is built in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

At the outset, it will be easy to make an agreement for soft CBMs rather than hard ones. The "soft" CBMs that the two sides could easily and swiftly agree with include:

- to unify terms used in the nuclear realm and to make a common dictionary;
- to provide education and materials relevant to light water reactors;
- to exchange nuclear materials such as natural uranium produced in the North;
- to supply products used in medical, agricultural and industrial sectors such as radioactive isotopes; and
- to exchange relevant materials and to hold seminars for nuclear safety.

The “hard” CBMs that would need more time and efforts to put into effect include:

- to make mutual visits by nuclear experts to each side’s nuclear facilities,⁹
- to organize a crisis control and relief system preparing for nuclear accidents and emergency;
- to assist each side to set up reliable nuclear safety regulations;
- to establish a standing consultative committee for working on the pending issues related with nuclear policies of the two sides;
- to create an environmental monitoring system against radioactive contamination; and
- to conclude a treaty that prohibits military attacks against nuclear facilities.

The Reciprocal Inspection Stage

Only when a cooperative atmosphere is created by CBMs would reciprocal inspection negotiations be resumed. Since the two Koreas have already signed the IAEA full-scope safeguards agreements, some may ask why reciprocal inspections are necessary. There are four reasons why such inspections are essential for inter-Korean nuclear cooperation.

Inter-Korean Relations. North and South Korea have legal obligations to carry out reciprocal inspections according to the article four of the JDD. If the two Koreas do not fulfill a key duty to verify compliance of what they agreed on, then the declaration itself will become meaningless. That is, without the inspection, the declaration would end up a dead letter and international suspicions over the two Koreas’ nuclear intentions will be heightened.

Since the nuclear issue is both an international *and* an inter-Korean agenda, reciprocal inspections are justified in the bilateral context just as IAEA safeguards are validated at a global level. In particular, it is important for Seoul and Pyongyang to maintain independent nature of reciprocal inspection and thereby establish the principle that problems on the Korean peninsula should and can be resolved by the Koreans themselves. Successful commitment to this principle of *resolving inter-Korean affairs by the two Koreas* would have a significant symbolic meaning of Korean sovereignty.

Reciprocal inspections are also essential to expand bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Unless each side’s nuclear program is transparent, it is difficult to envisage any significant mutual cooperation in the nuclear industry. Thus, the reciprocal opening of nuclear activities is critical for facilitating nuclear exchanges and cooperation as a part of improving North-South Korean relations.

Seoul-Pyongyang-Washington Trilateral Relationship. The U.S. government characterized the JDD and reciprocal inspections as a good model that can be applied in other regions. This American perception was reinforced by its keen recognition of the limitations of the IAEA inspection as revealed in the Iraqi case.¹⁰ For these reasons, many American decision makers believed that inspections between the two Koreas would be critical to complement the IAEA inspection.¹¹

Therefore, I could conclude that Washington adhered to the realization of a strict bilateral inspection mechanism on the Korean peninsula with a view to applying the Korean example to other regions like South Asia. I expect that the United States will push North and South Korea to fulfill their inspection commitments if the inter-Korean nuclear dialogue is resumed. Should the two

Complementing IAEA inspections. The limitations of the Agency inspection system can be complemented by reciprocal inspections. For example, the IAEA cannot release its inspection reports for either Korea to any other party without consent of the inspected side. Even if the two Koreas ask the IAEA to distribute its inspection report to the other side, this exchange would allow them to review only the result of the inspection performed by the third party, the Agency.

In this respect, reciprocal inspections directly conducted by the two Koreas are essential to expand mutual transparency of nuclear activities on the Korean peninsula. It is an important CBM that each side's nuclear scientists obtain comprehensive access and understanding to the other's nuclear facilities and technologies. By buttressing the global IAEA inspection, the bilateral inspection would become a second layer of verification to monitor North Korea's nuclear activities and to dissuade it against development of nuclear weapons.

Even if international and the inter-Korean inspections are performed on the same objects, the result will not be same. In case of the latter, inspectors use the same language and have the same cultural background and sentiment. Thus the inspection makes it possible to obtain valuable information that might be missed by inspectors with other ethnic backgrounds.

Establishing Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation. Although to different degree, both Koreas have been suspected by the international society as aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons. These concerns arose initially in relation to the South's attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Since then, the South has accepted various restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, imposed mainly by the United States. As is well known, the international community is suspicious of North Korea's intentions and behaviors today. Many questions as to North Korean nuclear activities remain to be resolved completely.

