DECEMBER 2025

January 2, 2026

Key findings

• In December, the trend of saturation in the number of Shahed-type UAV launches, which had been ongoing since the beginning of autumn, continued. Specifically, 5,131 Shahed-type drones were launched in December, of which 3,065 were designated as strike drones, and the remaining drones were categorized as decoy drones. Furthermore, this is the lowest figure recorded since the onset of autumn. The mean frequency of Shahed drone launches in December was approximately 166 per day. This figure approximates the mean number of Shahed drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 175 UAVs per day, with a peak in July, when the mean was 203 drones per day (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
• To summarize, it can be stated that since the onset of summer 2025, the quantity of Shahed drones has remained approximately constant at 5,340 per month, with a maximum of 6,297 in July. This suggests the potential for production saturation or constrained supplies of essential components.
• Presently, there has been an observed increase in the relative number of Shahed-type drones that are equipped with online video cameras and radio modems, as compared to the total number of such UAVs. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the utilization of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively control Shahed-type drones. This phenomenon may also be one of the factors contributing to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have initiated the publication of the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As demonstrated in Table 1, the mean number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the final quarter of 2025 approximates 60% of the aggregate number (58% in October, 62% in November, and 60% in December) of drones launched.
  • This finding is consistent with our earlier estimates and facilitates the calculation of the number of Shahed/Geran strike drones produced in Alabuga.
  • Concurrently, it is noteworthy that in mass attacks, the proportion of strike UAVs in the total number of launches typically diminishes, while in targeted attacks with a limited number of UAVs, the percentage of strike UAVs can reach 80% (see Figure 2).
• A decrease in the total number of Shahed drone launches was observed in December (5,131) compared to November (5,447). However, the absolute number of successful hits in December (886) is higher than in November (826) and ranks second after October (989) for all periods (see Fig. 3). The efficacy of strikes in December was 17.27%, which is the third highest monthly figure for all of 2025 (see Table 1).

Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

Firstly, it should be emphasized that the main purpose of decoy drones, despite some of them being equipped with small cumulative munitions, is to distract attention and exhaust air defense systems, as well as to conduct video reconnaissance. To assess the effectiveness of strikes, it is imperative to consider not all launched UAVs of the Shahed type, but specifically the strike-type models, such as the Shahed-136/131, Geran2-3, and Harpy 1A. The following assessments will be provided: overall effectiveness and the effectiveness of hits by the strike UAVs (in parentheses).

As demonstrated in Table 1, the average percentage of hits relative to the total number of Shahed-type UAV launches (both strike and decoy drones) exhibited a marked increase from 2-3% in January-February to 9% in March. Since April 2025, this figure has further elevated, ranging from 11.5% to 18.7%, and in terms of the number of strike UAV launches, from 19.5% to 32.3%, respectively. In December, these figures were 17.27% total and 28.21% strike-type UAVs, respectively.

It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a large scale and those that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness exhibited a decline to 5% total (8% strike UAVs). Conversely, during attacks involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness ranged from 40% to 50% (70%–80%). A notable illustration of this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, when the effectiveness surged remarkably to an exceptional 66%. 

In December, the maximum hit rate relative to the total number of UAVs launched was 45% on December 11. However, when only strike UAVs are considered, the maximum effectiveness was achieved on December 17 and amounted to 72.5%, as shown in Figures 4.a and 4b. These features must be considered when assessing the effectiveness of strikes by Shahed-type UAVs.

At the same time, as demonstrated in Figure 4, Shahed-type UAVs generally exhibit the lowest hit efficiency during mass attacks. In rare instances, this efficiency can also be low during attacks involving a limited number of UAVs. The following is a list of the lowest effectiveness of hits in December:

• 9.2% on December 5-6, with a total number of launches of 653 (20% of 300 strike UAVs);
• 17.8% on December 12-13, with a total number of launches of 460 (10.3% of 270 strike UAVs);
• 7.3% on December 13-14, with a total number of launches of 138 (11.76% of 85 strike UAVs);
• 6.1% on December 22-23, with a total number of launches of 635 (9.75% of 400 strike UAVs); and
• 4.8% on December 26-27, with a total number of launches of 519 (8.33% of 300 strike UAVs).

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker[1], most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. At the same time, four combined massive attacks in December 2025 focused primarily on energy infrastructure in various regions of Ukraine (see Fig. 5).

