Five months after the 12 Day War’s conclusion, it is useful to take stock of the status of Iran's nuclear enrichment and weaponization sites that were attacked.  Are the sites being rebuilt, sanitized, or left as they were on the day they were bombed?  What is the status of sites that held enriched uranium, particularly 60 percent highly enriched uranium but also stocks of 20 percent and up to five percent enriched uranium?  In addition, what is the status of two key sites not attacked in June, the Pickaxe Mountain complex near Natanz and Taleghan 2 at Parchin, the former slated for centrifuge-related activities or potentially possessing stocks of enriched uranium and the latter posing a risk of having a link to nuclear weapons development?

The Institute previously published a comprehensive assessment of major sites attacked in late June, just after the war’s end,^[1] and subsequently published additional studies on damage to individual sites.  Overall, the damage caused by airstrikes to numerous nuclear sites was extensive and, in many cases, catastrophic.  Iran has since undertaken damage assessments and efforts to conduct clean up and fortification work to varying extent at several sites.

The main nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan were largely destroyed and have seen little significant activity since the war.  The extent of damage to the tunnel portion of the Esfahan mountain complex remains unknown but could be severe.  The activities at Fordow to the extent visible appear to have been mainly related to damage assessments and minimal clean up.  At Natanz, activities also point towards protecting the site’s remaining utilities against future attacks. 

A major exception is at the Esfahan mountain complex, where Iran has taken actions to allow access and better protect at least one of the three tunnel entrances leading into the mountain. This tunnel entrance may have been recently accessed.  In a recent image, dated November 20, one portal entrance appears open.  In addition, the image shows that Iran may have installed what can effectively be called "Cruise Missile Chicane Barriers."  Two thick protective barriers work together to block a missile flying straight at the entrance. 

Overall, satellite imagery indicates that Iran's uranium enrichment program remains significantly set back.  At present, Iran does not appear able to enrich uranium in any significant manner or make gas centrifuges in significant numbers.  Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities, its facility to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its centrifuge manufacturing and research and development facilities remain severely damaged or destroyed. 

Unlike the enrichment-related sites attacked, select nuclear weaponization sites show extensive clean-up efforts.  Based on satellite imagery, at least three weaponization-related sites that were attacked have undergone cleanup activities that appear to include salvaging of remaining equipment and thus may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.

In addition, a nuclear weaponization site called Taleghan 2, not attacked in June but destroyed in the fall of 2024, has undergone significant construction activity over the last year. It now appears near completion, and holds a large, cylindrical chamber, which could be a high-explosive containment vessel suitable for nuclear weapons development activities.   

There are ongoing construction efforts at a mountainous area just south of the Natanz enrichment site known by its tallest peak as “Pickaxe Mountain.”  This site was not visibly attacked in June and comprises two underground tunnel complexes, one still under construction, labeled the Pickaxe Mountain Tunnel complex, and another built in 2007 and called the 2007 tunnel complex.  Iran announced in 2020 that the purpose of the Pickaxe tunnel complex is to hold an advanced centrifuge assembly facility that can produce several thousand centrifuges a year.  In addition, based on the estimated size of the underground halls, the Institute several years ago assessed that site could also hold a centrifuge enrichment facility.^[2]  The Pickaxe tunnel complex is not yet operational, but construction has been steady for several years^[3] and now appears to be nearing the end, at least of the tunnel complex itself.  In addition, the outer security perimeter wall of both tunnel complexes, which started well before the war in early 2025,^[4] is completed, although additional security measures are still being constructed.  Iran has never provided a reason for the 2007 tunnel complex.  The 2007 tunnel site appeared dormant for more than a decade but was slowly reactivated about five years ago with dramatic changes to the inner security perimeters at its tunnel entrances since September 2023.  During the war, stocks of enriched uranium may have been evacuated from the main Natanz site, a suspicion that is increased by hardening and recent burial efforts at its tunnel entrances.  In recent imagery, the 2007 tunnel entrances appear to have been modified to make them harder to access, perhaps to harden them against attack, perhaps to make inspections by the IAEA more difficult, if Iran did finally allow the IAEA to access its stocks of enriched uranium.  Given Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complex’s declared connection to the Iranian enrichment program and the 2007 tunnel complex’s possible role in storing enriched uranium, ongoing activities warrant close scrutiny.  With the widescale destruction of Iran’s other centrifuge related facilities, the Pickaxe Mountain complex is a potential candidate site for any Iranian reconstitution of its centrifuge program, from centrifuge component production to centrifuge assembly to uranium enrichment.

