This review summarizes the use of Shahed-type type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both strike and decoy drones, in Russian air strikes against Ukraine in 2025.  It analyzes the scale, types, and patterns of enemy air attacks using Shahed/Geran/Harpy-A1 strike UAVs and Gerbera/Parody decoy drones, among others.  The report also analyzes the effectiveness of strike drone hits depending on the type of attack (conventional, using a comparably small number of UAVs, or combined, using a large number of UAVs as well as cruise, ballistic, and aeroballistics missiles) and geography (Kyiv, frontline areas, areas deep inside the territory, and in western Ukraine).  The document highlights the impact of these attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, civilian areas, and the overall security situation, and summarizes detailed daily counts and operational information.  The report underscores the ongoing nature of the conflict, the evolving tactics and weaponry of the enemy, and the continued need for vigilance and robust defense measures to protect Ukrainian territory and civilians.

Overview of Enemy Air Attacks

Throughout the year, there were virtually no days without nighttime and large-scale air attacks by Russian forces using hundreds of Shahed-type UAVs, combined with ballistic and cruise missile strikes launched from various regions of Russia and occupied territories such as Crimea and Donetsk.  The number of UAVs launched in individual attacks ranged from dozens to over 800.  According to official Ukrainian data[1], the total number of Shahed-type UAVs launched by Russia in 2025 amounted to 54,538, including approximately 32,200 Shahed-type strike UAVs.

Notable large-scale attacks include the following: the strike on December 6, 2025, which involved 653 Shahed-type UAVs (including more than 300 Shahed and Gerber strike UAVs); the attack on October 30, 2025, which also involved 653 Shahed-type UAVs; the strike on July 9, 2025, using 728 Shahed UAVs; and the largest attack on September 7, 2025, using 823 air attack vehicles, including 810 Shahed-type UAVs (see Figure 1).

Shahed-type UAVs used in attacks (numbering from dozens to over 800 (including decoys UAVs) per attack)

• Strike UAVs:
  • Shahed 136 (Iranian version, assembled in Alabuga).
  • Shahed 131 (Iranian version, assembled in Alabuga).
  • Geran-2 (Russian version of the Shahed 136, manufactured in Alabuga).
  • Geran-3 jet UAVs (Russian version of the jet-powered Shahed, manufactured in Alabuga).
  • Garpiya (Harpy)-A1: (The Russian development is based on the Shahed-136/Geran-2, manufactured by JSC Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant, also known as IEMZ Kupol[2]).
  • In early January 2026, information emerged that Russia had tested new Geran-4 and Geran-5 UAVs at the end of 2025[3]. Subsequently, the use of the new Geran-5 was confirmed by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine[4].

• Drone Simulators and Imitation drones:

  (used as decoys or for reconnaissance, as well as for setting up mesh networks in coordinated attacks)

  • Gerbera
  • Parody

Attack Patterns and Impact

• Enemy attacks are widespread, targeting eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine, with frequent strikes reported in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkasy, Poltava, Mykolaiv, and other regions.  In some cases, enemy UAVs have crossed into neighboring countries such as Moldova, Romania, Poland, and Belarus, indicating the broad trajectory of the conflict. See the detailed map in Figure 2 published by @ShahedTracker[5].
• Enemy strikes targeted critical infrastructure, including energy facilities (thermal and hydroelectric power plants, gas infrastructure), residential buildings, industrial facilities, and logistics centers.
• These attacks were frequently accompanied by successive waves of drones and missiles (see Figure 3) that persisted for extended periods, often spanning several hours. The resulting debris from downed drones and missiles frequently led to secondary damage in nearby areas.  These attacks have been known to result in fatalities and injuries to civilians.
• Figure 1 demonstrates the Russian alterations in their attack tactics throughout the year, transitioning from daily "produce-launch" attacks during January to May of 2025 to cumulative mass attacks with a duration of 5 to 8 days.  This transition occurred in conjunction with a persistent attack utilizing an average of approximately 180 UAVs per day, commencing in June of 2025.
• Starting around mid-summer, the Russians began to implement a “Wolfpack” tactic, as described in detail in the report by @Tomasz Darmolinski[6]. This “Wolfpack” tactic is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.