Under these circumstances, neither side can enjoy full freedom of pursuing peaceful uses of nuclear energy by itself while criticizing the other. North and South Korea must work together to resolve the doubts of the international community as to their nuclear activities. To this end, they must be aware that they will sink or swim together—they are in the same boat. The two sides can coexist and prosper only when they embrace rather than reject each other.

For these reasons—inter-Korean relations, the trilateral relationship between the two Koreas and the United States, supplementing IAEA inspections, and establishing bilateral nuclear cooperation—reciprocal Korean inspections are a prerequisite for nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula.

The Inter-Korean Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Stage. In the second stage, North and South Korea would make separate and independent accounting of their nuclear materials, and inspectors from one side are dispatched to the other side. Only at the third stage would a single accounting scheme for nuclear materials and a common inspection system be established.

As in the ABACC, the two Koreas would create a single nuclear accounting system (the Korean Peninsula System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials; hereafter termed the KSAC). All of the nuclear materials used in all nuclear activities on the Korean peninsula are subject to KSAC regulations. The KSAC would replace the two sides' national accounting systems that would be operated separately at the previous stages.

Koreas fail to implement these inspections, political conflicts will likely occur between Washington and Seoul as well as between Washington and Pyongyang.

On the other hand, by carrying out the inspection, the two Koreas could demonstrate their commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the international community.

The KSAC should include the provision that nuclear materials for non-proscribed activities will be excluded from the inspection. Although neither Korea currently owns nuclear-propelled transportation vehicles, for example, the non-proscribed provision will make them be better prepared for future possibilities.

In order to implement KSAC regulations, Seoul and Pyongyang would establish a common inspection organization (the Korean Peninsula Agency for Nuclear Accounting and Control; hereafter termed the KANAC). Unlike the ABACC, it is recommended that the KANAC have a right to initiate and conduct its own special inspections. This provision does not mean that a special inspection requested by one party can be carried out under the KANAC regime. Since the KANAC is operated independent of both sides' governments, neither side can ask the KANAC to perform a special inspection. Therefore, the KANAC inspection regime would differ from that of other arms control treaties such as the CWC wherein a member country requests a special inspection, and the Technical Secretariat implements the request.

The proposed KANAC system would also differ from that of the ABACC in another important respect. North and South Korea would create a division in charge of nuclear materials under the KANAC (the Nuclear Material Supply Division; hereafter termed the NMSD). The NMSD would take control of all nuclear materials and equipments imported, exported or produced by the two Koreas and would distribute them to nuclear operators in each side. In short, the KANAC system would become a single, unified system for accounting, control and supply of nuclear materials and equipments in Korea.

The two Koreas would make a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that stipulates the establishment of the KASC and the KANAC. The agreement would be ratified by the parliaments of the two sides.

Resolving Past Nuclear Suspicions of North Korea. In order to draw broad support for the KANAC system, international suspicions over the past nuclear activities of North Korea will have to be resolved before the end of the third stage. At minimum, residual doubts about the two undeclared and disputed sites which are subject to a IAEA special inspection must be resolved. Only then would the two Koreas be able to develop the KANAC inspection regime by associating it with the IAEA.

Considering that North Korea has strongly argued that the two undeclared but disputed sites are for military purposes, it may be necessary to gain access to the sites separately from the KANAC inspection. That is, it is suggested to devise a particular arrangement for the two sites among the two Koreas, the IAEA and the United States.

The IAEA has shown flexibility to an extent that it would not stick to the name of "special inspection" so long as it is allowed access to the two sites. On the other hand, South Korea and the

United States expressed their willingness to open two US military bases in return for the inspection. Thus, all parties should be able to compromise in a way that allows Pyongyang to save face. Otherwise, they might be embarrassed by the discovery of nuclear materials that may be identified at supposed military facilities. Any such admission may be easier to accept if it is not limited solely to special inspections but is conducted in a way that provides gains for all parties.

Thus, the IAEA inspection and the reciprocal inspection of the two undeclared sites and two U.S. military bases¹² in South Korea should be conducted simultaneously. That is, the IAEA would inspect the two sites, the South would conduct its own inspection of the sites as well, and the North would verify that no nuclear weapons are present at two U.S. military bases in the South.¹³ In this approach, the Agency's determination to exercise its special inspection right would not be undermined. On the other hand, North Korea could argue that it had only allowed the IAEA and South Korea for a visit¹⁴ and could give maximum publicity to its inspection of U.S. military bases.