Special attention should be paid to the status of a new enrichment plant Iran declared to the IAEA in June just before the start of the war.  The Institute has assessed that the enrichment plant was to be inside the Esfahan mountain tunnel complex, which was heavily damaged in the war.  It should be noted, according to the November 12, 2025, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA “does not know the precise location of IFEP, its status for safeguards purposes, including whether it contains nuclear material, or whether it was affected by the military attacks.”

The fate and status of enriched uranium stocks, particularly stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) enriched to 60 percent in the isotope uranium 235, remain unconfirmed.^[5]  Iran has refused to allow the IAEA to verify these stocks, and these stocks, particularly the approximately 440 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, pose an ongoing threat.  Before the war, Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan held these quantities of enriched uranium of various enrichment levels at a number of facilities within the sites. In late October 2025, Director General Rafael Grossi stated that inspectors have seen movement around nuclear sites where stockpiles of enriched uranium are stored.^[6]  As of November 19, however, the IAEA assessment remains that the enriched uranium stockpiles were not moved away from their sites, which would be Esfahan, Fordow, and Natanz, although this does not mean they were not moved within the sites. 

With neither access to the sites nor updated information from Iran, the IAEA. has had to rely on satellite imagery, which can only show so much.  Outstanding questions remain that must be answered.  The location and status of Iran's stockpiles of both low and highly enriched uranium need to be verified as well as the quantity of centrifuges Iran built prior to the war and never installed.  International inspectors need to gain access to Iran's nuclear facilities to conduct a full damage assessment and determine what remains of Iran's nuclear program underneath the rubble.  As was the case before the war, the Iran safeguards issues extend beyond monitoring Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and enrichment capabilities and include the need for the IAEA to ascertain that Iran’s entire nuclear program has no nuclear weapons dimensions.  The visible activities over the last five months indicate that Iran does not intend to facilitate the resolution of either. 

Iran has announced publicly that it is going to rebuild its “peaceful” nuclear program.^[7]  However, Iran will need to spend significant time, resources, and money to rebuild and reconstitute what was destroyed or damaged during the 12-Day War.  To do so will require the importation of a great variety and quantity of sanctioned items from abroad, while facing reduced chances of successfully importing many of these vital goods due to the snapback of UN Security Council sanctions and the reinstatement of the international law banning Iran’s enrichment program.  After five months, Iran appears to have made minimal progress on reconstituting its destroyed capabilities.

 

Sites Considered

The attacks by Israel and the United States caused considerable damage to Iran’s nuclear program, comprising a set of IAEA-safeguarded sites and undeclared sites involved in developing and producing nuclear weapons.  The former are under the authority of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and the latter are under the authority of the sanctioned Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), a military advanced research and development entity that reports directly to the highest levels of the military and the Supreme Leader.

Those sites under the authority of AEOI considered below are all related to uranium enrichment^[8]:

• Natanz enrichment complex
• Fordow enrichment site
• Esfahan complex
• TABA/TESA Karaj centrifuge manufacturing site
• Kalaye Electric centrifuge testing and R&D site

Those sites under the authority of SPND considered below are related to nuclear weaponization:

• Sanjarian
• Lavisan 2 (Mojdeh) site
• New SPND headquarters
• Shahid Meysami Research Center

Two key sites related to uranium enrichment or nuclear weaponization are undergoing continued construction which started months or years before the June war, and while they are not yet operational appear in late stages of construction:

• Pickaxe Mountain site
• Taleghan 2 

 

Natanz Nuclear Complex 

During the 12 Day War, the Natanz Nuclear Complex was targeted repeatedly by Israeli airstrikes and once by the United States B-2 stealth bombers using two GBU-57 MOPs.  Figure 1 shows satellite imagery from November 2, 2025, providing a recent overview of Natanz and the damage to the complex. 

Damage to the complex remains widespread and key infrastructure and facilities connected to enrichment operations remain destroyed.  Overall, there have been limited activities at the complex.  No repair operations to damaged or destroyed buildings or infrastructure can be seen.  The pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) remains destroyed and no cleanup or repair operations have been conducted since it was targeted by the Israelis (see Figure 2). The penetration hole created by the two GBU-57’s above the buried enrichment hall has been backfilled, and a cap placed over it.  It is unclear if the underground facilities have been entered by Iranian personnel since. 

The GBU-57’s likely caused significant damage to the buried enrichment hall.  An overlay of the site using imagery from when the buried halls were under construction shows that the GBU-57’s likely entered directly into the buried enrichment hall (see Figure 3).  The IAEA in its verification and monitoring report issued in September 2025 echoed this assessment and stated, “[there are] indications of direct impacts on the underground enrichment halls, as a result of the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.”

