



ISIS Analysis of Latest IAEA Safeguards Report on Syria: Agreement on Homs Site Not Enough to Avoid a Special Inspection

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February 25, 2011

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released its [latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Syria](#). According to the new report, Syria informed the IAEA that it had agreed in principle to a visit to the Homs site. Syria had previously sent a letter to the IAEA informing it that the “...pilot plant at Homs and the activities being carried out there are not subject to Syria’s Safeguards Agreement...”¹ The IAEA has sought access to the Homs facility in order to “determine the extent of any uranium processing activities and nuclear material at that location,” and to investigate any links with material found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus.² In the latest report, the IAEA noted that the agreement to allow a visit to Homs “could represent a step forward.”

While Syria agreeing in principle to grant access to the Hom site is indeed a step forward, this comes more than two years after the IAEA initially requested access to multiple sites and individuals in Syria and documents related to its investigation of potential undeclared nuclear activity. On Wednesday, [ISIS published commercial satellite imagery](#) of a site reported by the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* to be a suspected covert uranium conversion facility and functionally related to the al Kibar reactor. In December 2010, [ISIS identified in satellite imagery a site near Masyaf](#) also suspected of being functionally related to the al Kibar reactor. The IAEA has made multiple requests for access and information in the years following the destruction of al Kibar. Many, including ISIS, have urged the Director General to call for a special inspection unless Syria demonstrates substantial cooperation with the IAEA.

Given the IAEA’s repeated requests to Syria for information and access, the agreement in principle to visit the Homs site does not constitute substantial cooperation. Such minimal cooperation by Syria in this latest safeguards report demonstrates the continued need for the Director General to call for a special inspection.

¹ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report by the Director General, 23 November 2010: http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Syria_report-nov23.pdf

² Ibid.