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According to an Associated Press report on May 17, 1998, Iraq
supports India's nuclear tests. The Ba'ath Party's newspaper,
Al-Thawra, said: "We cannot see how anyone can ask
India not to develop nuclear weapons and its long-range missiles
at a time it is like any other big state with its human and scientific
potential."
This statement is reminiscent of the old defiant Iraq. Prior to
the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein said that Iraq had the right
to nuclear weapons to defend itself against Israel.
Simultaneously, the Sunday issue of a Baghdad weekly, owned by
Saddam Hussein's eldest son Odai, announced that India has agreed
to enroll several groups of Iraqi engineers "in advanced
technological courses" scheduled for mid-July. The field
of training was left unstated, but one worries that Iraq could
acquire illicit assistance in the nuclear or ballistic missile
areas.
Background
Nuclear relations between Iraq and India date back to 1974. Saddam
Hussein flew to India specifically to sign a nuclear cooperation
treaty with Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister. The little known
treaty involved the exchange of scientists, training, and technology.
Reportedly, Iraqi scientists were working in India's plutonium
separation labs, often referred to as fuel reprocessing laboratories,
at the time India separated the plutonium for its first nuclear
explosive device. Those same Iraqi scientists later were in charge
of the nuclear fuel reprocessing unit supplied to Iraq by the
Italian company CNEN. A year or two later, an Indian scientist
spent a year at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission's computer
center training Iraqis on the use of nuclear computer codes.
However, following the destruction of the Iraqi (French-supplied)
Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, the Iraqi program went underground
to develop indigenous nuclear weapon production facilities. Iraq
no longer welcomed the exchange of scientists for fear of revealing
its clandestine program. Nuclear cooperation was placed on hold.
Nonetheless, India taught Iraq many tricks, including how to acquire
nuclear technology under the guise of peaceful nuclear energy.
Iraq also learned how easy it was to hide a nuclear weapons program
under the cover of peaceful use.
Implications of the Indian Test
With Pakistan likely to test its own nuclear bombs and several
major powers, including Russia and Britain, refusing to impose
sanctions on India, Iraq could find it easier to undermine inspections
or violate sanctions in the future.
The UN Security Council is considering whether to "close
the nuclear file" of Iraq and move to only the ongoing monitoring
and verification (OMV) program. The current crisis could further
erode the ability of the Security Council to enforce inspections
in Iraq. In general, the international community could find it
harder to enforce its norms. The result could be a more permissive
international climate especially among developing states.
Iraq is well-positioned to exploit this situation. Iraq's nuclear
establishment is still fully staffed. A recently revealed Iraqi
intelligence agency document could be indicative of future offers
from nuclear weapons scientists seeking to make a fortune by assisting
Iraq. This document states that Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist,
Dr. Abdul-Qadeer Khan, offered via an intermediary in October
1990 to provide Iraq key nuclear weapons assistance strictly for
financial gain.
If Iraqi-Indian cooperation is rejuvenated through training in
advanced technical courses, Iraq could solve some of its technological
bottlenecks, possibly in the nuclear area. The Indian government
is unlikely to provide Iraq with important nuclear know-how and
technology on an official basis. However, with a friendlier and
more relaxed climate between the two nations, Iraq may be able
to arrange for information transfer through bribes and favors
to politicians or scientists. Indian nuclear scientists who are
low paid or disaffected are especially vulnerable.
Iraq's position could be strengthened further if Iran decides
to seek nuclear weapons more aggressively. Iran's recent nuclear
and missile cooperation with Russia has been viewed with suspicion
by Arab states. Because of the historic hostility between the
Gulf States and Iran, the United States may find it increasingly
difficult to punish Iraq without alienating regional allies if
Iraq defies the OMV program or sanctions, particularly if the
Iranian nuclear threat increases and the peace process remains
stalemated.