Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action

Report by the Director General

1. As foreshadowed in GOV/2014/2, this report provides information on the status of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (Iran’s) nuclear programme in relation to the “voluntary measures” that Iran has agreed to undertake as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013.¹ According to the JPA, the first step would be time-bound (six months) and renewable by mutual consent. The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014.²

2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:
   i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;
   ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;
   iii. completed the dilution – down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 – of half of the nuclear material that had been in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 on 20 January 2014;³

¹ The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).

² Previous reports on the status of Iran’s nuclear programme in relation to the JPA were provided in GOV/INF/2014/1 (20 January 2014), GOV/2014/10, Annex 3 (20 February 2014) and GOV/INF/2014/6 (20 March 2014).

³ As of 14 April 2014, Iran had diluted 104.56 kg of the 209.1 kg of the nuclear material that had been in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 on 20 January 2014. Iran has undertaken, by 20 July 2014, to convert the remainder of this UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 into oxide (see para. 2 iv).
iv. fed 50.1 kg\(^4\) of UF\(_6\) enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) for conversion into uranium oxide;\(^5\)

v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF\(_6\) at FPFP;

vi. not made “any further advances” to its activities at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;

vii. provided an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor and agreed to hold a meeting with the Agency on 5 May 2014 to start discussions aimed at agreeing on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the reactor;

viii. continued the construction of the Enriched UO\(_2\) Powder Plant (EUPP) for the conversion of UF\(_6\) enriched up to 5% U-235 into oxide and consequently has yet to begin converting to oxide the UF\(_6\) “newly enriched” up to 5% U-235;\(^6\)

ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), without accumulating enriched uranium;

x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;

xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine;\(^7\)

xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow; and

xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon.

\(^4\) As of 12 April 2014.

\(^5\) Pursuant to its undertaking to convert into oxide the remainder of the UF\(_6\) enriched up to 20% U-235 (referred to in footnote 3).

\(^6\) Although the commissioning of the facility using natural uranium has been delayed beyond 9 April 2014, Iran has indicated to the Agency that this will not have an adverse impact on the implementation of Iran’s undertaking to convert to oxide the UF\(_6\) “newly enriched” up to 5% U-235 by 20 July 2014.

\(^7\) On 29 January 2014.