Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action

Report by the Director General

1. As foreshadowed in GOV/2014/2, this report provides information on the status of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (Iran’s) nuclear programme in relation to the “voluntary measures” that Iran has agreed to undertake as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013. The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, initially for a period of six months. On 24 July 2014, the JPA was extended until 24 November 2014, and on 24 November 2014 it was further extended until 30 June 2015.

2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:
   i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;
   ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;

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1 The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).


3 GOV/INF/2014/18, Annex.

4 GOV/INF/2014/28, Attachment.
iii. diluted – down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 – 108.4 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235;⁵

iv. fed 100 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) for conversion into uranium oxide;

v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF₆ at FPFP;

vi. not made “any further advances” to its activities at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;

vii. provided an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor and concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the reactor⁶ (based on the updated DIQ and the safeguards measures agreed on 5 May 2014);

viii. fed 2720 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP) for conversion into uranium oxide;

ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), without accumulating enriched uranium;

x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;

xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,⁷ to the Saghand Uranium Mine⁸ and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;⁹

xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;

xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and

xiv. provided,¹⁰ in relation to enhanced monitoring, the following:

- plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site;
- descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and
- information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

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⁵ For details, see GOV/INF/2014/26, footnote 4.

⁶ On 31 August 2014.

⁷ On 29 January 2014.

⁸ On 6 May 2014.

⁹ On 7 May 2014.

¹⁰ As of 20 April 2014: pursuant to Iran’s undertaking to provide this information within three months of the JPA taking effect, i.e. 20 January 2014.
3. In addition, the Agency confirms that since 24 July 2014, Iran has:

i. used 27.7 kg of U$_3$O$_8$, converted from UF$_6$ enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR;\textsuperscript{11,12}

ii. used 0.084 kg of U$_3$O$_8$, converted from UF$_6$ enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of miniature fuel plates for Mo$^{99}$ production;\textsuperscript{13}

iii. diluted about 4118 kg of UF$_6$ enriched up to 2% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.

\textsuperscript{11} On 25 November 2014, pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement, Iran temporarily stopped the operations for conversion and fuel manufacturing at FPFP in preparation for the Agency’s verification of the “physical inventory taking” at this facility. The Agency’s verification was carried out between 14 and 16 December 2014.

\textsuperscript{12} The Agency has verified that, since 24 July 2014, an additional 6.7 kg of this U$_3$O$_8$ (6.2 kg prior to 24 November 2014 and 0.5 kg since that date), have been generated by and removed from the fuel fabrication process as scrap. Iran reported that this nuclear material, which remains at the facility, had not met the technical specification for fuel fabrication.

\textsuperscript{13} In a letter dated 28 December 2014, Iran informed the Agency that FPFP was to start the production of miniature fuel plates for the MIX Facility for Mo$^{99}$ production.