Conclusions on the Increase in Effectiveness

Offensives comprising a substantial number of Shahed-type UAVs (>400) are predominantly components of integrated attacks encompassing diverse categories of missiles (refer to Figure 5). These occurrences manifest 4-5 times per month, commencing in the summer of 2025, apart from August, where it was 3 times (refer to Figure 1). In these attacks, they serve a dual purpose: to hit targets, but more importantly, to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses, thereby increasing the effectiveness of missiles, which are significantly more expensive.

A thorough examination of the statistics and geography of strikes involving Shahed-type UAVs reveals the primary factors contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of these strikes within Ukrainian territory:

• First, the proximity of the strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.) reduces flight time and allows for more efficient route planning.
• Secondly, recent advancements in navigation systems, particularly the incorporation of 16‑element CRPA antennas, have enhanced the capacity to counteract Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.
• Thirdly, the integration of online cameras and modems facilitates real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and evasive maneuvers.

There has been an increase in reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to neutralize than conventional Shahed‑136/131 drones. However, there have been reports of their successful interception by Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones.[2]

The most salient factor is the constant use of many Shahed-type drones, which rapidly deplete air defense resources. To address this challenge, it is imperative to fortify countermeasures and foster the development of Ukrainian capabilities to counter these threats, including the deployment of interceptor drones. Additionally, it is crucial to augment the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukraine to effectively combat the threat posed by drones.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June through December 2025.

	Hits		Interceptions		Launches Total		Launches strike UAVs Shahed & Geran			Hits/ Launches Total	Hits/ strike UAVs launches
	Total	Average daily	Total	Average daily	Total	Average  daily	Total official published	Total estimated	% of total	Average monthly	Average monthly
2025	7263		47275		54538		12728	19481	59%
January	90	2.90	2539	81.90	2629	84.81		1551		3.42%	5.80%
February	102	3.64	3802	135.79	3904	139.43		2303		2.61%	4.43%
March	377	12.16	3821	123.26	4198	135.42		2477		8.98%	15.22%
April	379	12.63	2043	68.10	2422	80.73		1429		15.65%	26.52%
May	714	23.03	3289	106.10	4003	129.13		2362		17.84%	30.23%
June	760	25.33	4678	155.93	5438	181.27		3208		13.98%	23.69%
July	723	23.32	5574	179.81	6297	203.13		3715		11.48%	19.46%
August	680	21.94	3448	111.23	4128	133.16		2436		16.47%	27.92%
September	737	24.57	4906	163.53	5643	188.10	3245		58%	13.06%	22.71%
October	989	31.90	4309	139.00	5298	170.90	3063		58%	18.67%	32.29%
November	826	27.53	4621	154.03	5447	181.57	3355		62%	15.16%	24.62%
December	886	28.58	4245	136.94	5131	165.52	3065		60%	17.27%	28.91%

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in 2025.

Figure 2.  Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 3.  Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.

Figure 4a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 4b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type strike UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 5.  Maps of the movement of air units (missiles and Shahed-type UAVs) over Ukrainian territory at the massive combined attacks. Source: @monitoringwar, https://t.me/monitoringwar and https://t.me/StrategicaviationT

NOVEMBER 2025

Key findings

• Contrary to predictions by some experts and officials of a substantial increase in production and attacks using large numbers of Shahed-type drones in the fall, 5,447 Shahed-type drones were launched in November, of which 3,355 were designated as strike drones. The average frequency of Shahed-type drone launches was approximately 182 per day. This figure approximates the mean number of Shahed-type drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 176 UAVs per day, with a peak in July, averaging 203 drones per day (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
  • Consequently, since the onset of summer 2025, the number of Shahed-type drones has remained approximately constant at 5,375 per month, which may suggest production saturation or constrained supplies of essential components.
• A recent and significant increase has been observed in the number of Shahed-type drones equipped with online video cameras and radio modems in the skies over Ukraine. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the usage of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively control Shahed-type drones. This phenomenon may also be a contributing factor to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As illustrated in Table 1, the mean number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the fall of 2025 approximates 59 percent of the total number (58 percent in September-October, 62 percent in November) launched. This finding aligns with our prior estimations and facilitates the calculation of the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced in Alabuga.
  • Concurrently, it is noteworthy that during the initial phase of November, the proportion of strike UAVs was approximately 64 percent, while in the latter half of November, it exhibited a modest decline to 59 percent (refer to Figure 2).
• Notwithstanding the rise in the aggregate number of Shahed-type drone launches in November (5447) relative to October (5298), the absolute number of successful attacks in November ranks second (826) after October (989) (see Fig. 3). The effectiveness of strikes in November was 15.16 percent, while in October it was 18.7 percent, which is the highest monthly figure observed for all periods (see Table 1).

Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

As illustrated in Table 1, starting in April 2025, the mean percentage of on-target hits is projected to range from 11.5 percent to 18.7 percent. It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a massive scale and those targeting deep within Ukraine, the relative effectiveness decreased to 5–8 percent. In contrast, during attacks involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness rate ranged from 40 percent to 50 percent. A notable illustration of this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, when the effectiveness surged to an extraordinary 66 percent. In November, the maximum recorded damage rates were 46.38 percent on November 9 and 49.58 percent on November 11, as illustrated in Figure 4.

In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 4, the Shahed-type UAVs demonstrated their lowest levels of effectiveness in November during instances of mass attacks. The effectiveness of these UAVs was recorded as follows:

• 11.35 percent on November 8, with a total number of launches of 458;
• 5.35 percent on November 14, with a total number of launches of 430;
• 7.14 percent on November 19, with a total number of launches of 476;
• 5.6 percent on November 25, with a total number of launches of 464; and
• 5.87 percent on November 29, with a total number of launches of 596.

It is important to note that attacks involving a significant number of Shahed-type drones (>400) are commonly part of combined attacks involving various types of missiles (see Fig.5), which occur every 5-7 days in the fall of 2025 (see Fig.1). Consequently, they serve a dual role, both striking targets and contributing to the depletion of Ukraine's air defense, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the missiles, which are significantly more expensive.

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker[1], most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. Of the five such combined massive attacks in November 2025, three were concentrated exclusively on Kyiv, one on Kyiv and the Poltava region (gas exploration), and one on the western part of Ukraine (see Fig. 5).

A thorough examination of the statistics and geography of strikes involving Shahed-type UAVs reveals the primary factors contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of these strikes within Ukrainian territory:

• First, the proximity of the strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.) reduces flight time and allows for more efficient route planning.
• Secondly, recent advancements in navigation systems, particularly the incorporation of 16‑element CRPA antennas, have enhanced the capacity to counteract Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.
• Thirdly, the integration of online cameras and modems facilitates real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and evasive maneuvers.

There has been an increase in reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to neutralize than conventional Shahed‑136 drones. However, there have been reports of their successful interception by Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones.[2]

Conclusions

The most salient factor is the constant use of a large number of Shahed-type drones, which rapidly depletes air defense resources. In order to address this challenge, it is imperative to fortify countermeasures and foster the development of Ukrainian capabilities to counter these threats, including the deployment of interceptor drones. Additionally, it is crucial to augment the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukraine to effectively combat the threat posed by drones.

 

 

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June-November 2025.

 

	Hits			Interceptions		Launches Total		Launches Shahed &Geran		Hits/ Launches
2025	Total	Average daily	Total		Average daily	Total	Average  daily	Total	%	Average monthly
January	90	2.90	2539		81.90	2629	84.81			3.42%
February	102	3.64	3802		135.79	3904	139.43			2.61%
March	377	12.16	3821		123.26	4198	135.42			8.98%
April	379	12.63	2043		68.10	2422	80.73			15.65%
May	714	23.03	3289		106.10	4003	129.13			17.84%
June	760	25.33	4678		155.93	5438	181.27			13.98%
July	723	23.32	5574		179.81	6297	203.13			11.48%
August	680	21.94	3448		111.23	4128	133.16			16.47%
September	737	24.57	4906		163.53	5643	188.10	3245	58%	13.06%
October	989	31.90	4309		139.00	5298	170.90	3063	58%	18.67%
November	826	27.53	4621		154.03	5447	181.57	3355	62%	15.16%

Table.1 Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran strike drones vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in Oct.-Nov. 2025.

 

Figure 3. Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.

Figure 4.  Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during the autumn of 2025.

 

 

OCTOBER 2025

Key findings

• Despite the anticipation of some experts and officials regarding a substantial escalation in Shahed attacks during the fall season, the observed frequency of Shahed drone launches in October amounted to approximately 171 per day. This figure approximates the number of launches recorded in June and September, with an average of 181 and 188 launches per day, respectively. The observed frequency of Shahed drone launches in October exceeded that of August, which averaged 133 per day due to a decline in attacks during the initial 20 days of August, yet fell short of the peak observed in July, with an average of 203 drones per day (see Fig.1 and Table 1).
  • Consequently, since the onset of summer 2025, the number of Shahed drones has remained approximately constant at 5,500 per month, which may indicate either production saturation or limited supplies of key components.
• Recently, there has been a notable increase in the presence of Shahed-like UAVs equipped with online video cameras and radio modems in the skies over Ukraine. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the utilization of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively manage Shahed-type UAVs. This phenomenon may also be a contributing factor to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran UAVs in the total number launched. As can be seen from Table 1, the average number of Shahed/Geran strike drones is approximately 58% of the total number. This coincides with the estimates we provided earlier and allows us to estimate the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced in Alabuga. If we take the value of 58%, then in October, approximately 3, 063 Shahed/Geran drones were launched.
  • At the same time, it should be noted that in the first half of October the number of Strike UAVs was about 55% but in the second half of October it became 65% (See Fig. 2).
• Despite a decline in the aggregate number of Shahed-like launches in October compared to previous periods (June, July, and September), the absolute number of successful attacks in October was higher (see Fig. 3). The efficacy of strikes in October was 18.7%, representing the highest monthly rate observed across all periods (see Table 1).

Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

As illustrated in Table 1, beginning in April 2025, the mean number of successful hits on the target is estimated to be between 12% and 18%. It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a mass scale and those that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness exhibited a decline reaching 5–8%. Conversely, in relatively smaller attacks, involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness levels attained a range of 40–50%. A notable instance that exemplifies this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, where the effectiveness surged to an exceptional 66%, as illustrated in Figure 4.

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker), most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. Consequently, the efficacy of strikes may be enhanced due to the following factors: first, the proximity of strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), which results in reduced flight times and more efficient route planning; second, the recent advancements in navigation systems, specifically the adoption of 16-element CRPA antennas, which enhance the ability to counter Ukrainian electronic warfare systems; and third, the integration of online cameras and modems, which enables the real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and the execution of maneuvers to evade targeting.

There has also been an increase in reports regarding the deployment of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which poses a significantly greater challenge to neutralize in comparison to conventional Shahed-136 UAVs.

Of primary importance is the persistent utilization of substantial numbers of Shahed-type drones, which are rapidly depleting air defense resources. This necessitates the enhancement of countermeasures and the augmentation of the provision of Western air defense systems to counter drones.

Figure 1.  Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June-October 2025.

 

	Hits			Interceptions		Launches Total		Launches Shahed &Geran		Hits/ Launches
2025	Total	Average daily	Total		Average daily	Total	Average  daily	Total	%	Average monthly
January	90	2.90	2539		81.90	2629	84.81			3.42%
February	102	3.64	3802		135.79	3904	139.43			2.61%
March	377	12.16	3821		123.26	4198	135.42			8.98%
April	379	12.63	2043		68.10	2422	80.73			15.65%
May	714	23.03	3289		106.10	4003	129.13			17.84%
June	760	25.33	4678		155.93	5438	181.27			13.98%
July	723	23.32	5574		179.81	6297	203.13			11.48%
August	680	21.94	3448		111.23	4128	133.16			16.47%
September	737	24.57	4906		163.53	5643	188.10	3245	58%	13.06%
October	989	31.90	4309		139.00	5298	170.90	3063	58%	18.67%

Table 1.  Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in 2025.

 

Figure 2.  Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in October 2025.

Figure 3.  Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.

Figure 4.  Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during the summer-autumn of 2025.

 

SEPTEMBER 2025

Key findings

• After a decline in the number of attacks in the first 20 days of August, the number of attacks increased in September (see Figure 1) and now stands at approximately 188 Shahed-type drones per day, close to the figures for June (an average of 181 drones per day) and July (an average of 203 drones per day).
• The average monthly number of drones for the period June through September does not show any increase, amounting to about 5400 drones per month, possibly indicating either production saturation or limited supplies of key components.
• Since September 8, official Ukrainian sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran drones in the total number launched (except for cases of mass attacks of 400-600 drones per day).  Figure 2 shows that the average number of Shahed/Geran strike drones is approximately 58 percent of the total number.  This coincides with the estimates the Institute provided in earlier reports and allows an estimate of the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced at Alabuga.  If the value of 58 percent is taken, then in September, approximately 3,250 Shahed/Geran drones were launched.
• Despite the decrease in the total number of Shahed launches in August compared to previous periods, the relative number of successful hits was higher in August.  In September, the effectiveness of the strikes was close to that of June (the number of drones launched was also similar in these two months).

Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

As can be seen from Table 1, starting in April 2025, the average number of hits on the target is approximately 12 to 18 percent.  During some attacks (especially massive ones and attacks deep into Ukrainian territory), relative effectiveness drops to 5–8 percent, and sometimes reaches 30–40 percent (see Figure 3).  In fact, as noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker), the largest number of hits falls on Kyiv and the territory of Ukraine closest to Russia (the border or the front line).  Thus, effectiveness can increase due to the fact that when striking areas close to the front line or the Ukrainian border (Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), the flight time is shorter, and the routes are better planned.  Moreover, recent changes to navigation systems allow the attacking drones to better counter Ukrainian electronic warfare systems and adjust flight trajectories.

