



Advisory: United States Enforces Existing Sanctions against Iranian Company Tied to Attempted Ring Magnet and Carbon Fiber Procurements, Confirming Earlier ISIS Report

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On August 29, 2014, the U.S. Department of State [announced](#) the addition of four Iranian entities suspected of illicit procurement of WMD related goods under existing U.S. sanctions against Iran. Under Executive Order 13382, one of the Iranian companies Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars is included, notably, as the State Department press release indicates, due to its attempted procurement of 100,000 highly specialized ring magnets with specifications relevant to use in centrifuges. The amount sought would have been adequate to outfit 50,000 centrifuges. The inquiries occurred in late 2011 via a Chinese commercial website. The State Department press release also indicated that Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars attempted to procure between 2010 and 2013 “high-strength carbon fiber from Asia-based suppliers, some of which is controlled for export pursuant to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines and is proscribed for export to Iran by UNSCR 1737.” High-strength carbon fiber is used in Iran’s advanced centrifuge rotors and for producing ballistic missiles. In particular, Iran uses such carbon fiber in its IR-2m centrifuges and has made many attempts to procure such fiber for its centrifuge program, some of which have succeeded.¹

The attempted ring magnet procurement by Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars [was first revealed publicly by ISIS](#), which obtained a copy of the enquiry for the specialized ring magnets and analyzed it, determining that the specifications in the enquiry indicated the ring magnets were for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges.² ISIS’s subsequent report was covered in a prominent February 2013 *Washington*

¹ See for example David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Houston Wood, *Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, July 29, 2013). <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/future-world-of-illicit-nuclear-trade-mitigating-the-threat/>

² David Albright, *Ring Magnets for IR-1 Centrifuges*, ISIS Report, February 13, 2013. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/iran_ring_magnet_13Feb2013.pdf

Post story, which is mentioned in the State Department press release.³ Additional information about this case was published in another ISIS [review](#) of this case.⁴

The public revelation in the State Department press release that Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars was also involved in trying to procure high strength carbon fiber demonstrates that this company was seeking various sensitive goods. It is not a manufacturing company, as it implied in its enquiry involving ring magnets. The evidence indicates that in fact this company was acting to procure illegally sensitive centrifuge-related goods for the Iranian centrifuge program.

ISIS's February 2013 report recommended that the United States sanction Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars. The recent designation of this company is therefore a positive development.

³ [Joby Warrick](#), "Iranian buying spree raises concerns about major expansion of nuclear capacity," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iranian-buying-sprees-raises-concerns-about-major-expansion-of-nuclear-capacity/2013/02/13/2090805c-7537-11e2-8f84-3e4b513b1a13_story.html

⁴ Albright, *Preventing the Suppression of Uncomfortable Truths on Iran's Nuclear Program*, ISIS Report. March 7, 2013. <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/preventing-the-suppression-of-uncomfortable-truths-on-irans-nuclear-program/8>