Chairman: Our next speaker is Holly Higgins. She is a Research Analyst at ISIS. She contributed several chapters to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.

Holly Higgins: Thank you. It is my intent to provide you with a broad understanding of confidence-building measures (CBMs), especially their application in regional contexts. Many of you already have a basic knowledge of confidence-building measures. Some of you even have a very unique understanding of these concepts from having personally implemented them. My purpose is to offer a refresher course that, I hope, will adequately address the components that go into making and implementing CBMs.

I will begin with a broad discussion of CBMs. I will touch on their development, prerequisites, and benefits. I will highlight different approaches that states could use in implementing CBMs. Lastly, I will look at a few region-specific cases to illustrate some examples of nuclear confidence building.

CBMs, broadly defined, can be any set of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral actions or procedures that act to reduce military tensions between a set or sets of states, before, during, or after actual conflict. In practice, they function to make the conduct of countries more calculable and predictable, so that states can have certain expectations with regard to the behavior of other states.

Dozens of successful CBMs have been applied throughout the world. Approaches vary, but in general there are four main areas: communication, constraint, transparency, and verification.

- **Communication** channels between conflict-prone states help to defuse tensions during moments of crisis or provide a more regular consultative mechanism. A prime example is the “hotline” that was established between national command authorities in Washington and Moscow after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

- **Constraint** measures are designed to keep certain types and levels of states’ military forces at a distance from one another, especially along borders. These measures could include the advance notice of troop movements above a pre-agreed level, or placing constraints on military exercises. Limited force deployment zones, or “thin-out” zones, also restrict the type and number of military equipment or troops permitted in or near a certain territory or border. An example of this constraint was former President George Bush’s decision to withdraw all deployed ground, air, and sea launched tactical nuclear weapons overseas in the fall of 1991.

- **Transparency** measures foster greater openness of military capabilities and activities. Such measures may include pre-notification requirements, data exchanges, and voluntary observations of another state’s military exercises and operating procedures. Nuclear transparency measures also include unilateral declarations of nuclear-related data, or exchanges of such data among parties. Decisions by the United States and the United Kingdom to declassify information about their military fissile material stocks are examples of unilateral transparency measures aimed at confidence building.
• Verification measures are designed to confirm or verify a state’s compliance with a particular treaty or agreement. These can include aerial inspections, ground-based electronic sensoring systems, and on-site inspections. Aerial inspections enable parties to monitor compliance with force deployment limitations in restricted zones, to confirm data exchanges, and to provide early warning of potentially destabilizing activities. On-site inspections, in particular, can help verify that states are complying with agreements. Inspections may be carried out by third parties, opposing parties, or jointly.

Along the Israeli-Syrian border, the United States has acted as the third party to conduct aerial inspections, as do NATO and former Warsaw Pact members under the terms of the 1988 Open Skies Treaty. In the 1975 Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel, electronic sensors were used in the Sinai peninsula. A prime example of a mature, regional nuclear inspectorate is ABACC.

The above examples provide a very broad overview of confidence-building measures. In practice, CBMs appear to be most useful as a prelude to more comprehensive agreements. They often lead to improved trust and more formal cooperative measures.

Efforts to implement CBMs proceed more smoothly if the countries involved possess the political will to see the measures through to their fruition. States and their leaders must see the benefits of CBMs in order to sustain them through the rocky process of implementation. Moreover, democratic states must also gain the public’s support.

Political will often means being secure in one’s own capabilities. While CBMs strive to eliminate the elements of secrecy in military activity, agreements implementing CBMs must also manage to preserve or enhance—rather than endanger—the involved states’ national security. If participating states are secure in the knowledge that the CBMs do not undermine, or, in fact, may be beneficial, to their own national security, the measures have a greater chance of being sustained and developing into further cooperative activity.

Yet, the motivations behind the negotiation of initial steps need not all be in concert. States also do not require equivalent or balanced military capabilities to take initial steps. In fact, the only shared desire could just be the mutual desire to avoid inadvertent escalation or accidental war. The steps will necessarily be small at the outset if serious grievances must be bridged. Thus, the process begins by identifying shared interests and developing a philosophy of cooperation over time.