Electrical infrastructure, including primary electrical power, backup generators, and a support building, remains destroyed and inoperable (see Figure 4).  A destroyed steam pipeline likely connected to HVAC or electrical infrastructure has not been repaired, debris remains strewn across the nearby area (see Figure 5).  Notably, at least 19 HVAC chillers used in the HVAC system were dispersed around the complex in late August, early September.^[9]  The chillers remain dispersed (see Figure 6).  This was likely done to protect the valuable and difficult to replace chillers in the event of a follow-up attack, and importantly, it also shows that the facilities are not operating as there is no need for HVAC equipment. 

 

Figure 1.  An overview of the Natanz Nuclear Complex showing the damage caused by the attacks several months ago.  The site remains stagnant and very little activity has occurred. 

Figure 2.  A recent view of the PFEP. The facility is destroyed and has not been repaired. 

Figure 3. An image of Natanz taken during the construction of the buried enrichment halls overlaid with an image taken after the strike by the United States.  The penetration hole caused by the GBU-57 can be seen directly above the buried enrichment hall containing the installed centrifuge cascades. 

Figure 4. Three images of the onsite electrical infrastructure powering the facilities.  The infrastructure remains destroyed and has not been repaired. 

Figure 5.  A recent view of the destroyed likely steampipes.  Debris can be seen strewn in the nearby area. 

Figure 6. A view of Natanz showing the locations of 19 HVAC chillers.

 

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Imagery of Fordow from November 2, 2025, shows little to no new significant activity at Fordow (see Figure 7). The site has remained relatively dormant since Iran conducted what was likely damage assessments of GBU-57 MOP penetration holes in the locations of the two ventilation shafts in late July. Roadways were built leading to the blast holes, and for a short period of time, a crane was erected near one of the shaft holes and heavy machinery was in place to move earth.  The holes have since been filled in and the crane and other heavy machinery have been removed (see Figure 8).  The tunnel portal entrances remain backfilled and have not been cleared (see Figure 9).  Additionally, a new road can be seen in the outer security perimeter, however the road does not appear to lead to anything notable. 

If any effort is made to reconstitute the site, Iran will need to rebuild or repair the ventilation system, which is critical to the site's operation.  The damage to the facility is likely significant, and this assessment has been echoed by the IAEA in its verification and monitoring report issued in September 2025, stating, “[the] FFEP is expected to have suffered very significant damage as a result of the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.” 

 

Figure 7.  An overview image of the Fordow nuclear complex.  The tunnel portal entrances remain backfilled with soil. 

Figure 8. Two recent images showing the locations of the destroyed ventilation shafts that were targeted by the United States. Both destroyed shafts and their respective GBU-57 penetration holes have since been filled in with soil. 

Figure 9.  A view from November 2, 2025, showing the tunnel portal entrances. All entrances remain backfilled with soil and likely have not been entered. 

 

Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Complex 

The Esfahan Nuclear site is a large site including the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and several other uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities, natural and enriched uranium stores, and uranium metal production facilities.  It contains the most important parts of making uranium hexafluoride, various forms of uranium oxide, uranium metal, and reactor fuel. As part of fuel fabrication, Iran built a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) to make reactor cladding for its low enriched uranium oxide reactor fuel.  There is also a tunnel complex to the north that is part of the nuclear site built in about 2005 with modifications visible in 2020/2021.  The tunnel complex was originally declared to the IAEA to hold sensitive materials and equipment in case of attack and be able to do small scale conversion work.  This tunnel is assessed to hold large amounts of Iran’s stock of 60 percent HEU, which the IAEA estimates comprised a total of 440 kg in June 2025. The Institute also assessed that the Esfahan tunnel complex is (or was) to be the location of a new enrichment plant Iran was secretly building, which it finally announced to the IAEA just before the start of the war, but without providing any details.

The primary above ground nuclear complex has not seen any activity since it was attacked by Israel and the United States (see Figure 10), except minimal road-clearing and perimeter fencing around select destroyed buildings.  Satellite imagery from October 24, 2025, shows that the Uranium Conversion Facility, and the surrounding nearby destroyed buildings remain destroyed with debris spread about the complex (see Figure 11).  Neither cleanup effort nor reconstitution effort at these above ground facilities has been made.  To sustain future enrichment activities, Iran will need to rebuild the Uranium Conversion Facility in order to produce more uranium hexafluoride to feed future centrifuge plants.  Rebuilding the plant, which depended on extensive, now sanctioned, imported equipment, will be challenging. 

