

**WORKING PAPER**  
**PRESENTED BY THE GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED STATES PARTIES TO**  
**THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-**  
**PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Building on the working papers presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT at the First, Second, and Third Preparatory Committee meetings, this working paper represents the Group's inputs to be considered by the 2010 Review Conference (previous working papers are contained in the documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.11, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.12, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.16, and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30)

**II. PROCEDURAL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE NPT**

The Group recalls that the Preparatory Committee at its third session adopted the draft provisional agenda of the 2010 Review Conference, according to which, the Conference is mandated to review the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the Decisions and Resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

In the context of the above-mentioned mandate, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty calls for an agreement, in accordance with rule 34 of the draft rules of procedure for the 2010 Review Conference to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT to deliberate on 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons; to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT; and to consider and adopt a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING TO THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE NPT

#### Basic Principles and Objectives

1. **To emphasize** that the NPT is the key international instrument aimed at halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving nuclear disarmament and promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses in nuclear energy.
2. **To reaffirm** that the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the NPT, in a non-discriminatory manner, remains essential for its effectiveness in realizing its objectives.
3. **To reiterate** that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and that the full and effective implementation of all Treaty obligations, including in particular by nuclear-weapon-States, plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and security.
4. **To reaffirm** the commitment of Nuclear-Weapon States to their undertakings on nuclear disarmament including the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT.
5. **To reaffirm**, that each article of the Treaty is binding on States Parties without distinction, and that States Parties are required to strictly comply with their obligations under the Treaty as well as those agreed by consensus at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, including in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

#### Nuclear Doctrine and Nuclear Sharing

6. **To note with deep concern** security doctrines of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.
7. **To reaffirm** that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Party to the Treaty. **Emphasize**, in this context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.

8. **To stress** the importance of reaffirmation by Nuclear-Weapon States of their obligations, and full implementation of Article I, and refrain from nuclear weapon sharing, with other states under any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.
9. **To stress** the importance of reaffirmation by non-Nuclear-Weapon States of their commitments to the full implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear weapon sharing with Nuclear-Weapon States, non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and States not Party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in time of peace as well as in time of war, including in the framework of military alliances.

### **Nuclear Disarmament**

10. **To reconfirm** that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate; as endorsed both at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference.
11. **To reaffirm** the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by Nuclear-Weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
12. **To voice** concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space, in which the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.
13. **To agree** that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes, and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

### **Nuclear Testing**

14. **To reaffirm** that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

15. To support the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
16. **To realize** the objective of the CTBT, the commitment of all States Signatories, especially the five Nuclear-Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament is essential. The five Nuclear-Weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.

### **Security Assurances**

17. **To recall** that at the 2000 Review Conference, States Parties to the Treaty had agreed by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five Nuclear-Weapon States to the non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
18. **To reiterate** that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some Nuclear-Weapon States, including certain States' nuclear posture reviews, contravene the security assurances provided by Nuclear-Weapon States and violate the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT.
19. **To reaffirm** that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be effectively assured by Nuclear-Weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons. Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

### **Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones**

20. **To welcome** the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world.
21. **To welcome** the ongoing consultations between ASEAN and Nuclear-Weapon States on the Protocol of the South-East Asian Nuclear-weapon-free Zone and urges Nuclear-Weapon States to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty as soon as possible.

22. **To welcome** the entry into force of the treaties establishing of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Central Asia and to stress the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and the Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status by all States in their respective regions and by all the concerned States, as well as signature and ratification by Nuclear-Weapon States and other relevant States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories as envisaged in Article VII of the Treaty.
23. **To reiterate** the crucial need for practical steps aimed at achieving speedy establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East without any further delay.
24. **To welcome** the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbors to conclude the required legal instrument institutionalizing Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

## **Regional Issues**

### **Middle East**

25. **To intensify** the efforts aimed at establishing a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle East and **call for** cooperation and consultation among States Parties in order to identify and adopt necessary practical steps to achieve that goal in implementing the 1995 Resolution on Middle East and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
26. **To stress** that the adoption of Resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and Resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities by the IAEA General Conference are another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and remain the main obstacles to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
27. **To express** concern that Israel continues to refrain from acceding to the NPT despite the accession of all other States in the region.
28. **To reaffirm** the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (Part I), which "calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception to accede

to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.”

29. **To recall** that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis of which the NPT was indefinitely extended, without a vote in 1995, and that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.
30. **To reaffirm** the 2000 Review Conference Final Outcome which underscored the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.
31. **To stress** that the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT should contain concrete and practical recommendations concerning the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, including a commitment by each State Party to the Treaty to strictly prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the NPT and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. States parties to the NPT should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

### **Safeguards and Verification**

32. **To reaffirm** that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States Parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfillment of their Treaty obligations; with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.
33. **To acknowledge** that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations.
34. **To confirm** that obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programs, provide credible assurances enabling States Parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful

purposes in accordance with Article IV. Therefore, States Parties to the Treaty are **called upon** to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States Parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

35. While **expressing** full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA, **strongly rejects** attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its technical cooperation program, in violation of the IAEA Statute, and stresses that any undue pressure of interference in the IAEA, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the IAEA, should be avoided.
36. **To emphasize** that the States Parties to the NPT should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of the NPT related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework.