The Four Party Inspection Agreement Stage

A Korean inspection regime is not sufficient to assure the international community that the two Koreas' nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only. If the inter-Korean relations are deteriorated, then the KANAC inspection system may not operate effectively, or might collapse altogether. Also, concerns might arise that the two Koreas collude to develop nuclear weapons and use the KANAC system to cover up such a secret program. Furthermore, if the regional inspection system is not technically competent, it will be hard to get global support to the system.¹⁵

For these reasons, the establishment of the regional inspection system on the Korean peninsula must incorporate the international inspection mechanism into the KANAC system. The four party inspection system among the two Koreas, the KANAC, and the IAEA would ensure that inter-Korean nuclear cooperation and the KANAC inspection regime contribute to peace and security in Northeast Asia as well as denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

At the fourth stage, North and South Korea, the KANAC and the IAEA would sign a four party safeguards agreement that would replace the existing full-scope safeguards agreements for the two Koreas. The four-party agreement would be ratified by the parliaments of the two sides.

Seoul and Pyongyang would also agree that the IAEA's inspection results would be distributed to the other side. This arrangement would increase the confidence of each side to the other side's nuclear activities.¹⁶ Of course, the KANAC's inspection results would be reported to the IAEA. The Agency would retain its right of special inspection.

The KANAC would have to harmonize with the IAEA in conducting inspections. To this end, a measure would have to be devised to enhance transparency and to maximize technical and economic efficiencies. For such sensitive facilities as the radiochemical laboratory, for example, the KANAC and the Agency would perform a joint team inspection, but the analysis and judgment of the inspection results would be made independently. For other facilities, the IAEA would observe the KANAC inspection process and make its own conclusion based on the materials provided by the KANAC, the KANAC's inspection report, and its observation results.

In conclusion, the multiparty inspection system can be instituted in Korea if the following three conditions are met. First, international suspicions over North Korea's so-called past nuclear

activities have to be eliminated. Second, a common North-South Korean inspection system should obtain trust from the international community for its technical effectiveness. Third, the common inspection system should make it clear that it is an organization supplementing but not replacing the international inspection regime. If the three conditions are met, international suspicions that the two Koreas might collude to go nuclear can be resolved as well. Operating together with the global inspection mechanism, the regional inspection system can reinforce verification layers to detect nuclear weapon development and increase the probability to find out any illegal activities that can be missed by the IAEA.

Conclusions

In this paper, I examined the possibilities of applying ABACC experiences to the Korean peninsula and presented an incremental scheme for the application. This inter-Korean nuclear cooperation plan is important as a preparation for future requests by the international community. It is also in each Korea's interest. The four-stage plan can be a systemic scheme to make a breakthrough in the current impasse in the bilateral nuclear relations.

Considering the characteristics of the Korean peninsula, the role of the regional inspection system can be even more comprehensive than that of the ABACC or the Euratom. If inter-Korean arms control talks make progress, then bilateral verification mechanisms for various arms control treaties can be combined with the KANAC inspection regime. To save inspection costs and to increase efficiency, an overarching verification organization that incorporates separate verification activities required under various treaties will be a practical and feasible approach in the future.

The cooperative scheme proposed here is premised on positive responses from the part of the DPRK. The reality is not as auspicious as supporting this premise and does a question arise *how to* induce North Koreans to come forward. Three imminent approaches can be thought of. First, the international community as a whole should increase its pressure for North Korea to become a less hostile and more rule-complying member of the community that can get together. International pressures do not have to be broad in context and actually, had better be more specific in issues and contents. For example, a G-8 summit of mid-July of 2001 praised South Korea's sunshine policy and wished for a second North-South Korean summit as soon as possible. Had it asked for the implementation of the Denuclearization Declaration or the resumption of the North-South nuclear talks, the G-8 statement could have been better served for inter-Korean nuclear cooperation.

The second approach would be tight linkage of related issues with the purpose of inducing the DPRK cooperation in the nuclear confidence building. There have been attempts to exercise this option but with not much success. South Korea's sunshine policy is criticized largely because it is perceived by many as a policy unilaterally to give Pyongyang. So in the future dealings with North Korea, outside assistance need be made in tight connection with the North's tension-reducing and confidence-building actions in other fields including nuclear.

Finally, as in South American, a top-down approach might prove to be very effective in Korea especially when North Korea is a one-man dominant society. The second summit meeting, if happens, would be a fantastic avenue where the two leaders of the Korean peninsula can freely and honestly discuss nuclear issues. Even Kim Jong-Il's visit to South Korean nuclear sites cannot be ruled out. In their

preparation for the second summit, South Korean policy makers should be equipped with some modest nuclear CBMs and an invitation of Kim Jong-Il to the Ulchin nuclear power plant that is a reference model of the ongoing KEDO light-water reactor project in North Korea.

