Case Study: Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Tier One Common High Priority Items Exported from China to Russia
This case study is an assessment of roughly one month of trade data scrutinizing Chinese exports to Russia of Tier 1 goods valued at roughly $40 millions of dollars. Tier 1 goods are the most important items Russia needs to manufacture and build the precision-guided weapon systems critical to waging war in Ukraine. They are further characterized by the lack of Russia’s domestic production of them and limited global manufacturers, requiring Russia to import them. This case study adds to the growing body of work that China not only has emerged as a critical source of Tier 1 items, cementing its role as a key backer of Russia’s military industrial complex, but it does not take any meaningful steps to block these transfers.
Comprehensive Updated Assessment of Iranian Nuclear Sites Five Months After the 12-Day War
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Satellite Imagery Shows Possible High-Explosives Containment Vessel at Taleghan 2, a Former AMAD Plan Nuclear Weapons Development Site
Recent satellite imagery of Taleghan 2, a former nuclear weapons development site established under the AMAD Plan shows ongoing construction and the presence of what appears to resemble a long, cylindrical chamber, maybe a high-explosives containment vessel, likely measuring approximately 36 meters long and 12 meters in diameter placed inside a building measuring roughly 40 meters long and 17 meters wide.
Canadian-Based Company Fined by U.S. Commerce Department for Hiding U.S. Exports to Iran
Canada-based biotechnology company Luminultra illegally exported from its Maryland-based production facility three Photonmaster luminometers and 25 aqueous test kits valuing $33,438 USD to Iran on October 21, 2022. Under instructions from the Iranian buyer, and hopes of future sales to the Iranian market, Luminultra agreed to falsify export declarations and ship the items from the United States via the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Iran. Under further instructions from the Iranian buyer, Luminultra received payment at a Canadian bank in Canadian dollars specifically to avoid payment for the shipment in USD and through a US bank.
New Construction Identified at Taleghan 2, a Former AMAD Plan Nuclear Weapons Development Site
New construction activity, which began before the June 12-Day War and continued afterwards, has been occurring at the former Taleghan 2 site, which was destroyed by an Israeli bombing on October 25th, 2024. Starting around mid-May, efforts were made to rebuild the structure destroyed in the October 2024 attack. Satellite imagery from May 20, 2025, shows a black temporary cover that had been hastily installed over the destroyed building (see Figure 1). By June 12, 2025, imagery shows ground preparations and the laying of foundations in front of the temporary reconstructed cover building (see Figure 2). The site was not bombed during the 12-Day War.
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Case Study: Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Tier One Common High Priority Items Exported from China to Russia
This case study is an assessment of roughly one month of trade data scrutinizing Chinese exports to Russia of Tier 1 goods valued at roughly $40 millions of dollars. Tier 1 goods are the most important items Russia needs to manufacture and build the precision-guided weapon systems critical to waging war in Ukraine. They are further characterized by the lack of Russia’s domestic production of them and limited global manufacturers, requiring Russia to import them. This case study adds to the growing body of work that China not only has emerged as a critical source of Tier 1 items, cementing its role as a key backer of Russia’s military industrial complex, but it does not take any meaningful steps to block these transfers.
Comprehensive Updated Assessment of Iranian Nuclear Sites Five Months After the 12-Day War
Five months after the 12 Day War’s conclusion, it is useful to take stock of the status of Iran's nuclear enrichment and weaponization sites that were attacked. Are the sites being rebuilt, sanitized, or left as they were on the day they were bombed?
Satellite Imagery Shows Possible High-Explosives Containment Vessel at Taleghan 2, a Former AMAD Plan Nuclear Weapons Development Site
Recent satellite imagery of Taleghan 2, a former nuclear weapons development site established under the AMAD Plan shows ongoing construction and the presence of what appears to resemble a long, cylindrical chamber, maybe a high-explosives containment vessel, likely measuring approximately 36 meters long and 12 meters in diameter placed inside a building measuring roughly 40 meters long and 17 meters wide.
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NEW CASE STUDY: Millions of Dollars’ Worth of Tier One Common High Priority Items Exported from China to Russia
This case study is an assessment of roughly one month of trade data scrutinizing Chinese exports to Russia of Tier 1 goods valued at roughly $40 millions of dollars. This adds to the growing body of work that China not only has emerged as a critical source of Tier 1 items, cementing its role as a key backer of Russia’s military industrial complex, but it does not take any meaningful steps to block these transfers.
The study identified hundreds of Russian companies importing Tier 1 items, which are not made in Russia, from Chinese companies containing a mix of illegal Western products and Chinese-manufactured products. The trade data in this case study supports that Chinese companies are providing their own domestically produced Tier 1 goods to Russia, giving Russia a substitute for Western goods.
This report examined 5243 trade records, almost all during January 2024, accounting for nearly $40 million worth of Tier 1 items being exported by Chinese companies to Russia and found that Russia received from China over $14.4 million worth of Tier 1 items produced by non-Western manufacturers. Many of those Tier 1 goods were produced by Chinese companies.
This case study highlights 15 Chinese manufacturers producing and supplying Tier 1 goods to Russian companies, some of which are connected to the Russian military industrial complex. Six of those companies have been sanctioned by the United States, but the remainder are non-sanctioned entities, despite their supply potential and the Tier 1 items that were shipped to Russia, according to the trade data.
Furthermore, an analysis of the trade data shows that 33 of the Russian importers had been sanctioned by the United States as of the writing of this report, representing a total cargo value shipped from China of $12.6 million worth of Tier 1 items produced by both Western and non-Western manufacturers. Of those sanctioned Russian importers, thirteen were sanctioned before the period of the trade data; 12 were sanctioned during the period of the trade data; and eight were sanctioned after the period of the trade data.
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