

113TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To provide for a Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategy,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mrs. SHAHEEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To provide for a Next Generation Cooperative Threat
Reduction Strategy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Next Generation Coop-
5 erative Threat Reduction Act of 2013”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The United States nonproliferation and
9 threat reduction assistance program known as the
10 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is

1 one of the most successful congressionally-led United
2 States foreign policy initiatives in the post-Cold War
3 era.

4 (2) The CTR Program was initiated by the
5 United States Congress in legislation introduced by
6 Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Dick Lugar (R-
7 IN) in 1991.

8 (3) The initial purpose of the Nunn-Lugar CTR
9 Program was to dismantle and prevent proliferation
10 of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass
11 destruction (WMD) and their associated infrastruc-
12 ture in the independent states of the former Soviet
13 Union and to prevent the transfer of weapons of
14 mass destruction knowledge to other countries.

15 (4) As of February 28, 2013, the Nunn-Lugar
16 CTR Program has—

- 17 (A) deactivated 13,300 nuclear warheads;
- 18 (B) destroyed 1,473 intercontinental bal-
19 listic missiles (ICBMs);
- 20 (C) eliminated 831 ICBM silos;
- 21 (D) destroyed 442 ICBM mobile launchers;
- 22 (E) eliminated 233 bombers;
- 23 (F) eliminated 906 nuclear capable air-to-
24 surface missiles;

1 (G) destroyed 728 submarine launched bal-
2 listic missile (SLBM) launchers;

3 (H) eliminated 936 SLBMs;

4 (I) destroyed 48 ballistic missile sub-
5 marines;

6 (J) sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and
7 holes; and

8 (K) destroyed 39,986 metric tons of chem-
9 ical weapon agent.

10 (5) Due to the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program,
11 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear
12 weapons free and Albania is chemical weapons free.

13 (6) The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is based on
14 the premise that governments have a responsibility
15 and a mutual interest in working together to reduce
16 the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological
17 weapons and their associated infrastructure and
18 know-how.

19 (7) Though the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was
20 initially focused on the independent states of the
21 former Soviet Union, the threat represented by the
22 proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
23 WMD-related materials, infrastructure, and know-
24 how extends well beyond the borders of these states.

1 (8) The threat posed by WMD-related prolifera-
2 tion is increasingly prevalent in the Middle East and
3 North Africa (MENA), where political instability
4 and deeply-rooted violent extremism contribute to an
5 already dangerous threat to the United States and
6 some of its strongest allies.

7 (9) Terrorist organizations, including core al
8 Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda
9 in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
10 Hezbollah, Hamas, and their extremist supporters
11 continue to operate in the MENA region and have
12 sought or may seek to attempt to secure WMD ma-
13 terials or know-how.

14 (10) The Government of Iran's continued illicit
15 development of its nuclear program and its move-
16 ment towards an advanced nuclear weapons capa-
17 bility could lead to a nuclear arms race in the re-
18 gion.

19 (11) The Iranian regime's continued support
20 for and association with terrorist organizations in
21 the region, including Hamas and Hezbollah, pose a
22 significant and growing proliferation challenge for
23 the entire global community.

24 (12) Continued upheaval and violence in Syria
25 and the threat of the Assad regime's substantial

1 chemical weapons stockpile being used or falling into
2 the wrong hands also pose a significant and imme-
3 diate WMD-related proliferation challenge to the en-
4 tire global community.

5 (13) United Nations Security Council Resolu-
6 tion (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) binds all United Na-
7 tions members to adopt and enforce effective con-
8 trols to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their
9 means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related
10 materials; yet countries in the Middle East and
11 North Africa have a relatively weak record of imple-
12 mentation of UNSCR 1540.

13 (14) The MENA region continues to experience
14 significant political instability and sits atop a com-
15 plex web of ethnic differences, a history of violence
16 and extremism, robust military capabilities, a grow-
17 ing collection of unsecured weapons, and a variety of
18 unstable governments.

19 (15) The Arab Spring and the continued revolu-
20 tions across the MENA region represent significant
21 opportunities but also difficult challenges as the
22 United States attempts to create new relationships
23 with popularly elected governments that can be inex-
24 periented in nonproliferation, counter-proliferation,
25 or related security efforts.