Improving mutual confidence and trust in the political domain can create more effective CBMs. Governments are especially leery of taking any steps that can be viewed as conciliatory, or politically damaging, in the face of continuing provocations. Yet, small steps are useful and necessary to foster an improved political climate, before more elaborate steps are taken.

The initiatives must be feasible. For instance, if a CBM involves third-party agreements or assistance, mechanisms for its implementation must be compatible with the foreign policies of the third parties. With many of the more substantive initiatives involving nuclear capabilities, technical feasibility must also be addressed.
CBMs are flexible enough to be adapted to specific regional security environments, yet similar enough in concept so that worldwide, regions can learn from one another’s experiences. The experiences of CBMs in one region can stimulate problem-solving approaches in other regions.

But there are limits on transplanting an experience from one region to another. Confidence-building measures cannot be transposed wholesale from one region to another. Each region has its own unique culture and history. Adaptation is possible, because concerns over border security, surprise attack, accidental war, and unintended escalation are felt in many regions, but there are no “one-size-fits-all” recipes.

The initiatives discussed and implemented in South Asia offer sobering insights for other regions. India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with a history of conflict. Their history is interspersed with war, conflicts on issues of bilateral importance, and a simmering territorial dispute over Kashmir. These conflicts have created a situation where each country expects the worst of the other.

The South Asian environment is a crisis-prone region and, consequently, averting another war is essential, particularly since a war could escalate to a nuclear exchange. In an ideal situation, India and Pakistan would develop stabilizing measures to address the variety of nuclear-related issues between them. These include preventative measures to minimize conflict escalation; measures to assist in crisis management at times when tensions are heightened, and perhaps when conventional conflict is already in progress; and measures to manage de-escalation, and bring the regional parties back from the brink of nuclear conflict.

India and Pakistan have developed CBM-like structures and agreements since the countries’ independence. Most of the CBMs now in place were prompted by the wars in 1947 – 1948, 1965, and 1971, and by periods of high tension associated with military exercises conducted between 1986 – 1991.

The first observation about the India-Pakistan relationship, and their attempts to ease tension, is that the parties have been more reactive than proactive in seeing that conflict does not break out again. A lesson is that CBMs cannot be forced upon parties that are still infused with such raw emotion and mistrust.

The first nuclear CBM was the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Facilities, which was signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 31, 1988. It was ratified in 1991 and implemented in January 1992. The bilateral agreement prohibits attack, directly or indirectly, against nuclear installations or facilities in either country. In an effort to be more transparent, the agreement also requires an annual exchange of lists detailing the location of all nuclear-related facilities in each country. Lists of the facilities covered by this agreement are now exchanged periodically, but often have not been wholly accepted by the other side.

Over the years, both countries have made their own separate initiatives to decrease tension. At times, Pakistan has proposed bilateral nuclear arms control measures with India, declaring, for example, that it would be prepared to join the NPT or accept other nonproliferation measures if India did so. But India has rejected these proposals, arguing that they do not address the nuclear threat India faces from China, and that nuclear disarmament questions should be addressed as global rather than regional issues.
India released its draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999. The document states that: “In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence-building measures shall be sought, negotiated, and maintained.” Pakistan has yet to formalize its own nuclear doctrine or respond to India’s offer.

India’s doctrine also intends to abide by the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons. India states that the fundamental purpose of its nuclear weapons “is to deter the use and threat-of-use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Pakistan has yet to issue a similar no-first-use declaration and, based on its smaller conventional forces compared to India’s, is unlikely to do so.

Currently both India and Pakistan are voluntarily maintaining a moratorium on further nuclear testing. Sustaining such a moratorium helps limit the expansion of nuclear weapons capabilities in the region. These unilateral commitments illustrate one of the highlights of CBMs, in that CBMs are often easier to achieve than formal arms control agreements. CBMs are flexible enough that they can be tacit and informal, such as India and Pakistan’s general understanding about testing, or quite specific, such as the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Facilities.