¹ For example, Hans Blix, director of the IAEA, mentioned that “Tailed-made approaches [to verification] may have to be developed for some countries and regions to encourage maximum transparency. A central issue facing the international community is what approaches would be effective and acceptable for a particular situation and set of circumstances.” He also pointed out that “Precedents exist for customized, two-tiered verification arrangements cooperatively linked with the IAEA’s system: the long-established European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the younger Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.” Hans Blix, “Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: the Lesson of Iraq,” *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1992), pp. 60-61. Arguing the prime motivation for developing nuclear weapons is the countries’ attempts at countering perceived security threats, Steinberg and Fischer contended that the limitations of the international nonproliferation regimes should be supplemented by establishing regional regimes that reflected the characteristics of each region. Gerald Steinberg, “Non-Proliferation: Time for Regional Approaches?” *Orbis* (Summer 1994), pp. 409-423; David Fischer, “The Regional Track for the Last Three NPT Holdouts—Israel, India & Pakistan,” *PPNN Issue Review* (May 1995)

² Seongwhun Cheon, “Regional Non-Nuclear Options from South Korea’s Perspective,” in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: the Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 391-414.

³ Seongwhun Cheon, “North Korea’s Nuclear Problem: Current Status and Future Prospects,” *Korean Journal of National Unification* 1 (1993), pp. 85-104.

The ABACC stands for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and is the name of the organization for mutual inspection and administration. “ABACC experiences” or “ABACC system” used in this paper broadly represent the two countries’ nuclear cooperation efforts and agreements made by the two sides or with other parties such as the IAEA.

⁵ North Korea had announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. The North suspended the effectuation of the withdrawal statement on 11 June 1993, which was a successful achievement of the first round of the DPRK-US bilateral meetings.

⁶ Tom Collina and Fernando Barros, “Translating Brazil and Argentine’s Success,” *ISIS Report* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 1995), p. 7.

⁷ Regarding a possible scheme of a nuclear weapon free zone in Northeast Asia, see Seongwhun Cheon and Tatsujiro Suzuki, “A Nuclear-Free Zone in Korea and Japan,” *Korea Herald*, June 13, 2000, p. 6.

⁸ Tom Collina, “The Lessons of Latin America: How the Argentine-Brazilian Bilateral Inspection Regime Applies to the Korean Peninsula,” *Presentation for the Research Institute for National Unification and the Technology Center for Nuclear Control*, February 24, 1995, p. 3.

⁹ In case of Argentina and Brazil, visits to some sensitive facilities like a reprocessing facility were done lightheartedly as if visitors and hosts were having coffees together. Taking pictures was not allowed. Interview with Brazilian Physicist Dr. Fernando Barros, February 28, 1995.

¹⁰ For example, in 1992, Ronald Lehman, then the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency remarked that “Indeed, we may see experience gained here in Korea which may provide concepts useful elsewhere such as in the Middle East and South Asia. The two Koreas have a long way to go, but there are other regions that have not even taken the steps in the nuclear area already begun by Seoul and Pyongyang. One region where development of nuclear CBMs is less advanced is South Asia...” Ronald Lehman, “Arms Control and Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula,” *Four Nations Arms Control Seminar on the Korean Peninsula* held by the Institute for North Korea Studies, Seoul, June 2, 1992, pp. 24-25.

¹¹ Ronald Lehman underscored the importance of the reciprocal inspection to resolve international concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program and called for South Korea’s patience and persistence in working out an effective bilateral inspection system. *Korea Herald*, June 3, 1992.

¹² After meeting Ujin Choi, the chairman of the Northern side of the JNCC, in November 1992, Peter Hayes revealed that North Korea determined they would limit inspections to perhaps one or two designated sites in the South. Peter Hayes, *Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead?* (Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Pacific Research, November 1992), p. 4. Considering the two undeclared sites are in dispute, two U.S. bases could be the objects of the first reciprocal inspection.

¹³ Seongwhun Cheon, “Countering proliferation: South Korea’s strategic choices,” in Taewoo Kim and Selig Harrison, eds., *Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Problem* (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 1995), p. 175-179.

¹⁴ On November 13, 1992, Ujin Choi distinguished “the IAEA officials’ visits” from “the IAEA inspectors’ inspection.” Mr. Choi stated that the North had permitted visits to some of undeclared sites in order to extend a spirit of cooperation to the IAEA. Peter Hayes, *Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead?*, p. 3.

¹⁵ Collina, “The Lessons of Latin America: How the Argentine-Brazilian Bilateral Inspection Regime Applies to the Korean Peninsula,” pp. 3-4.

¹⁶ Fischer, “The Regional Track for the Last Three NPT Holdouts—Israel, India & Pakistan,” p. 3.