1 (16) A number of governments in this unstable
2 region are considering the development of civilian
3 nuclear power programs, including the Governments
4 of the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
5 and other countries.

6 (17) As a result of these difficult challenges,
7 the United States has a clear interest in preventing
8 or minimizing the potential proliferation of WMD-re-
9 lated weapons, technologies, materials, and know-
10 how in the MENA region.

11 (18) Despite the threat of proliferation in the
12 Middle East and North Africa, only a small percent-
13 age of United States CTR and nonproliferation-re-
14 lated assistance programs have been focused on the
15 countries of this region.

16 (19) Until 2003, Congress limited the use of
17 Department of Defense (DOD) CTR funding to pro-
18 grams in the former Soviet Union.

19 (20) Section 1308 of the National Defense Au-
20 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (22 U.S.C.
21 5963) authorized the utilization of limited Depart-
22 ment of Defense CTR funding outside the inde-
23 pendent states of the former Soviet Union for short-
24 term projects and emergency funding.

1 (21) In section 1306 of the National Defense
2 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
3 110–181; 122 Stat. 413), Congress, for the first
4 time, specifically authorized funding for longer-term
5 CTR initiatives to address emerging security chal-
6 lenges and urgent threats in regions of the world be-
7 yond the independent states of the former Soviet
8 Union, stipulating that CTR should be “strenght-
9 ened and expanded” for “broader international co-
10 operation and partnerships,” including “programs
11 and projects in. . .the Middle East”.

12 (22) Section 1306 of the National Defense Au-
13 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 also mandated
14 that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a
15 study “to analyze options for strengthening and ex-
16 panding the CTR program”.

17 (23) The congressionally mandated report from
18 the National Academy of Sciences, “Global Security
19 Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat
20 Reduction,” published in 2009, recommended ex-
21 panding CTR activities into the Middle East, to in-
22 clude—

23 (A) encouraging and assisting with secu-
24 rity and destruction of chemical weapons stock-
25 piles;

1 (B) providing chemical weapons detection
2 and interdiction equipment and training;

3 (C) providing training for parliamentarians
4 and national technical advisors;

5 (D) promoting chemical safety and security
6 in the region;

7 (E) promoting biological safety, security,
8 and disease surveillance programs;

9 (F) promoting implementation of UNSCR
10 1540;

11 (G) promoting counter-trafficking obliga-
12 tions under UNSCR 1540;

13 (H) strengthening export controls and bor-
14 der security, including maritime security; and

15 (I) other cooperative programs aimed at
16 stemming the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
17 and biological weapons of mass destruction
18 technologies, materials, and know-how.

19 (24) The Department of State, the Department
20 of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Secu-
21 rity support nonproliferation projects aimed at coop-
22 eratively preventing the proliferation of weapons of
23 mass destruction in the Middle East and North Afri-
24 ca, including through—

1 (A) the Department of State Nonprolifera-
2 tion and Disarmament Fund;

3 (B) the Department of State Export Con-
4 trol and Related Border Security Program;

5 (C) the Department of State Global Threat
6 Reduction program;

7 (D) the Department of Energy Second
8 Line of Defense program;

9 (E) the Department of Energy Global Ini-
10 tiatives to Prevent Proliferation program;

11 (F) the Department of Energy Global
12 Threat Reduction Initiative;

13 (G) the Department of Homeland Security
14 Container Security Initiative; and

15 (H) the Department of Homeland Security
16 Secure Freight Initiative.

17 (25) These programs provide critical but small-
18 scale support in combating proliferation challenges
19 in the region, and they do not by themselves rep-
20 resent a robust, comprehensive, or whole-of-govern-
21 ment approach to nonproliferation in the MENA re-
22 gion.

23 (26) After extensive delays, near the end of
24 2012, the Executive Branch finally completed inter-
25 nal bureaucratic processes necessary to expand the

1 Department of Defense CTR Program more exten-
2 sively into the Middle East and the Department of
3 Defense recently publicly announced its intention to
4 apply fiscal year 2013 funds to help Syria's neigh-
5 bors counter the immediate threat posed by Syria's
6 chemical weapons.

