Shahid Mahallati: “Temporary” Plant for Manufacturing Nuclear Weapon Cores
Iranian Pathway to a Nuclear Weapon Under the Amad Plan – What we learned from the Nuclear Archives
Sources
1. David Albright, Olli Heinonen, Frank Pabian, and Andrea Stricker, “A Key Missing Piece of the Amad Puzzle: The Shahid Boroujerdi Project for Production of Uranium Metal & Nuclear Weapons Components,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 11, 2019, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/summary-of-report-a-key-missing-piece-of-the-amad-puzzle-the-shahid-borouje/8 ↩2. The Institute uses the convention of referring to 3/14 in a Farsi document as 3.14, where the “/” is translated as a “.” Sometimes, the Farsi document uses 14/3, reflecting reading from right to left, which is also translated as 3.14. ↩
3. “A Key Missing Piece of the Amad Puzzle: The Shahid Boroujerdi Project for Production of Uranium Metal & Nuclear Weapons Components.” https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/a-key-missing-piece-of-the-amad-puzzle ↩
4. Director General of IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005. ↩
5. Hemmat is also spelled as Hemat.↩
6. The measurements 80 * 20 square meters defining an area containing the workshop are difficult to interpret, since they are not given as an area of the workshop. ↩
7. Translator’s comment: The use of the singular group when referring to plural is relatively common in Farsi, where here the translation is referring to both group 7 and group 14. There is no slash between 7 and 14, so it is not 7/14. ↩
8. Translator’s comment: The use of the singular group is relatively common in Farsi, when the translation is referring to the plural, here both group 7 and group 14. There is no slash between 7 and 14, so it is not 7/14. ↩
9. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “The Physics Research Center and Iran’s Parallel Military Nuclear Program,” Institute for Science and International Security, February 23, 2012, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/PHRC_report_23February2012.pdf See also Institute web site page, PHRC Documents, http://isis-online.org/phrc ↩
10. Frank V. Pabian (2015) The South African Denuclearization Exemplar, The Nonproliferation Review, 22:1, 27-52, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2015.1071969 https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5nWGiVQ5CevyjqXrjWJe/full and Albright with Stricker, Revisiting South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2016), available at Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and other booksellers and as a pdf at https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/RevisitingSouthAfricasNuclearWeaponsProgram.pdf ↩
11. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020, https://isis-online.org/uploads/iaea-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_NPT_March_2020_report.pdf ↩
12. See Project 110 organizational chart in isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/from-irans-nuclear-archive-organizational-chart-of-project-110-amad-supraor/8 ↩
13. The Physics Research Center and Iran’s Parallel Military Nuclear Program. ↩
14. Briefing of Albright, by telephone, June 6, 2018. ↩
15. David Albright and Andrea Stricker, Taiwan’s Former Nuclear Weapons Program: Nuclear Weapons On-Demand (Washington, DC, Institute for Science and International Security, 2018). https://isis-online.org/books/detail/taiwans-former-nuclear-weapons-program-nuclear-weapons-on-demand/15 ↩
16. Ibid. ↩
17. “A Key Missing Piece of the Amad Puzzle: The Shahid Boroujerdi Project for Production of Uranium Metal & Nuclear Weapons Components.” ↩
18. IAEA Director General, Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, December 2, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf ↩
19. Last phrase is paraphrased: “Reality denied comes back to haunt,” Philip K. Dick, Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said. ↩