Tunnel Complex.        The Esfahan tunnel complex is under a nearby mountain and has three visible entrances, called the Northern, Middle, and Southern tunnel entrances.  While damage to the tunnel entrances was visible right after the U.S. attack, the extent of damage inside the tunnel complex is unknown.  It is possible that newer warheads for the Tomahawk cruise missiles, namely Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warheads, were used and caused substantial internal damage.  These newer warheads have blast-fragmentation capabilities and increased penetration capabilities, giving them much greater bunker busting capabilities against hardened targets compared to standard high explosive warheads.  In addition, Los Alamos National Laboratory has worked turning unused fuel in a Tomahawk into a thermobaric explosion, which can cause additional damage inside the tunnel complex.  Requests to the Pentagon about the type of warhead used against the Esfahan tunnel complex were unanswered.

Satellite imagery from late September and October shows that Iran has undertaken additional steps to rework the Northern tunnel entrance area and to clear the entrances to the backfilled Middle tunnel portal.^[10]   The effort to clear the two tunnel entrances likely constituted preparatory activities that would enable Iran to establish safe and secure access to the tunnel portals. It is possible that the tunnel portals could have been entered; a scenario more likely for the Northern entrance where one image shows an open door.  It is difficult to discern in available imagery whether the Northern tunnel portal is open on any given day, but it does appear open and accessible in an image dated November 20, 2025.  In contrast, we have yet to see an image of the Middle entrance that shows the door open and an unidentified object appears to have remained stationary right outside the portal for the last month.  The Southern tunnel portal remains backfilled.  Figure 12 shows the tunnel portal entrance areas as of October 24, 2025, and as of November 20, 2025. 

Preliminary access to the Northern tunnel entrance likely was gained in late June 2025, but then Iran chose to rework the entrance area; such vehicle access was evidently closed off for several weeks while the entrance was being reconstructed, including two bulwarks perpendicular to the actual entrance apparently to provide additional strength to the portal.  During that time, the overhanging steel framework was removed, earthen material was moved back in front of the entrance, blocking it.  Two side buttress-like bulwark structures were rebuilt, and the area above the entrance appeared to be covered with shotcrete to prevent erosion. Earthen material that had been blocking the north entrance up until about July 22nd was removed in large part and regular vehicle access had apparently been restored based on evidence of vehicle tracking on top of the little remaining earthen material. Vehicle traffic is frequently seen. Sedans were also present just outside the entrance as well.

The construction activity outside the Northern entrance continued over the last few months, and it now appears that Iran may have installed what can effectively be called "Cruise Missile Chicane Barriers".  There are now two thick protective barriers, one wedge shaped widening from about 1.5 meters to 4 meters extending at an angle from one of the bulwarks mentioned above and another one about 4 meters thick further up the road.  They appear designed to interfere in the ability of a cruise missile or other type of missile to strike directly at the tunnel portal. 

This passive defense of the Northern portal also complicates ground access to the portal.  As of November, it is clear that the vehicle entry path was rerouted accordingly as a result.  Vehicle access to the portal is now via a curved pathway around the support building.  This indicates that the site is either operational now, or will be soon, and likely the best candidate for housing something of extremely high value–possibly the new centrifuge plant or the HEU stockpile or both.   

 

Figure 10.  An overview of the Esfahan Nuclear Complex.  Damage remains extensive and no cleanup or reconstitution activities have occurred at the above ground facility. 

Figure 11.  Two images from October 24, 2025, showing the damage to the Uranium Conversion Facility and the building that held the capability to produce enriched uranium metal.

Figure 12.  The top left shows an image from October 24, 2025, showing the Northern tunnel portal to the underground complex at Esfahan. The image on the top right shows a more recent image of the Northern tunnel portal with the construction of a new roadway and the addition of two cruise missile chicane barriers.  The bottom image shows the southern tunnel entrance.

 

TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing Site

The TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing site remains destroyed (see Figure 13).  No cleanup or repair operations have occurred since it was attacked in June 2025.  Debris remains strewn across the complex with several buildings destroyed. 

The TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing site was an important Iranian nuclear facility that manufactured centrifuge components.  The site was first attacked in a drone strike in June 2021 during a campaign by Israel to disrupt Iranian centrifuge manufacturing and assembly.  Previously in July 2020, the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center (ICAC) located at Natanz exploded as part of a sabotage operation carried out by Israel.  After the attack on Karaj, the IAEA reported in late January 2022 that centrifuge manufacturing capabilities were moved from this site to an unspecified location at the Esfahan nuclear complex, which was bombed on the night of June 20/21, 2021 (see below).  The TABA/TESA plant was repaired after being attacked in 2021 and was reported to be making the non-rotating components of centrifuges.  It was under IAEA surveillance under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) prior to the June war, although for several years the IAEA was not allowed to view surveillance video of the plant’s centrifuge manufacturing activities. 

 

Figure 13.  The TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing site remains destroyed and no cleanup has occurred.  The site is heavily littered with debris from the destroyed buildings. 

 

Sanjarian 

Sanjarian, a site never visited by the IAEA, was a key Amad testing and manufacturing facility, associated with the development and testing of the “shock wave generator” (a sophisticated multipoint initiation system (MPI)), exploding bridgewires, and diagnostic equipment for shock wave generator testing.  It also produced the high purity plastic high explosive PETN used in the shock wave generator channels.

Satellite imagery of Sanjarian from November 2, 2025, shows that little activity has occurred at the site (see Figure 14).  Several buildings remain destroyed and rubble is spread out across the complex.  Two cars can be seen inside the walls of the complex, meaning the Iranians have visited it.  So far, no effort has been made to sanitize or reconstitute this former AMAD plan site. 

 

Figure 14. A recent image of Sanjarian showing that extensive damage to the site remains. 

 

Lavisan 2 Campus (Mojdeh Site)

The “Lavisan 2” campus (also known as the Mojdeh Site), a site never visited by the IAEA and located near Malek Ashtar University, was viewed as a follow-on organization to the AMAD Plan, which had been shut down in 2003 and followed by a smaller, more camouflaged nuclear weapons program initially headquartered in Lavisan 2, headed by the now deceased Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, also the leader of the AMAD Plan.  This organization evolved, eventually being subsumed in about 2011 by the SPND, the advanced military research and development entity that reports directly to the highest levels of the military and the Supreme Leader. SPND took over the campus as its initial headquarters and continued work on nuclear weapons.  This campus was also the location of the Modern Defense Readiness Test Center, the Institute of Applied Physics, and SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group.  Shahid Karimi Group was identified by the U.S. Treasury as an entity working on missiles and explosives projects connected to SPND. 

In the past several months, Iran has made a concerted effort to sanitize the Mojdeh site by demolishing buildings and clearing rubble.^[11]  Imagery from October 23, 2025, shows that this sanitization effort has continued (see Figure 15).  The remaining rubble from the razed Institute for Applied Physics building and the nearby security building have been completely removed.  A nearby administrative building has since been razed, and a pile of rubble now remains. 

The rapid work by Iran to quickly demolish and clear the rubble of these important buildings may be a prelude to rebuilding key SPND capabilities.  It also serves as sanitization of the site, limiting the ability of any possible future inspection obtaining evidence of undeclared nuclear and nuclear-weapons related research and development activities that may have occurred there.  Iran has previously sanitized sites to stonewall IAEA inspectors and hide its past nuclear weapons development work. 

Figure 15. Satellite images of the Mojdeh site showing how the sanitization process has continued since July 2025. 

 

New SPND HQ 

SPND moved to a different headquarters in 2013, while continuing important activities at the Lavisan 2 campus.  The new headquarters was one and a half kilometers from its previous location at Lavisan 2 and located on “Fakhrizadeh Street" in Tehran. This building was never visited by the IAEA.  The building appears to have been targeted several times by airstrikes; however, it never collapsed but was likely severely damaged internally and ultimately rendered unusable. 

VANTOR (formerly MAXAR) Satellite imagery taken between August 19, 2025, and October 23, 2025, shows that Iran is in the process of demolishing the building (see Figure 16).  The roof and the top floors of the building have been removed, leaving large rubble piles surrounding the building.  It is unclear how long it will take Iran to fully demolish the building.  In the meantime, Iran appears to be salvaging remaining equipment, such as three cooling units that were visible on August 19 and removed by October 23. 

Figure 16. Two images showing the new SPND HQ before and during the demolition process. 

 

Shahid Meysami Research Center

The Shahid Meysami (or Meisami) research center is located west of Tehran, near Karaj, and is part of Iran’s nuclear weaponization complex, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In July 2025, the Institute published a detailed assessment of the site and the damage done by Israeli airstrikes.^[12] 

This site is part of the Shahid Meysami group, a known subordinate of SPND (officially known as the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research).  The group was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2020 for undertaking projects that include testing and producing chemical agents and optimizing them for effectiveness and toxicity for use as incapacitation agents. The IDF identified the Shahid Meysami site as being “used to produce raw materials for the development of nuclear weapons.” 