7 (27) The Department of Defense has also initi-
8 ated a program with fiscal year 2013 funds to work
9 with the Government of Libya to help the country
10 meet its commitment to the Organisation for the
11 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by destroying its
12 chemical weapons stockpile.

13 (28) In addition to preventing proliferation of
14 WMD across borders shared with Syria and destroy-
15 ing chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya, the De-
16 partment of Defense has requested new funding to
17 initiate bio-engagement programs in the Middle East
18 in its fiscal year 2014 budget request.

19 (29) There is an urgent need today to more
20 sharply focus United States Government efforts and
21 resources on WMD proliferation in the MENA re-
22 gion.

23 (30) The United States Government needs a
24 comprehensive regional strategy for nonproliferation
25 activities in the Middle East and North Africa,

1 which includes additional, targeted resources for co-
2 operative threat reduction work in the region, and
3 one that utilizes all of our diplomatic, intelligence,
4 military, and public affairs tools in a coordinated
5 and creative whole-of-government approach and
6 leverages support from a wide variety of partners
7 and donors, including foreign countries, nongovern-
8 mental organizations, international institutions,
9 United States and foreign businesses, academic in-
10 stitutions, and other sectors.

11 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) countries around the world have a continued
14 interest in working together to reduce the threat
15 posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
16 related technologies, materials, associated infrastruc-
17 ture, and know-how;

18 (2) the United States Government, as a leader
19 in the international community in curbing the threat
20 posed by the proliferation of WMD-related weapons,
21 technologies, materials, infrastructure, and know-
22 how, has a national security interest in working with
23 the countries of the Middle East and North Africa
24 on establishing and developing robust nonprolifera-
25 tion capabilities in the region to effectively detect,

1 interdict, deter, and defend against proliferation of
2 WMD in the region;

3 (3) the United States Government should con-
4 tinue to expand the Department of Defense CTR
5 Program beyond the independent states of the
6 former Soviet Union, to include the countries of the
7 MENA region, provided that these programs com-
8 plement already existing United States nonprolifera-
9 tion programs in this region and provided that Con-
10 gress is properly informed of the long-term coopera-
11 tive threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance
12 strategy to be implemented;

13 (4) Congress supports the initiation of CTR
14 programs aimed at addressing the immediate threat
15 of Syrian WMD-related proliferation in the region
16 and the destruction of the chemical weapons stock-
17 pile in Libya and urges the United States Govern-
18 ment to ensure sufficient funding for the continu-
19 ation and expansion, if necessary, of these critical
20 programs;

21 (5) the United States Government should con-
22 tinue to strongly press all members of the United
23 Nations, including the countries of the MENA re-
24 gion, to fully implement UNSCR1540, which im-
25 poses binding obligations on all United Nations

1 member states to adopt and enforce effective con-
2 trols to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
3 destruction, their means of delivery, and the illicit
4 spread of related materials, and the United States
5 Government should provide for and develop coopera-
6 tive assistance programs aimed at more expedi-
7 tiously implementing those responsibilities and con-
8 trols;

9 (6) at a time of strained resources, the United
10 States needs a comprehensive and effective, whole-
11 of-government approach to global cooperative threat
12 reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs
13 that maintains the ability to provide assistance
14 through both military and civilian channels, seeks to
15 cancel unnecessary or ineffective programs, reduce
16 and eliminate duplication or overlap, and that maxi-
17 mizes the efficiency and effectiveness of Unites
18 States assistance;

19 (7) the United States Government should seek
20 increased and sustained financial and other support
21 from Russia, the European Union and its member
22 states, China, Japan, and other countries for strong-
23 er, standardized, and worldwide physical security for
24 WMD-related weapons and materials as well as for

1 other international nonproliferation efforts, particu-
2 larly in the MENA region;

3 (8) the United States Government should make
4 clear that any states that provide WMD to terrorist
5 groups or individuals will face severe and grave re-
6 taliation involving all elements of United States
7 power; and

8 (9) the United States Government should re-
9 assert and reinforce United States security commit-
10 ments around the MENA region in order to assure
11 allies that the pursuit of nuclear, chemical, or bio-
12 logical weapons or capabilities is not necessary or
13 conducive to stability in this dangerous region.