There continue to be reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which fly faster and are more difficult to shoot down than the Shahed-136 type drones.

Nonetheless, the steady use of a large number of Shahed-type drones exhausts air defense resources. This requires increased supplies of Western anti-drone air defense systems.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type drones, aka UAVs, during June to September 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed vs total number of strike+decoy drones in September 2025.

	Hits		Interceptions		Launches		Interceptions/ Launches	Hits/ Launches
	Total	Average daily	Total	Average daily	Total	Average  daily	Average monthly	Average monthly
September	737	24.57	4906	163.53	5643	188.10	86.94%	13.06%
August	680	21.94	3448	111.23	4128	133.16	83.53%	16.47%
July	723	23.32	5574	179.81	6297	203.13	88.52%	11.48%
June	760	25.33	4678	155.93	5438	181.27	86.02%	13.98%
May	714	23.03	3289	106.10	4003	129.13	82.16%	17.84%
April	379	12.63	2043	68.10	2422	80.73	84.35%	15.65%
March	377	12.16	3821	123.26	4198	135.42	91.02%	8.98%
Feb.	102	3.64	3802	135.79	3904	139.43	97.39%	2.61%
Jan.	90	2.90	2539	81.90	2629	84.81	96.58%	3.42%

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type drones in 2025.

 

Figure 3. Statistics of the Hits vs launches of the Shahed-type drones, aka UAVs, during the summer of 2025.

 

 

AUGUST 2025 

Key Findings

• The first 20 days in August 2025 saw a decrease in the number of Shahed-type drone launches and the absence of large-scale attacks against Ukraine.      However, the number of attacks increased sharply a few days after the August 15^th summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
• After the large number of Shahed-type drone attacks in June (181 drones daily average) and especially in July (203 drones daily average), the daily average number during August 1-20 was 88 but by the end of August the daily average had risen to 133.
• It should also be noted that compared to the large peak attacks in July (539, 728, and 597 drones per day), the most massive attack in early August involved only 162 drones but in the last 10 days of August the massive attacks resumed (574, 598 and 537 drones per day).

Causes of Relative Decrease in Launches

The relative decrease in the number of drones launched against Ukraine may be due to many factors, including: 

• Ukraine's attacks on component manufacturing in Russia (especially navigation equipment), problems with the supply chain for components, and preparations for some kind of super-strike.
  • However, many also believe that Putin decided to reduce the intensity of attacks ahead of the summit with Trump, while simultaneously building up forces for strikes after the meeting.  This view was confirmed by statistics on attacks shortly after the summit ended.
  • Another reason for the decrease may be related to youth workers at the plant, the “summer vacation” of Alabuga Polytechnic students and scandals related to the exposure of the use of foreign young women in the production of drones.
  • And finally, the lower number of launches in August may also be related to the modernization of Shahed/Geran + Gerbera/Parodia drones and their equipping with new electronics to expand their functionality, for example:
    • Role splitting and adaptation to “wolf pack” tactics.
    • The latest “innovation” is installing video cameras and modems so that strike drones, which are preprogrammed, have possibilities to be guided online, and drones that previously only served as decoys are now also used as reconnaissance drones deep inside Ukrainian territory.

Increased Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

Despite the decrease in the total number of Shahed launches in August compared to previous periods, the relative number of successful hits was higher in August.  This may be because in August, Russia focused on strikes on territory close to the front line or the Ukrainian border (Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), where the Shahed drones do not fly long distances throughout Ukraine.  This is clearly visible in the graph: during the most massive attacks in June-July, the relative effectiveness of strikes was very low, sometimes around 3 percent. 

There are increasing reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to shoot down than the usual Shahed-136 type drones.

In fact, as noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker)  the largest number of hits falls on Kyiv and the territory of Ukraine, which is close to Russia (the border or the front line).

The improved effectiveness of strikes in August may also be related to the fact that the Russians, as detailed in the report of @Tomasz Darmolinski (published in LinkedIn), began to use “Wolfpack” tactics.  This “Wolfpack” tactic is vividly illustrated in Ukrainian Telegram channels, which track the direction of attacks in detail and report on the approaching drones. 

 

Figure 1.  Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type drones during the summer 2025.

 

Figure 2.  Statistics of the Hits vs launches of the Shahed-type drones during the summer 2025.

Figure 3.  An example of grouping Shahed-type UAVs during one of the attacks. Source: https://t.me/war_monitor/32002