Initial Reaction to IAEA Iran Safeguards Report

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The most striking point in the just-released International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) quarterly Iran safeguards report is Iran’s consistent refusal to address the inspectors’ concerns that it had a well-structured nuclear weapons program prior to 2004, and that parts of that program may have continued afterwards and some may be on-going today. In particular, the report states that Iran has still not provided information regarding two areas of concern, called “practical measures” in the IAEA document, despite Iran’s commitment to do so two months ago. The report also states that no further technical discussions are planned before November 24, the deadline for the P5+1 and Iran to negotiate a long-term nuclear agreement. By failing to address the IAEA’s concerns, Iran is complicating, and even threatening, the achievement of a long-term nuclear deal. The United States and its allies have repeatedly stated that Iran must demonstrate concrete progress on addressing the IAEA’s concerns. Unless Iran takes some measures soon, any deal that could be reached will likely need to link any significant economic or financial sanctions relief to Iran addressing the IAEA concerns about Iran’s military nuclear programs and nuclear weapon related activities, some of which may be on-going.

The IAEA’s language in this report reads more negatively than previous quarterly reports, signaling that Iran is not cooperating on this key issue and appears unwilling to settle it. Key highlights of the IAEA report on the military nuclear dimensions issue follow:

1) Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the IAEA to clarify the outstanding practical measures on the military nuclear dimensions, nor has it proposed any new practical measures in the next step of the Framework for Cooperation. The Framework is an agreement between the IAEA and Iran to resolve the IAEA’s concerns in a step-by-step manner.

2) At a meeting on 2 November 2014 with the IAEA, Iran provided some explanation of related open source scientific publications. Iran has not however provided any explanations that enable the IAEA to clarify the two outstanding practical measures, which were supposed to be addressed two months ago.

3) With respect to new practical measures, in a letter dated 25 August 2014, the IAEA first invited Iran to propose such new measures that it would implement in the next step in the Framework for
Cooperation. This invitation has been repeated several times since, including at a meeting in Teheran on 8 October 2014, but Iran has not proposed any new practical measures.

4) With regards to the Parchin site of alleged high explosive work related to nuclear weapons development, Iran’s activity is likely to have further undermined the IAEA’s ability to conclude effective verification.

5) The visa for one member of the IAEA team to visit Iran for the technical meeting in Tehran in October 2014 was not issued. This is the 4th occasion on which this staff member has been unable to participate in technical meetings in Tehran as a result of Iran not issuing a visa.

A longer analysis of the IAEA report will follow. A recent ISIS report addressing the military dimensions issue can be found here.