14 **SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF**
15 **WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE**
16 **MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.**

17 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall establish a
18 multi-year comprehensive regional assistance strategy to
19 coordinate and advance CTR and related nonproliferation
20 efforts in the Middle East and North Africa (in this sec-
21 tion referred to as the “MENA CTR and Nonproliferation
22 Strategy”).

23 (b) **CONSULTATION.**—In establishing the MENA
24 CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy, the President shall
25 consult with the appropriate congressional committees;

1 relevant Federal departments and agencies, including the
2 Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland
3 Security; multilateral organizations; international institu-
4 tions; representatives of civil society, including leading
5 nongovernmental and other experts; and other entities
6 that could assist in curbing the proliferation of nuclear,
7 chemical, or biological weapons, weapons components,
8 weapons-related materials, their associated delivery vehi-
9 cles, and know-how.

10 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection
11 (a) shall include the following elements:

12 (1) A commitment to utilizing and building
13 upon the cooperative model of success demonstrated
14 by the last two decades of the Nunn-Lugar CTR
15 Program in the independent states of the former So-
16 viet Union.

17 (2) A commitment to approach Middle East
18 and North Africa nonproliferation issues on a re-
19 gional basis as well as on a country-by-country basis.

20 (3) The expansion of current CTR and other
21 nonproliferation assistance programs in the MENA
22 region and the initiation of new programs with new
23 partner countries in the region as appropriate.

24 (4) Planning to ensure that countries receiving
25 such assistance in the Middle East and North Africa

1 countries have an appropriate stake in the develop-
2 ment of each country-specific strategy and are also
3 contributing financially to the effort with an appro-
4 priate level of burden-sharing.

5 (5) A plan to more fully engage, leverage, and
6 increase assistance, financing, and other support
7 from partners in the international community for
8 CTR and nonproliferation assistance programs in
9 the Middle East and North Africa, which may in-
10 clude—

11 (A) governments of other countries, includ-
12 ing Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and others
13 with an interest in a safe, secure, and stable
14 MENA region;

15 (B) the European Union, including the
16 European Council, the European Commission,
17 the European Parliament, and the associated
18 member states of the European Union;

19 (C) the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
20 tion and its member states;

21 (D) international institutions, including the
22 United Nations, the International Atomic En-
23 ergy Agency, and others;

1 (E) international donors, including philan-
2 thropists, foundations, and businesses inter-
3 ested in international nonproliferation efforts;

4 (F) multilateral partnerships, like the
5 Group of Eight or the Group of Twenty;

6 (G) Middle East and North African re-
7 gional institutions, including the Gulf Coopera-
8 tion Council and the Arab Atomic Energy
9 Agency; or

10 (H) well-respected and prominent inter-
11 national nonprofit and nongovernmental organi-
12 zations such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

13 (d) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Assistance authorized
14 under subsection (g) in support of the MENA CTR and
15 Nonproliferation Strategy may be made available for pro-
16 grams and activities to address the challenges posed by
17 the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weap-
18 ons, weapons components, weapons-related materials, and
19 their delivery vehicles, in the MENA region, including in-
20 novative new assistance programs with new partner coun-
21 tries in the region.

22 (e) COORDINATION.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Assistance authorized under
24 subsection (g) in support of the MENA CTR and
25 Nonproliferation Strategy shall be integrated with

1 pre-existing CTR and nonproliferation programs,
2 and such assistance shall be coordinated between the
3 relevant United States Government agencies involved
4 with CTR or nonproliferation programming in the
5 Middle East and North Africa.

