Reports
May 2025 Updated Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment Against Ukraine
by Dr. Igor Anokhin1 and Spencer August Faragasso
May 12, 2025
Download PDFRecorded drone strikes over the period March 1 through May 12, 2025 show Russia continued its near daily bombardment of Ukraine with Shahed 136 drones, causing immense destruction, despite ceasefires. Russia announced a limited one-month ceasefire, starting on March 18th, meant to exempt attacks of Ukrainian energy infrastructure, a common target. While the number of drones launched during this timeframe dropped, Ukraine still witnessed near-daily attacks. 2 Ukrainian officials have presented evidence that Russia disregarded this ceasefire and continued to attack Ukraine’s power plants and electrical grid with Shahed 136 drones. 3 After another, albeit brief, ceasefire from May 8th to the 10th, coinciding with Victory in Europe Day, Russia resumed attacks on Ukraine using Shahed drones. While the majority of the drones are being downed, 12.5 percent on average across the assessed reporting period are hitting their targets. In a worsening development, May has so far experienced a much greater hit rate of 18 percent. Only a small number of the drones are required to survive the journey to cause great damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and other targets. Ultimately, the Shahed 136 is a key weapon to Russia that enables it to maintain daily destructive pressure on Ukraine, despite negotiation attempts to end the war. Russia may be learning new ways to avoid its Shahed 136 drones being downed by Ukraine.
This report assesses data covering the period of March 1, 2025, to May 12, 2025, on the Russian military’s attacks with Shahed 136 drones, building upon a previous assessment released in early March 2025. 4 We assess the data as the number of Shahed 136 reportedly launched, the number intercepted, the number that successfully struck their targets, the number of drones reported as “lost”, and the number of drones that reportedly returned to Russian (or Belarusian) territory. The data analyzed for this report came from open-source channels verified by the Institute and official statements released by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Assessing the true number of Shahed 136 drones used in the attacks continues to be complicated considering Russia’s prolific use of decoy drones like the Gerbera and the Parody that mimic the Shahed.
The persistent use of the Shahed 136 drone by the Russian armed forces highlights its importance as a weapon system that it seeks to improve. Protecting the production of Shahed 136 drones has also become a priority for Russia. On April 23, the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, the site where the Shahed 136 and the Gerbera decoy are produced, was attacked by Ukrainian remotely controlled aircraft and drone systems. While the attack ultimately failed to cause any damage to the production plants and the aircraft were intercepted, it revealed the extent Russia has gone to protect the site. Satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute in a recent publication showed the installation of an anti-aircraft defensive site intended to protect the Alabuga complex. 5 In line with this, no decreases in Shahed drone launches were noted after the attack.
Data Assessment
Between March 1, 2025, and May 12, 2025, Russia used 7974 drones against Ukraine. Of the drones used, 999 hit their targets (a 12.5 percent hit rate), 6975 are recorded as having missed their targets, of which Ukraine successfully downed at least 4188; another 2785 were lost in the area of operation; none returned to Russian (or Belarusian) territory; and two were recorded as just flying in the air, aka fate unknown (see Figure 1). Across the total assessed period, each attack used an average of 110 Shahed drones. Table 1 shows that May (so far) and March both have higher average launch rates for the respective months than April. In March 2025, 4198 drones were used, in April, 2422 drones were used, and in the first 12 days of May 1345 drones were used. The lower launch count in April may represent a depletion of Russia’s stockpile of drones from heavy use in March. It also overlaps with a limited ceasefire that started in late March, although a direct correlation is hard to make, as Russian Shahed 136 attacks on Ukraine continued on a near-daily basis.
After a brief ceasefire on May 8-10, Russia resumed attacks on Ukraine using Shahed drones. On May 11 and 12, 108 Shahed drones were launched per day. There were only six days between March 1, 2025, and May 12, 2025, when Russia did not attack Ukraine with Shahed-136 drones (April 1st, 7th, and 20th, and May 8th, 9th, and 10th). The stockpile appears to have been built up again leading into May. The largest attacks in the assessed period occurred on March 21st (214 Shahed-type drones) and May 7th (218 Shahed-type drones). The total of 1354 drones used in the first twelve days of May 2025 are a relatively large increase over April, but less than March. For the first twelve days of March 2025, 1601 drones were used, and in the same period of April 2025, 765 drones were used.
Despite the majority of the drones being downed, an overall rate of 12.5 percent reaching their target is significant. It’s also significant that the absolute number of successful hits in April (379 hits) was higher than in March (377 hits), even though the total number of launches was almost halved. May has so far seen a much greater hit rate of 18 percent, where 243 of the 1354 drones launched have hit their targets. Only a small number of the drones are required to survive the journey to cause great damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and other targets, and this fits precisely into Russia’s strategy in using the drones. The drones are mass-produced and are inexpensive compared to ballistic missiles and other weapon systems, meaning they can be readily expended.
Table 1. A summary of the drones launched.
Figure 1. Recorded Shahed-type daily launches from March 1, 2025, to May 12, 2025, detailing the number intercepted, the number that successfully struck their targets, the number of drones reported as “lost”, and the number of drones that reportedly returned to Russian (or Belarusian) territory.
The chart in Figure 2 shows the daily launch rate of “strike drones” over the full period considered, March 1, 2025, to May 12, 2025, recorded from data released by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The chart shows that Russia is keeping up pressure on Ukrainian defenses by launching near daily drone strikes. Drones appear to be launched in cyclical patterns, where spikes in drone launches are then followed by short lulls that feature fewer drones, a trend that’s been previously observed in past analysis by the Institute.
Figure 2. This chart shows the recorded Shahed 136 and dummy drones daily launches from March 1, 2025, to May 12, 2025. The blue line charts the moving daily average.
1. Dr. Igor Anokhin’s affiliation is the Institute for Nuclear Research, National Academy of Science of Ukraine. ↩
2. David E. Sanger and Paul Sonne, “Putin Agrees to Limits on Energy Targets but Not Full Ukraine Cease-Fire,” The New York Times, March 18, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/18/us/politics/trump-putin-call-ukraine-russia-ceasefire.html#:~:text=Still%2C%20if%20strikes%20on%20energy,Our%20side%20will%20support%20this. ↩
3. Robyn Dixon, “Russia set to end energy ceasefire with Ukraine, even as fighting rages,” The Washington Post, April 16, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/16/russia-ukraine-expiration-energy-ceasefire/. ↩
4. Dr. Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso, “Updated Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment Against Ukraine,” Institute for Science and International Security, March 5, 2025, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/updated-analysis-of-russian-shahed-136-deployment-against-ukraine/. ↩
5. Spencer August Faragasso, with the Good ISIS Team, “Alabuga Special Economic Zone Post-Attack Analysis and Air Defense Site Identification,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 1, 2025, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/alabuga-special-economic-zone-post-attack-analysis. ↩
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