### **Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

37. **To underscore** that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted to affect the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.
38. **To stress** that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the right of States Parties to technical cooperation among themselves or with the international organizations keeping in view the needs of the developing States Parties.
39. **To recognize** the rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty and ensuring that no State Party is limited in exercising their rights in conformity with the Treaty.
40. **To reaffirm** that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.
41. **To note with concern** that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes persist.
42. **To emphasize** that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity", and

only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

43. **To reiterate** that the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply is a very complex and multi-dimensional concept with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. In order to reach a consensual conclusion, it is premature for this issue to be considered before undergoing extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations. In this context, **reject**, in principle, any attempts aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity”; and **emphasize** that any ideas or proposals, pertaining to the non-proliferation of any peaceful nuclear technology, which are used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of such technology, are inconsistent with the objectives of the NPT.
44. **To reiterate** a need for caution while addressing thoroughly the associated technical, legal and economic aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, so that any proposal that eventually emerges in this regard is in full accordance with the Treaty and takes into account the respective legal obligations of States Parties, and the principle of non-discrimination. **To underline** that any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all States Parties; and **recall** “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” which was adopted at the 1995 Review Conference has made it clear that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-Nuclear-Weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
45. **To reaffirm** the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities -- operational or under construction -- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. **To recognise** the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
46. **To emphasize** that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by the IAEA in meeting the needs of its Member States for material, equipment and



technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its Statute.

47. **To stress** that the IAEA technical cooperation program, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA's Statute and the guiding principles which ensures that the projects are consistent with all the decisions of the IAEA's Policy-Making Organs. **To reiterate** that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above objectives.
48. **To stress** its full support to all efforts which are aimed at strengthening the role of the IAEA in line with the objectives of the Statute. In this context **to emphasize** that the efforts towards strengthening all statutory activities of the IAEA should take place in a balanced manner.
49. **To underline** that concerns related to nuclear weapon proliferation shall not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty. In this context **to underscore** the importance of peaceful nuclear technology for the sustainable socio-economic uplift of developing nations, provided that nuclear activities are subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.
50. **To stress** the importance of nuclear safety and security. While nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play the key role in the development of international safety standards, and nuclear security–guidance based on best practices. **To emphasise** that undue nuclear safety and security concern should not be used to hamper the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries.

#### IV. ACTION-ORIENTED RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NPT OBLIGATIONS

The 2010 Review Conference should establish the following set of recommendations pertaining to progress in the following fields: universality, nuclear disarmament, nuclear testing, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ's), regional issues, particularly in the Middle East, safeguards and verification, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

##### Universality

51. **To call upon** States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to the Treaty as non-Nuclear-Weapon State with a view to achieving its universality at the earliest possible time.
52. **To call on** all States Parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.
53. **To reaffirm** the integrity of Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and the commitment of all States Parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provision of the Treaty to any State not Party to the Treaty. **To reaffirm** also, toward the attainment of these objectives, the commitment of all States Parties to prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of all nuclear related equipment, information material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field to states non party to the treaty in a manner inconsistent with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

##### Nuclear Disarmament

54. **To call for** the full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Treaty including those agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
55. **To accelerate** the process of negotiations that should be undertaken, in accordance with Article VI, as well as implementing the 13 practical steps for the

systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, without further delay, in order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

56. **To agree on** an action plan on nuclear disarmament which includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapon with a specified framework of time including a nuclear weapon convention, without delay. The group presents its proposal on such an action plan in a separate document to the Review Conference.
57. **To agree on** a program of work for the Conference on Disarmament that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.
58. **To establish** a standing committee by the review Conference to monitor and verify nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.
59. **To reaffirm** commitment by Nuclear-Weapon States to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.
60. **To establish**, as a matter of priority, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfillment of the obligations under Article VI and further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

### **Nuclear Testing**

61. **To stress** the significance of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT, requiring its ratification by the remaining Annex 2 States, including in particular by two Nuclear-Weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.
62. **To ratify** the CTBT by Nuclear-Weapon States with all expediency. Positive decisions by Nuclear-Weapon-States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the CTBT. Nuclear-Weapon-States have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the CTBT. These actions would encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the treaty.

## Security Assurances

63. **To call for** the negotiation of a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty remain essential and should be materialized without further delay.
64. **To seek** the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by Nuclear-Weapon States to the non-Nuclear-Weapons States Parties to the NPT to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States Parties and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

## Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

65. **To confirm** that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty as well as Mongolia's nuclear weapon-free status represents a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
66. **To urge** Nuclear-Weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone, have done so with reservation or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of that zone to modify or withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretations.
67. **To highlight** the importance of holding the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to the treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones and Mongolia and its contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

## Middle East

68. **To focus** substantially the activities of the 2010 Review Conference on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and that States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the three Treaty depositories and sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, should report on steps

they have taken to promote the undelayed establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and the realization of goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

69. **To recommend** the establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees.
70. **To recommend** the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.
71. **To call upon** States Parties to the NPT to provide appropriate support in order to facilitate the implementation of the IAEA General Conference Resolutions GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities.
72. **To call upon** States Parties to the NPT to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfer to Israel.
73. **To reiterate** the commitment of all States Parties to the NPT to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguard.
74. **To support** the efforts of NAM's States Parties in the Middle East in pursuing the earliest implementation of the 1995 resolution on Middle East and **invite** the Conference to closely consider the proposals put forward by States Parties of the region in this regard.

### **Safeguards and Verification**

75. **To reiterate** that the IAEA's work with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and full scope safeguards agreements.

76. **To request** all States that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards.
77. **To request** that all Nuclear-Weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards. This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the NPT and IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of Nuclear-Weapon States' obligations with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty in a manner inconsistent with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
78. **To consider** the strengthening of the IAEA's system for the protection of confidentiality of safeguard-related information.

### **Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

79. **To stress** the commitment of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy of the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving maximum benefits and applying pertinent sustainable development in their health, industry, agriculture and other development related activities.
80. **To emphasize** that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of the adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the NPT as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

81. **To reiterate** that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty, should be removed.

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