The last few years have witnessed significant growth in the amount of separated or unirradiated civil plutonium in the world. In the 1970s, visions of a closed fuel cycle resulted in decisions to construct large-scale reprocessing plants in Europe. But without breeder reactors in which to burn plutonium, national programs expanded plans to use mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in light-water reactors (LWRs). Despite this shift in strategy, the pace of plutonium separation exceeded plutonium use, resulting in significant inventories of separated plutonium. This trend is expected to continue, at least for several more years. There is growing consensus in the international community that stockpiles of separated plutonium should be minimized because separated plutonium is a proliferation hazard. Achieving this goal, however, remains difficult.
Current Inventories
During the last few years, about 20 tonnes per year of plutonium have been separated worldwide, and roughly 10 tonnes per year of plutonium have been fabricated into MOX fuel. In total, based on declarations of nine key states distributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the stock of separated or unirradiated civil plutonium grew by about 11 tonnes from the end of 1997 until the end of 1998, reaching almost 195 tonnes.
The inventories of separated or unirradiated plutonium in 14 countries at the end of 1998 are given in table 1. As can be seen, the largest inventories are in the nuclear weapon states.
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| Britain France Belgium Germany Japan Switzerland Russia United Statese China Indiaf Netherlandsg Italyh Swedeni Spain |
75.9 3.8 6.5 4.9 <0.05 30.3 4 - 5 0 0.7 0 0? 0 <0.1? |
<0.05 1.0 Not Declared 24.4 0 - 5d Not Declared 0 0 0 1.2 ~0.5? 0.833 0? |
35.6 ~2b Not Declared 0 <0.05 Not Declared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0? |
40.3 ~2.8 ~24c 29.3 ~1 30.3 4 - 5 0 0.7 1.2 ~0.5 0.83 0? |
| Total (rounded) | - | - |
| a Unless otherwise noted, the sourve of this information is the IAEA's INFCIRC/549 and its associated declarations. The totals of Columns A and D do not match because the declarations are incomplete and the plutonium in Column B many be in a country not included in the declarations. |
| b Not declared, but the estimate of 2 tonnes of foreign-owned plutonium is based on discussions with Belgian nuclear officials. |
| c German holdings in other countries are estimated by assuming that this material is held in Britain, France or Belgium and that the vast bulk of Belgian, German, Japanese, Swiss, Dutch, Italian and Swedish holdings outside of their countries (Column B) is equal to the amount of plutonium in Britain, France and Belgium that is foreign-owned. ISIS's central estimate for column B is 18 tonnes. |
| d Five tonnes of plutonium in spent fuel were sent for reprocessing, according to Switzerland's declaration to the IAEA. Most of this plutonium is not separated. |
| e ISIS estimate of the amount of unirradiated plutonium originally produced in civil reactors is 4 to 5 tonnes, the bulk of which was procduced in British civil reactors. This is part of the 52.5 tonnes declared excess by the United States. Of this 52.5 tonnes, the United States has declared that 45 tonnes are in unirradiated form or separated forms. |
| f ISIS estimate. |
| g From Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Tweede kamer, vergaerjaar 1996-1997, 25422, nr 1. This Dutch separated plutonium is located in France. Our understanding is that no Dutch spent fuel was reprocessed at BNFL or Cogema in 1998. |
| h Estimate of Italian plutonium stored in Britain. ISIS does not know if Italy has an in-country stock of a few hundred kilograms of separated plutonium. It is assumed that Italian plutonium in Super Phenix fuel is irradiated; if not, or swap happened, then the values in Column B could change and the values in Column D could increase. |
| i Swedish separated plutonium from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), Granskiningspromemoria 99:30, 199-07-01. Dnr 8.26-981480. |
The quantity for the United States in table 1 includes only the amount of plutonium that originated from civil reactors. The total quantity of unirradiated plutonium declared by the United States is 45 tonnes, almost all of which was produced in its military production reactors and recently declared excess to military needs. The full value is not included in this analysis, because ISIS tracks civil and military plutonium separately and believes that mixing these categories would needlessly complicate debates about plutonium disposition.
Figures for 1999 were not available at publication time. Based on available information, the amount of separated plutonium is estimated to have increased to about 205 tonnes by the end of 1999.
Achieving a Balance
To bring about a balance right now, reprocessing rates would need to be cut by almost one-half to ensure that the amount of plutonium separated each year can be made into MOX fuel. Nonetheless, several factors may cause annual separation and fabrication to be brought into balance. Currently, the British Sellafield MOX fabrication plant (SMP) is awaiting a license for plutonium operations. Its principal contracts will be with non-nuclear weapon states who need to convert their plutonium separated at the nearby Thorp plant into MOX fuel. The second factor is that the French MELOX MOX fabrication facility may receive government permission to turn more French and foreign-owned plutonium into fuel.
Finally, the amount of spent fuel that will be reprocessed is expected to decrease. The main reduction is expected at the French UP3 facility, whose annual throughput could soon decrease to a quarter of its previous throughput, following the completion of the “baseload” contracts. Further in the future, significant cuts are also expected at Thorp. The only exception to this downward trend in reprocessing is in Japan where a new, large reprocessing plant may start in 2007.
Based on such considerations, projections of separated plutonium inventories can be derived from existing public information about reprocessing and MOX fabrication plans. Figure 1 represents a projection based on current plans and expectations. 2 This “baseline” projection shows that the amount of separated plutonium will increase to about 225 tonnes before it starts to decrease in 2004. However, in 2010 the amount of separated plutonium is projected to still exceed 190 tonnes. In 2015, the amount of separated plutonium will be about 150 tonnes.
