Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment Against Ukraine Ahead of the Alaska Summit
Key findings
- There was a decrease in the number of launches and absence of large-scale attacks in August.
- After the big attacks in June (181 drones a day on average) and especially in July (203 drones a day), the average number in August was 75 drones a day.
- It should also be noted that compared to the very peak attacks (539, 728, and 597 drones per day) in July, the most massive attack in early August involved 162 drones.
- This may be due to many factors, such as Ukraine's attacks on component manufacturing in Russia (especially navigation equipment), problems with the supply chain for components, and preparations for some kind of super-strike. However, many experts also believe that Putin has decided to reduce the intensity of attacks ahead of the summit with Trump, while at the same time building up forces for strikes after the meeting. This will become clear very soon.
- Despite the decrease in the total number of Shahed launches in August compared to previous periods, the relative number of successful hits was higher in August.

| Hits | Interceptions | Launched | Hits/ Interceptions | Hits/ Launched | ||||
| Total | Average per day | Total | Average per day | Total | Average per day | |||
| August | 278 | 18.53 | 849 | 56.60 | 1127 | 75.13 | 32.74% | 24.67% |
| July | 723 | 23.32 | 5574 | 179.81 | 6297 | 203.13 | 12.97% | 11.48% |
| June | 760 | 25.33 | 4678 | 155.93 | 5438 | 181.27 | 16.25% | 13.98% |
| May | 714 | 23.03 | 3289 | 106.10 | 4003 | 129.13 | 21.71% | 17.84% |
| April | 379 | 12.63 | 2043 | 68.10 | 2422 | 80.73 | 18.55% | 15.65% |
| March | 377 | 12.16 | 3821 | 123.26 | 4198 | 135.42 | 9.87% | 8.98% |
| Feb. | 102 | 3.64 | 3802 | 135.79 | 3904 | 139.43 | 2.68% | 2.61% |
| Jan. | 90 | 2.90 | 2539 | 81.90 | 2629 | 84.81 | 3.54% | 3.42% |

Increased Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes
This may be because in August, Russia focused on strikes on territory close to the front line or the Ukrainian border (Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), where the Shahed drones do not fly long distances throughout Ukraine. This is clearly visible in the graph: during the most massive attacks in June-July, the relative effectiveness of strikes was very low, sometimes around 3 percent.
In fact, as noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker), the largest number of hits falls on Kyiv and the territory of Ukraine, which is close to Russia (the border or the front line).
The improved effectiveness of strikes in August may also be related to the fact that the Russians, as detailed discovered in the report of @Tomasz Darmolinski (published in LinkedIn), began to use “Wolfpack” tactics.
This “Wolfpack” tactic is vividly illustrated in Ukrainian Telegram channels, which track the direction of attacks in detail and report on the approaching UAVs.
See the full report in PDF.