The Times of Israel reported that the site was believed to house “plastic explosives and advanced materials used in nuclear detonation testing." Iran’s detonation system, or multi-point initiators (shock wave generators) require highly purified plastic explosives in its channels. 

Satellite imagery from October 21, 2025, from Airbus, and November 2, 2025, from VANTOR, show significant cleanup and clearing operations at several of the destroyed or damaged buildings, constituting salvaging as a possible prelude to reconstruction.  So far, imagery does not show any effort to rebuild these buildings and reconstitute the lost capabilities there. Several destroyed buildings throughout the complex have been razed and large rubble piles have appeared (see Figure 17 and 18).  Imagery from November 2, 2025, shows the attacked area in the northwest of the complex, where three large dump trucks are visible and are being used to clear debris (see Figure 19).  Nearby, several sorted piles of what may be salvageable materials and equipment have appeared. 

One destroyed building shown in Figure 19 was fully razed and the foundation was repaved as of November 2. A close-up from October 21 shows the extent of clean-up compared to the aftermath of the strike, as visible on July 1. The razed building has been completely cleared, leaving an empty lot and a large rubble pile nearby (see Figure 20). At the nearby blown out hangar-type building, the high-bay metal frame remains in place, however, much of the debris has been cleared and piled up.  A large crane can be seen erected near a parked dump truck, likely used for moving and hauling debris (see Figure 21).  A nearby area has been cleaned up and an overhang was repaired. 

In the eastern corner of the complex, near the entrance to the site and surrounded by a group of multi-story administrative/office buildings, the remnants of a multi-story building that had been leveled during the attack were demolished, leaving only a pile of rubble in place.  A small debris pile has formed nearby (see Figure 22). 

The likely laboratory related building in the southernmost corner of the complex was severely damaged on one site.  It appears that damage was sufficient to render the entire building unusable as Iran has proceeded to demolish the building.  As of November 2, an excavator can be seen demolishing the building (see Figure 23).  The fake roof and the remnants of the ventilation equipment it was covering on top of the actual roof has already been removed.  A dump truck is parked nearby, and a rubble pile can be seen right outside the complex’s security perimeter walls.  Another pile of material is also visible; this appears more orderly and likely contains salvageable materials and equipment. 

 

Figure 17.  A recent overview image of the Shahid Meysami Research Center. 

Figure 18.  A side-by-side view of several destroyed buildings in the westernmost portion of the complex.  As can be seen, the site is in the process of being razed and sanitized. 

Figure 19.  A recent image of the destroyed buildings in the westernmost portion of the complex showing the presence of dump trucks used to haul debris and other cleanup activities. 

Figure 20. A side-by-side view of a destroyed building near the center of the complex showing that it has now been razed and completely cleared.  A rubble pile is seen nearby. 

Figure 21.  A before and after view of the hanger-type building near the center of the complex. Debris has been piled up and a dump truck and a crane are visible.  The roofing materials have been collected and cleaned up. A nearby area has been cleaned up and repaired. 

Figure 22.  A before and after view of a destroyed building in the south-east corner of the complex. 

Figure 23.  A before and after view of what is likely a laboratory building.  The building was severely damaged, and Iran appears to have decided to demolish the remnants and recover potentially salvageable equipment.  Cars can be seen nearby and within the security perimeter and on-going demolition activities are occurring with the false red roof and the damaged ventilation equipment underneath having been removed. 

 

“Kalaye Electric” Centrifuge Site

The “Kalaye Electric” centrifuge research and development workshops, located on Damavand Road in eastern Tehran, had been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Additional Protocol from 2016 to about 2021.  In September 2025, the Institute published a detailed assessment of Israeli strikes on Kalaye Electric, the first public report of its kind (Israel did not publicly identify this site as attacked).^[13]  Under the JCPOA, the IAEA conducted extensive monitoring of Kalaye Electric’s testing of advanced centrifuge rotor assemblies, specifically IR-8 rotor assemblies. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Kalaye Electric site was the center of undeclared Iranian centrifuge research and development activities, which were uncovered by the IAEA. Following its reveal, the site was at first repurposed but later remodeled to serve its current purposes, i.e., the research, development, and testing of advanced centrifuges.  Israel attacked the Kalaye Electric site twice between June 16th and June 18th, 2025, effectively destroying the facility. Figure 24 shows the site before and after it was attacked. 