Key Findings

• Contrary to some experts' and officials' predictions of a significant increase in production and attacks using large numbers of Shahed-type drones by the end of 2025, there has been a trend toward saturation in the number of Shahed drone launches since the beginning of autumn (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Specifically:
  • in September, the average number of launches per day was approximately 188 Shahed-type drones, exceeding the August figure of 133 launches per day due to a decrease in attacks during the first 20 days of August.  However, this figure did not reach the peak observed in July, when the average number of launches was 203 drones per day.
  • In October, 5,298 Shahed-type UAVs were launched.  The average frequency of launches was approximately 171 per day.
  • In November, 5,447 Shahed-type UAVs were launched.  The average frequency of launches was approximately 182 per day.
  • In December, 5,131 Shahed-type UAVs were launched.  This is the lowest figure recorded since the beginning of autumn.  The average launch frequency in December was approximately 166 per day.
• In summary, after the peak launch rate of Shahed-type UAVs in July (6,297) and a subsequent decrease in attacks during the first 20 days of August, the average number of Shahed-type UAV launches has remained constant at approximately 176 per day, or 5,380 per month, since fall 2025.  This suggests either production saturation or supply constraints of necessary components.
• According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, Ukrainian forces targeted Shahed UAV launch and storage sites a minimum of four times in 2025.  These reports were accompanied by detailed satellite images (see, for example, reports by @kiber_boroshno[7]).  Of these, the site located at Donetsk airport was attacked twice in 2025 (November 5 and December 30).
  • Concurrently, the impact of attacks on launch/storage sites on the overall launch dynamics remained imperceptible.  This discrepancy is illustrated in Figure 1.
  • Furthermore, several experts have underscored the observation that, in consideration of the limited impact evident in terms of the number of Shahed-type UAV launches, Ukrainian forces have prioritized their efforts on strikes against Russian oil refineries, military-industrial complex-related manufacturing facilities, and weapons depots.  This strategic focus on targeting these specific assets has been demonstrated to be more effective in diminishing Russia's capacity to engage in warfare against Ukraine.
• Since September 8, official sources have initiated the publication of the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches.  As demonstrated in Table 1, the mean number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the final quarter of 2025 approximates 60 percent of the aggregate number (58 percent in October, 62 percent in November, and 60 percent in December) of drones launched.
  • This finding is consistent with our earlier estimates and facilitates the calculation of the number of Shahed/Geran strike drones produced in Alabuga (about 60 percent).
  • Concurrently, it is noteworthy that in mass attacks, the proportion of strike UAVs in the total number of launches typically diminishes, while in targeted attacks with a limited number of UAVs, the percentage of strike UAVs can reach 80 percent (see Figure 5.a).
  • Figure 5.b shows the number of Shahed-type strike UAV launches since fall 2025. It ranges from 98 to 112 launches per day, compared to 165 to 188 launches of all Shahed-type UAVs (see also Table 1).
• Presently, there has been an observed increase in the relative number of Shahed-type drones that are equipped with online video cameras and radio modems, as compared to the total number of such UAVs.  The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the utilization of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively control Shahed-type drones.  This phenomenon may also be one of the factors contributing to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• In the reporting of Shahed-type strike drones, no differentiation is made between the number of Harpy A-1 UAVs versus the Shahed and Geran drones.  Therefore, the total number of Shahed-type strike UAVs includes those manufactured in both Alabuga and Izhevsk, and it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of drones manufactured by either company. 

Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

Firstly, it should be emphasized that the main purpose of decoy drones, despite some of them being equipped with small cumulative munitions, is to distract attention and exhaust air defense systems, as well as to conduct video reconnaissance.  To assess the effectiveness of hits, in addition to all launched Shahed-type UAVs, strike-type models such as Shahed-136/131, Geran-2-3, and Harpy-1A should be considered separately.  The following assessments will be used in the future: overall hit effectiveness and strike UAV hit effectiveness (in parentheses).

As shown in Table 1, the average percentage of hits relative to the total number of Shahed UAV launches (both strike and decoy) increased significantly from 2-3 percent in January–February to 9 percent in March.  Since April 2025, this figure has increased even more, ranging from 11.5 percent to 18.7 percent overall and from 19.5 percent to 32.3 percent for strike UAVs.  In December, these figures were 17.27 percent and 28.21 percent, respectively.

It is noteworthy that during some attacks, particularly large-scale ones that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness decreased to 5 percent overall and 8 percent for strike UAVs.  Conversely, during attacks involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness ranged from 40 percent to 50 percent (70 percent–80 percent).  A striking example of this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, when effectiveness rose sharply to an exceptional 66 percent.

Some peculiarities in calculating the effectiveness of attacks are worth noting.  For instance, in December, the maximum accuracy rate relative to the total number of UAVs launched was 45 percent on December 11.  However, when evaluating solely strike UAVs, the maximum effectiveness was observed on December 17, reaching 72.5 percent, as illustrated in Figures 6.a and 6.b.

