Images (click for large view) |
Facility |
North Korean
Declarations |
Unresolved Issues |
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1) Small IRT Research Reactor and
associated "hot cells" supplied by the Soviet Union;
reactor placed under IAEA safeguards in 1977. |
Admitted that in 1975
it separated minute amount of plutonium in these hot cells. The
plutonium was produced in the IRT reactor. |
North Korea has not
provided written records to substantiate its claims, raising
suspicions that it separated more plutonium from the reactor
since then. Worst-case assessments conclude North Korea could
have separated up to 4 kg of plutonium produced in this reactor. |
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2) Gas-Graphite Reactor (25 megawatt-thermal
(MWt)) at Yongbyon. It can produce on average enough plutonium
for one bomb per year. |
Claims that the reactor
is for electricity production (5MWe). Claims that the initial
core of fuel was unloaded in May - June, 1994 |
The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was denied the ability to inspect this fuel
to determine whether or not this core was indeed the first one.
Many suspect that the North unloaded most or all of the first
core in 1989, which would have resulted in about 7-10 kg of weapon-grade
plutonium in spent fuel. The core currently being unloaded contains
in total approximately 25 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. |
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3)"Radiochemical Laboratory"
at Yongbyon. Large plutonium separation plant, composed of
two separation "lines," parts of which are operational. |
Declared that it separated
about 100 g of weapon-grade plutonium on one occasion in March
1990 from damaged fuel rods that had been removed from the nearby
25MWt graphite reactor. |
After analyzing radioactive
samples taken from equipment and nuclear waste at the facility,
the IAEA concluded that North Korea had separated more plutonium
than it declared -- perhaps enough for a bomb or two. However,
North Korea has prevented IAEA inspectors from arriving at a
firm estimate of the amount of undeclared plutonium. |
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4) Two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon.
U.S. satellite photos show two camouflaged nuclear waste sites.
One is a building with a hidden basement that is connected to
the Radiochemical Laboratory by a trench that might contain pipes. |
Denies that these are
nuclear waste sites; instead insists that they are military sites
exempt from IAEA inspection. |
The sites might contain
waste leftover from separating plutonium. Because of the chance
of finding new evidence of the amount of separated plutonium,
the IAEA wants to inspect these sites and take samples of any
waste found there. |
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5) Gas-Graphite Reactors (under construction),
including a 200MWt reactor at Yongbyon and a 600-800 MWt reactor
at Taechon. The 200MWt reactor could be completed in a few years
and could produce enough plutonium for 8 to 10 bombs. The larger
reactor is also scheduled to be completed within the next several
years, but will probably be dedicated to electricity production. |
Plans to finish these
reactors to produce electricity. |
If completed, these
reactors could produce large quantities of weapon-grade plutonium,
enough for a sizable nuclear arsenal. Since the irradiated fuel
from this type of reactor is not generally considered suitable
for long-term storage or geological disposal, the North might
argue that it has to separate the plutonium for health and safety
reasons. The Radiochemical Laboratory, if finished, is believed
to have the capacity to separate all the plutonium from these
reactors. |
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6)Weaponization activities or facilities. |
Denies having done any
weaponization activities. |
North Korea may have
the capability to make nuclear weapons, but few indicators of
such activity have been found. |