VANTOR satellite imagery from October 18, 2025, shows that the site remains destroyed (see Figure 25). Only a small amount of debris has been cleaned up, enough to clear a narrow path through the complex where a car can be seen parked.  The destroyed and damaged buildings remain covered in rubble.  Otherwise, the site has not seen any notable activity that would constitute a repair or reconstitution effort.   

Figure 24.  The two images, above and below, show the site before and after it was attacked by Israel during the 12 Day War. 

Figure 25.  A recent satellite image of the Kalaye Electric centrifuge site.  The site has remained destroyed and very little activity has occurred since its destruction. 

 

Other Sites of Relevance

It is important to mention two other sites, namely the Natanz Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complexes and Taleghan-2, located in the Parchin military complex.  The former is included because construction is ongoing at this declared, centrifuge-related, deeply buried site and the latter was bombed in 2024 and is being rebuilt into a facility of potential nuclear weapons concern. 

Natanz “Pickaxe Mountain” and 2007 Tunnel Complexes 

The Pickaxe Mountain (also known as the Mt Kolang Gaz-La complex) underground complex under construction just South of the Natanz Nuclear Complex has experienced steady, ongoing construction since late 2020.  There is also a nearby, older tunnel complex, referred to in Institute publications as the tunnel complex dating to 2007 or as the 2007 tunnel complex. 

The Institute last issued a satellite imagery update on these two complexes in early October, highlighting the ongoing construction, and  it has an update forthcoming.^[14]  The Pickaxe Mountain complex is notable because it is deeply buried, perhaps even more so than the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), raising significant concern, especially as Iran plans for it to hold an advanced centrifuge assembly facility that can produce several thousand centrifuges a year, once Iran reconstitutes a capability to make centrifuge components.  In addition, based on the estimated size of the underground halls, several years ago the Institute assessed that site could also hold a centrifuge enrichment facility.  There are currently no signs that Iran has changed its plans for the facility after the war, and as of November 2025, the site appears to be entering a late stage of construction.  Given its declared connection to Iran’s enrichment program, the ongoing activities warrant close scrutiny.  Given the widescale destruction of its other centrifuge related facilities, the Pickaxe Mountain complex is a potential candidate site for any Iranian reconstitution of its centrifuge program, from component production to assembly to enrichment.

As of November 2025, Iran has established a completed security perimeter wall surrounding the entire mountain base of Mount Kolang Gaz La (aka Pickaxe Mountain) and the surrounding area, including the pre-existing 2007 tunnel complex under a smaller peak nearby (see Figure 26).  Iran has also continued its efforts to harden the tunnel portal entrances at the Pickaxe Mountain complex; most recently covering one of the western tunnel entrance extensions at this site with rock, as was previously done for an eastern entrance extension (see Figure 27 and 28).  Construction continues on additional security barriers along the perimeter wall. 

More perplexing are activities at the nearby pre-existing 2007 tunnel facility, where efforts to harden the tunnel entrances are continuing, but at a level which may result in inaccessibility, perhaps more indicative of securely locking –or burying– stored assets in place. 

These activities bring new emphasis to an outstanding question on whether Iran moved enriched uranium stocks from the Natanz enrichment plant to the site during the 12 Day War prior to U.S. engagement.  A satellite image dated June 18, 2025, shows a truck leaving the 2007 tunnel facility area at around 9 AM local time (see Figure 29).

As of November 2025, the concrete slabs Iran placed over the 2007 tunnel entrances have been buried with layers of cement, soil, and rock, but heavy machinery and dark sheets of materials indicate that additional layering is ongoing (See figure 30 and 31).  Both the upper tunnel entrance, which connects three alcoves before leading under the mountain, and the lower tunnel entrance appear to be blocked by dirt.  Going back in time, available imagery shows that at least the lower entrance appears to have been accessible until mid-August.  On August 29, a dump truck appeared outside the lower tunnel entrance’s portal.  As of August 30, the portal appears blocked by dirt, more clearly visible in angled images, such as the one taken on November 14.  The upper tunnel entrance appears also blocked by dirt, however, the extent to which it was accessible in recent months is less clear. 

 

Figure 26.  An overview of the Pickaxe Mountain base and surrounding area, including the Pickaxe mountain tunnel complex and a 2007 tunnel complex nearby, as of late September 2025.  The security perimeter wall has been completed but construction of additional security barriers is ongoing as of November. 

Figure 27.  The set of eastern tunnel entrances of the Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complex.  The entrance identified as auxiliary entrance has a long entrance extension, situated in a channel of rock, which was covered by dirt and rock in July and August. 