There was also a decrease in the total number of Shahed drones launched in December (5,131) compared to November (5,447).  Nevertheless, the absolute number of successful strikes in December (886) surpasses November's total (826), ranking second only to October (989) across all periods (see Table 1 and Figure 7).  These features must be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of Shahed-type drone strikes.

Finally, it should be also noted that, although Shahed-type UAVs typically demonstrate the lowest effectiveness in mass attacks, this effectiveness can sometimes be low even in attacks involving a limited number of UAVs.

For example, the following is a list of the lowest effectiveness of hits in December:

• 9.2% on December 5-6, with a total number of launches of 653 (20% of 300 strike UAVs);
• 17.8% on December 12-13, with a total number of launches of 460 (10.3% of 270 strike UAVs);
• 7.3% on December 13-14, with a total number of launches of 138 (11.76% of 85 strike UAVs);
• 6.1% on December 22-23, with a total number of launches of 635 (9.75% of 400 strike UAVs); and
• 4.8% on December 26-27, with a total number of launches of 519 (8.33% of 300 strike UAVs).

Conclusions on the Increase in Effectiveness

Offensives comprising a substantial number of Shahed-type UAVs (>400) are predominantly components of integrated attacks encompassing diverse categories of missiles (refer to Figure 5).  These occurrences manifest 4-5 times per month, commencing in the summer of 2025, apart from August, where it was 3 times (see Figure 1).  In these attacks, they serve a dual purpose: to hit targets, but more importantly, to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses, thereby increasing the effectiveness of missiles, which are significantly more expensive.

A thorough examination of the statistics and geography of strikes involving Shahed-type UAVs reveals the primary factors contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of these strikes within Ukrainian territory:

• First, the proximity of the strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.) reduces flight time and allows for more efficient route planning.
• Secondly, recent advancements in navigation systems, particularly the incorporation of 16‑element CRPA antennas, have enhanced the capacity to counteract Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.
• Thirdly, the integration of online cameras and modems facilitates real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and evasive maneuvers.

There has been an increase in reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to neutralize than conventional Shahed‑136/131 drones. However, there have been reports of their successful interception by Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones.[8]

The most salient factor is the constant use of large numbers of Shahed-type drones, which rapidly exhaust air defense resources.  As stated in numerous official Ukrainian statements, by the conclusion of 2025, Ukraine's air defense capabilities had been significantly depleted.

To address this challenge, it is imperative to fortify countermeasures and foster the advancement of Ukraine's capacity to counter these threats, particularly through the deployment of interceptor drones. Furthermore, to effectively address the threat posed by drones, it is imperative to augment the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukraine.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.
 

Figure 2.  Reported Damage from April through November 2025 (https://x.com/ShahedTracker)

Description: 

• Hit (Confirmed): Destruction / Stated as Hit
• Hit (UnConfirmed): Damage Reported but no details
• Fire: "Light" Damage (Windows, Facade), Injury or unclear of source/extent
• Drone: Destruction, unspecified type Comb. 

Strike (Combined Strike): Destruction by missile, KAB and/or drone

Figure 3.     Maps of the movement of air units (missiles and Shahed-type UAVs) over Ukrainian territory at the massive combined attacks.

Source: @monitoringwar, https://t.me/monitoringwar and https://t.me/StrategicaviationT

Figure 4.          Examples of grouping Shahed-type UAVs during the attacks.

Source:            https://t.me/war_monitor/32002 (August 20, 2025) https://t.me/war_monitor/35291 (November 29, 2025)

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.

Number of Launches by quarter:

1. Total UAVs = 10731,    Strike UAVs = 6331
2. Total UAVs = 11863,    Strike UAVs = 6999
3. Total UAVs = 16068,    Strike UAVs = 9336
4. Total UAVs = 15876,    Strike UAVs = 9483

Average number of Launches per day by quarter:

1. Total UAVs = 119,        Strike UAVs =   70
2. Total UAVs = 130,        Strike UAVs =   77
3. Total UAVs = 175,        Strike UAVs = 101
4. Total UAVs = 173,        Strike UAVs = 103

Figure 5.a.    Statistics of the launches of the strike UAVs (Shahed-136/131+Geran-2/3+Harpy-A1) vs total number of UAVs (strike+decoy) in September through December 2025.

Figure 5.b.    Statistics of the launches of the strike UAVs (Shahed-136/131+Geran-2/3+Harpy-A1) in September through December 2025.

Figure 6.a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 6.b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type strike UAVs in September through December 2025. 

Figure 7. Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (Total and Strike) during 2025.