Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

1. On 28 April 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/27). This report covers developments since April 2006.

2. As a follow-up to the meeting on outstanding verification issues that took place in Tehran on 13 April 2006 (see GOV/2006/27, para. 5), the Director General met in Vienna with the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on 26 April 2006, and with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran on 18 May 2006, to discuss those issues further. At these meetings, the Director General urged Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency on outstanding verification issues and reiterated the importance of Iran’s implementation of the confidence building measures requested by the Board of Governors.

3. On 28 April 2006, the Agency received from the Permanent Mission of Iran a letter dated 27 April 2006 in which it was stated that “Iran is fully prepared to continue granting the Agency’s inspection in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards provided that the Iran’s nuclear dossier will remain, in full, in the framework of the IAEA and under its safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues reflected in [the Director General’s] report GOV/2006/15 of 27 February 2006, in accordance with the international laws and norms. In this regard, Iran will provide a time table within next three weeks.” No such timetable has as yet been received.

A. Enrichment Programme

A.1. Contamination

4. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issue (GOV/2006/27, paras 8–9). As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, given the difficulty of establishing a definitive conclusion in connection with this long outstanding issue, a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programme, as well as full implementation of
the Additional Protocol, are necessary for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

**A.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology**

5. The Agency has continued its investigation of the outstanding questions related to Iran’s P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes (see GOV/2006/27, paras 10–14). However, Iran has not made any new information available to the Agency.

6. Following public statements made by high level officials of Iran that Iran was conducting research on new types of centrifuges, the Agency wrote to Iran on 24 April 2006 seeking clarification of the scope and content of such research. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s request.

**B. Uranium Metal**

7. With the assistance of some Member States, the Agency is carrying out investigations on information and documentation which may have been provided to Iran by foreign intermediaries (GOV/2006/27, paras 15–16). To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the Agency to have a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF$_6$ to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres. Iran has yet to provide the Agency with a copy of that document.

**C. Plutonium Experiments**

8. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report to the Board (GOV/2006/27, para. 17), the Agency has been pursuing with Iran information provided by Iran concerning plutonium separation experiments. In a letter dated 17 April 2006, Iran reaffirmed its previous explanations. On 5 May 2006, the Agency responded to that letter, reiterating in detail the inconsistencies between Iran’s explanations and the Agency’s findings.

9. As agreed during a meeting on 10 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27, para. 17), Iran provided the Agency on 6 June 2006 with further explanations, and a copy of the logbook kept by the researcher responsible for the plutonium experiments. These are currently being assessed.

**D. Heavy Water Research Reactor**

10. The last visit by Agency inspectors to the Arak site was in April 2006 as part of design information verification of the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), at which time it was noted that construction of the facility was continuing, as reported in GOV/2006/27, para. 18.

**E. Other Implementation Issues**

11. Iran has declared the production at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) of approximately 118 tonnes of UF$_6$, along with some intermediate products, between August 2005 and April 2006. Between 20 and 24 May 2006, the Agency carried out physical inventory verification (PIV) of the nuclear material at UCF. A final assessment of the results will be possible once the analysis of the nuclear material samples taken during the PIV is completed. All UF$_6$ produced at UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance measures. On 6 June 2006, a new conversion campaign was begun at UCF.

12. Iran has continued its testing of centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). As reported previously by the Director General, a campaign involving the completed 164-machine cascade was conducted in April 2006 (GOV/2006/27, para. 31). The Agency carried out an inspection at PFEP on
2–3 May 2006, in the course of which it took samples to confirm the enrichment levels of the product. Since that time, Iran has fed UF\textsubscript{6} into a single machine, and one machine of the 10-machine cascade, and, on 6 June 2006, started feeding UF\textsubscript{6} into the 164-machine cascade. Iran is continuing its installation work on other 164-machine cascades. The Agency carried out another inspection at PFEP on 6 and 7 June 2006. The enrichment process and product at PFEP, including the feed and withdrawal stations, are covered by Agency containment and surveillance measures. However, Iran has thus far declined to discuss implementation at PFEP of remote monitoring, which is an important verification measure in certain enrichment facilities.

13. On 7 June 2006, the Agency also carried out design information verification at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, where it was noted that construction was ongoing.

14. There are no new developments to report with respect to the other implementation issues referred to in the previous report (GOV/2006/27, paras 19 and 20).

F. Voluntary Implementation of the Additional Protocol

15. Since Iran’s suspension of the voluntary implementation of its Additional Protocol on 5 February 2006, Iran has not been implementing the provisions of that Protocol.

G. Transparency Visits and Discussions

16. With reference to the environmental samples taken from some equipment at a technical university in January 2006 mentioned in paragraph 25 of GOV/2006/27, analysis of those samples showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. On 16 May 2006, Iran responded to the Agency’s requests for clarification stating, inter alia, that, as mentioned during the visit of inspectors to Tehran on 27 January 2006, the equipment had not been acquired for or used in the field of nuclear activities. Iran indicated that it was, however, investigating how such particles might have been found in the equipment.

17. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s requests for clarifications concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (see GOV/2006/27, paras 24–25). Iran has also not provided the Agency access to interview the other former Head of the PHRC. The clarification and access sought by the Agency have taken on added importance in light of the results of the environmental sampling referred to in paragraph 16 above.

18. In paragraph 26 of GOV/2006/27, the Director General reported that, in January 2006, the Agency took environmental samples from some corrosion resistant steel, valves and filters, the results of which were still pending. The results have now been analysed, and show no indication of the presence of particles of nuclear material.

19. The Agency has continued to follow up on information concerning studies related to the Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/27, paras 27–29). Since the last report of the Director General, Iran has not expressed readiness to discuss these topics further.