Figure 28. A view of the Western tunnel portal entrances.  More rock was added over the main tunnel portal extension (left in this image), further reinforcing it. 

Figure 29. A view of the 2007 tunnel entrances at Natanz showing a vehicle leaving the facility area during the 12-Day war. It does not appear to be an open flatbed or dump truck used to transport earthen materials. 

Figure 30. A view of the 2007 tunnel entrances showing that they have been hardened with slabs of concrete placed above the tunnel portals. The upper tunnel entrance includes an extension which connects the main tunnel with three alcoves. 

Figure 31.  A view of the 2007 tunnel entrances as of November 14.  Iran is continuing to harden the top of entrances through layers of cement, rock, and soil.  Both portals are blocked by dirt. 

 

Taleghan 2

Taleghan 2 is a site located inside the Parchin military complex that was used for nuclear weapons development purposes under Iran’s Amad Plan in the early 2000s.  Named after the high explosive test chamber the building housed, it was labeled “Taleghan 2” in many documents in the Israeli captured Iran Nuclear Archive.  Although available evidence supports that the high explosive chamber and associated flash x-ray were removed from the building during a multi-year Iranian sanitization of the site, which also included the co-located Taleghan 1 building, Israel indicated that Taleghan 2 had in the last few years a nuclear weapons connection.  The site was attacked by Israel in late October 2024, severely damaging it.^[15]   The site was not attacked during the 12 Day War. 

Satellite imagery taken between May and November 2025 shows that Iran has made considerable effort to rebuild the site and enhance it.  The Institute has issued multiple reports detailing this construction effort, showing most recently concerning activities that resemble the construction of what is possibly a cylindrical high explosive containment vessel and facilities to house it.^[16],[17]  Reconstruction efforts began around mid-May 2025, before the 12 Day War (see Figure 32). Construction has progressed steadily since then. 

Satellite imagery taken between August and November 2025 shows the construction of a long central building positioned between hill slopes measuring roughly 40 meters long and 17 meters wide that contains what appears to be a cylindrical high explosive containment vessel measuring roughly 36 meters long and 12 meters wide (see Figure 33 and 34).  The design of the facility under construction strongly suggests that explosives will be present at the site.  All buildings are designed with reinforced arched metal frames and metal roofs.  The reinforced structures provide the buildings with enhanced blast protection from either an airstrike or an internal explosion. Several satellite imagery views of the possible containment vessel show what appears to be an access point into the vessel, critical to its function (see Figure 35).  The central building is connected to two external portals via a middle structure.  It is also possible that the main building will be buried underneath earth, as large earth piles can be seen on the hill just above the building ready to be bulldozed over it (see Figure 36).  Burying the site would provide further protection.  Additionally, the layout of the two smaller side buildings appears to be designed in such a way that if bunkered over with earth, they each include a blast mitigation feature known as a "blast trap" at the back of each building.  Nearby, a possible support building was also constructed.  Imagery from November 14, 2025, shows three rectangular slits on the metal roof of the main building, possibly used for ventilation of the internal containment vessel (see Figure 37). 

These activities are significant and deeply concerning given the site's history as an AMAD Plan nuclear weapons related development facility utilizing a high explosive chamber. Although there is no current evidence to support any nuclear weapons related purpose for the site, an effort should be made to discern if this is an attempt by Iran to build a facility to reconstitute either the nuclear weapons related high explosive test chamber facilities that were originally part of the AMAD program or some other purpose.  The larger building might serve as the location for the renewal of either such activities with the two smaller buildings being for the purposes of test/manufacturing control and test/manufacturing diagnostics.  More information is needed to make an accurate assessment as to the purpose of this rebuilt facility. 

 

Figure 32.  Two images showing early reconstruction activities at Taleghan 2.  A temporary cover structure is visible in both images likely covering the construction of the possible high explosives containment vessel. 

Figure 33. The Taleghan 2 site showing the beginning of construction of the arched structures.

Figure 34. Several images of Taleghan 2 taken between September and November 2025 show clearly the internal cylindrical possible containment vessel and its width.  The middle image details the length and width of the internal object. The building itself measures 40 meters by 17 meters.

Figure 35. A side view of the possible containment vessel showing what appears to be an access point. 

Figure 36. An overview of the Taleghan 2 site from November 14, 2025.  Large earth piles can be seen on the hill above the main building.

Figure 37. A recent image of Taleghan 2 showing the metal domed roof being installed. Three possible ventilation slits can be seen in the roof of the building containing the possible containment vessel.

---

Sources