Any projection of future plutonium stocks is uncertain. There are several factors that may keep the inventory of separated plutonium from shrinking, as projected in figure 1. First, several countries, particularly Britain and Russia, do not have appropriate reactors or plans to use MOX fuel during the next 10 years, and there is little support for burning MOX fuel in other countries. The second factor is that some countries have encountered resistance in obtaining licenses to use MOX fuel in light-water reactors, delaying the date when the MOX fuel is irradiated even though it can be fabricated. This delay has seriously affected Japan’s ability to use MOX fuel. In addition, SMP may not operate or fabricate MOX fuel at its capacity, because of either commercial or political difficulties.
On the other hand, political developments could also accelerate the decline in plutonium inventories. A decision to halt operations at the Thorp reprocessing plant or increase MOX fabrication capability would lead to lower future plutonium inventories.
Projected Inventories in Key Countries
Understanding the impact of these various factors requires a better understanding of the inventories expected in key countries. Table 2 contains estimates of the size of plutonium inventories in key countries involived in commercial reprocessing for the years 2010 and 2015. These estimates are based on current plans for reprocessing, MOX fabrication, and MOX fuel irradiation. Unlike the projection in figure 1, these estimates include information on specific reactors scheduled to use MOX. Table 3 summarizes the projections of these two methodologies.
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| Countries with plans to use MOX Belgium France Germany Japan -without Rokkasho-mura -with Rockkasho-mura starting in 2007 and working as planned Sweden Switzerland |
2.8 40.3 24 29.3 n/a 0.83 1 |
0 30 - 45b 0 - 30c 0 - 20 d 15 - 35d 0? 0 |
0 20 - 45b 0 - 20c 0 - 10d 25 - 50d 0 0 |
| Sub-total | 30 - 95 with Rokkasho-mura: |
20 - 75 with Rokkasho-mura: | |
| Countries without plans to use MOXe Britain China India Italy Netherlands Spain Russia |
59.8 0 0.7 0.5 1.2 0? 30.3 |
90 0 ? 1.0 - 1.5 3.0 1 35f |
100 ? ? 1.0 - 1.5 3.0 1 35f |
| Sub-total | |||
| Countries with plans to dispose of civil plutonium with excess military plutonium United States |
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| Sub-total | |||
| Total (rounded) | 165 - 230 with Rokkasho-mura: |
165 - 220 with Rokkasho-mura: |
| a Source: table 1. |
| b This range reflects the uncertain future of the MELOX MOX fabrication facility. The upper bound assumes MELOX's capacity remains 100 tonnes per year for French plutonium. If the license to expand the facility to handle more French plutonium is granted, more MOX will be fabricated leading to a lower inventory of separated plutonium. The lower bound assumes that MELOX will fabricate a total of 125 tonnes per year of MOX fuel. |
| c This range reflects the uncertain future of both the amount of plutonium Germany will reprocess in the future and how much MOX fuel can be fabricated. If Germany terminates its post-baseload contracts to separate plutonium--currently an unlikely prospect--or can secure enough capacity within MOX fabrication plants to turn all of its plutonium into fuel, then the plutonium inventory would be minimized. Limited MOX capacity and continued reprocessing contracts will mean a larger separated inventory. Japan and Germany are by far the largest foreign MOX buyers, so as Japan's MOX requirements increase, Germany and Japan will be vying for the same MOX fuel. |
| d This range reflects the uncertain timing of Japan's use of MOX in reactors and its plants to build a reprocessing plant, Rokkasho-mura. If Japan implements its MOX use plan on schedule, it will load 18 reactors with MOX fuel by 2010, and minimize its inventory of separated plutonium; delaying the schedule will delay the time at which all of the plutonium is used (the estimate of 0 - 10 tonnes in 2015 reflects this). But the operation of a domestic reprocessing plant, or the negotiation of further reprocessing contracts in Europe, will increase the amount of separated plutonium —at this point there will not be enough reactors in which to insert that quantity of MOX fuel. And again, Japan and Germany are by far the largest foreign MOX buyers, so as Japan’s MOX requirements increase, Germany and Japan will be vying for the same MOX fuel. |
| e The following projections assume that neither MOX nor any other disposition actions occur. |
| f This estimate assumes that Russia will halt reprocessing of LWR spent fuel in 2002. |
Most of the estimates are ranges, reflecting uncertainties about MOX fabrication capacity and subsequent use in a reactor. For example, the range in the case of Japan reflects the uncertainty about which Japanese reactors will load MOX fuel, how much MOX fuel will each reactor use, and how long will the licensing of each reactor take. In the case of Germany, the range reflects the difficulty of utilities to acquire MOX fuel, despite having sufficient LWRs licensed to burn almost all of its separated plutonium.
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(from Table 2) | 195 +/- 30 With Rokkasho-mura: 210 +/- 35 | 190 +/- 30 With Rokkasho-mura: 225 +/- 35 | |
(from Figure 1) |
Observations
The estimates in this paper show that several national stocks of separated plutonium may remain large for considerable time. In addition, several countries have no ability to use MOX fuel and may not develop such a capability because of financial or political constraints.
Notes
1 Early versions of this report were co-authored by Lauren Barbour, then a Staff Scientist at ISIS. Back
2This projection assumes that SMP opens in 2001 and reaches a capacity of 120 tonnes of MOX fuel per year and the MELOX facility reaches 160 tonnes per year in 2004. This projection assumes that the post-baseload reprocessing contracts at Thorp and La Hague are fulfilled. It also assumes that the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant and an adequately-sized MOX fuel fabrication plant are also built, meaning that the separation and fabrication of plutonium is in balance for these two facilities. Whether these facilities will indeed operate or a balance will be achieved remains uncertain. In addition, current Japanese plans do not involve enough LWRs to use both MOX produced in Japan and MOX produced from spent fuel reprocessed in Europe during the next 10-15 years (see table 2). back