Surprising Admission by India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE):

Claims revealing sensitive centrifuge drawings does not violate DAE’s secrecy requirements

David Albright and Paul Brannan
September 19, 2008

In a surprising development today, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has acknowledged that it released sensitive gas centrifuge design information during its procurement process, but asserts that the release of this information “does not compromise technology control requirements.” According to a DAE press release, quoted by The Hindu, the redacted drawings released in a report by ISIS yesterday were "of a convoluted tube, having a variety of applications where flexibility is required. By this drawing alone, no sensitive information is revealed."

ISIS provided these drawings to two independent groups of gas centrifuge experts in Europe, who concurred that the tubes (with bellows) were for gas centrifuges and should not be publicly available. The results of their analysis were included in an ISIS report about India's gas centrifuge program.

The DAE does not appear to appreciate the sensitivity of the information it releases in its procurement process. Today’s press release confirms this potentially dangerous approach to the control of sensitive technology. The U.S. government should be concerned about the standards and methods the DAE uses to classify and protect nuclear information.

The press release also displays a disregard for the laws in NSG countries that ban the export of items to unsafeguarded nuclear programs in countries such as India without a license. The press release did not deny DAE's acquisition of tributyl phosphate (TBP) internationally. It said that that TBP is not a "controlled item in NSG listing guidelines." That is true, but this ignores catch-all laws that control the use of such dual-use materials in unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as India's. Because TBP is used in reprocessing, the U.S. government has focused on stopping TBP sales to North Korea and other countries. By using trading companies to procure TBP overseas, India violated the spirit of NSG guidelines. Those trading companies and suppliers potentially violated the laws of NSG countries. The press release betrays a surprising lack of knowledge of NSG export control laws, and raises questions about India's ability to implement an effective export control system.