6 (2) SCOPE.—Integration and coordination of
7 the Middle East and North Africa CTR and Non-
8 proliferation Strategy required under subsection (a)
9 should be the responsibility of the President and
10 shall include—

11 (A) an assessment to address where poten-
12 tial gaps in assistance may exist while also en-
13 suring the elimination or reduction of any po-
14 tential overlap or duplication in efforts;

15 (B) the establishment of appropriate
16 metrics for determining success in the MENA
17 region, as well as metrics for prioritizing poten-
18 tial partner countries under consideration for
19 Middle East and North Africa CTR and non-
20 proliferation programs;

21 (C) an effort to ensure that the MENA
22 CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy fits in the
23 broader United States Government-wide global
24 WMD threat reduction strategy and that assist-

1 ance is properly aligned with United States pol-
2 icy goals in the MENA region;

3 (D) a formal plan to ensure the sustain-
4 ability of coordination in the long term, irre-
5 spective of the President and other officials in
6 office or personalities in place, including clear
7 designations of agency and departmental re-
8 sponsibilities, accountability, and lines of com-
9 munication and authorities;

10 (E) a description of ways to reduce the po-
11 tential for stove-piping of information, intel-
12 ligence, and activities between counterterrorism
13 and counterproliferation programming; and

14 (F) a plan to ensure the proper tracking
15 and reporting of United States Government-
16 wide assistance in the MENA region.

17 (f) REPORTS.—

18 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
20 President shall submit to Congress the strategy out-
21 lined in subsection (a).

22 (2) ANNUAL REPORT.—Annually thereafter, the
23 President shall submit to Congress a report, in clas-
24 sified and unclassified form, that describes the
25 progress made by the President in implementing the

1 MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy, which
2 should include a list of the activities and countries
3 supported by the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation
4 Strategy, the agencies and assistance levels utilized
5 to implement the strategy, and the extent to which
6 specific program goals, progress, and milestones
7 have been achieved over the course of the prior year.

8 (g) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—There is authorized
9 to be appropriated not less than \$30,000,000 for each of
10 fiscal years 2014 through 2019 to be utilized by the rel-
11 evant executive agencies, including the Department of De-
12 fense, the Department of State, and the Department of
13 Energy, to implement the strategy outlined in subsection
14 (a).

15 **SEC. 5. REPORT ON CTR AND NONPROLIFERATION EF-**
16 **FORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AF-**
17 **RICA.**

18 Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appro-
20 priate congressional committees a report detailing all cur-
21 rent CTR and related non-proliferation activities in the
22 MENA region over the previous five years and all United
23 States Government funding contributed across each of the
24 Federal agencies in support of CTR and related non-
25 proliferation activities in the MENA region during that

1 time period, including the amount contributed, the identity
2 of the entity receiving such contribution and undertaking
3 each funded activity, the agency providing the contribu-
4 tion, a brief summary of each specific project undertaken,
5 the specific nonproliferation objectives sought to be
6 achieved by each project, and the extent to which the ob-
7 jectives have been achieved.

8 **SEC. 6. REPORTS ON 2014 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT IN**
9 **THE NETHERLANDS.**

10 (a) REPORT ON COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTIVES,
11 STRATEGIES, AND POLICIES IN THE LEAD-UP TO THE
12 2014 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT IN THE NETHER-
13 LANDS.—The President shall submit to Congress a report,
14 in classified and unclassified forms, that details the com-
15 prehensive objectives, strategy, and policies of the United
16 States with respect to the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Secu-
17 rity Summit in the Netherlands, not later than 30 days
18 prior to the Summit.

19 (b) FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON OUTCOMES FROM THE
20 2014 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT IN THE NETHER-
21 LANDS.—Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of
22 the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands,
23 the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classi-
24 fied and unclassified forms, detailing the outcomes of the
25 Summit and the extent to which the United States Gov-

1 ernment was able to accomplish the objectives, strategies
2 and policies detailed pursuant to subsection (a).

3 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

4 In this Act:

5 (1) MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.—The
6 term “Middle East and North Africa” includes the
7 countries or areas of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran,
8 Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mo-
9 rocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi
10 Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and
11 Yemen.

12 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
13 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
14 mittees” includes—

15 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the
16 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
17 on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Home-
18 land Security and Governmental Affairs, and
19 the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
20 sources of the Senate; and

21 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the
22 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
23 on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Home-
24 land Security, and the Committee on Energy
25 and Commerce of the House of Representatives.