After the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan had to confront more openly the reality of their now nuclearized neighborhood. In February 1999, India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif met in Lahore, Pakistan, and agreed to: a Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers; a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the Foreign Secretaries; and the Lahore Declaration itself, again made by the Prime Ministers. The nuclear concerns identified in the Lahore documents are nuclear safety, security, use control, limits on threat, and alert status. A series of CBMs were proposed to address these concerns.

In the ministerial statement, the Prime Minister’s recognized that: “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries added to their responsibility of the avoidance of conflict between the two countries.” The text of the MOU concerned the terms of nuclear risk reduction. It emphasized measures to improve nuclear security and prevent an accidental nuclear exchange. One of the measures sought to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Another called for the creation of communication mechanisms similar in some aspects to those required by the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

Specifically, the two sides committed to exchange information on their nuclear doctrines and security concepts; prevent accidental nuclear crises; work on measures to improve control over their nuclear weapons; review existing CBMs and emergency communications (hotlines) arrangements “with a view to upgrading and improving these links”; and strengthen India and Pakistan’s unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing by making their commitments binding “unless either side…decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

But just three months later, fighting broke out over Kargil and the technical details of the Lahore document were never worked out. As is often the case between India and Pakistan, implementing the agreements suffered setbacks and became hostage to political tensions over territory. This absence of trust and confidence among the leaders of India and Pakistan, as evident during the
Kargil crisis of May-July 1999, is a major cause of tension in South Asia and undermines the significance of CBMs agreed to by New Delhi and Islamabad. Until the details are finalized and the pledges made at Lahore are implemented, nuclear risk reduction in South Asia will remain rhetorical.

An important lesson is that the emphasis of Indian and Pakistani leaders on declaratory measures is not that productive in an atmosphere devoid of trust. A no-first-use policy is low on substance and difficult to verify without intrusive measures to demonstrate a reduced state of readiness, including keeping warheads separate from delivery vehicles, and other indications of recessed deterrence. What are needed are nuclear risk-reduction measures that are specific, substantive, and easily verifiable. As mentioned earlier, improving mutual confidence and trust in the political domain is the first order of business for creating effective CBMs. Thus, establishing even a modicum of trust is necessary in order to stabilize their adversarial relations. The two countries must rethink the process of CBM measures as necessary for the resolution of their conflicts.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, participants in the Middle East peace process gathered together in October 1991 in Madrid. Five multilateral groups were formed shortly after the opening round. These groups focused on an array of issues from refugees to the environment. The only group devoted exclusively to security issues was the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group. The purpose of ACRS was to apply confidence-building measures to the region and broadly discuss a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) or other weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ).

Chaired by the United States and Russia, early ACRS sessions sought to build knowledge of CBMs among the regional participants. Until mid-1993, the working group focused primarily on familiarizing the regional parties with arms control and with one another. The parties were presented with explanations of the histories and provisions of arms control agreements implemented in the Middle East and in other regions.

Expert-level meetings focused principally on CBM discussions in five areas: declaratory measures, communications, maritime agreements, military information exchanges, and conflict prevention/regional security. There were a number of special site-visits, as well. In October 1994, several parties visited a German nuclear power plant and discussed the interaction between the IAEA and its regional verification authority, EURATOM. As part of a workshop on implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, parties also toured both a Swiss chemical weapons verification laboratory and a Finnish chemical weapon verification-related training facility.

As parties came to articulate their concerns, the nuclear asymmetry of the region proved to be a focal point. A wide gap between Israeli and Arab priorities on arms control emerged. Israel proposed that the first steps toward arms control consist of transparency CBMs, while Egypt suggested that all parties in the region first sign existing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons treaties and allow international inspections. Israel maintained that CBMs were a prerequisite to any steps toward denuclearization. Thereafter, Egypt and Israel remained at loggerheads in the ACRS talks about how best to initiate a process of building confidence in the region.

Egypt and Israel also differ in their requirements for a future regional NWFZ. Israel does not have confidence in IAEA safeguards provided under the NPT, and insists upon a tight and comple-
mentary regional verification regime, whereas Egypt maintains that the existing IAEA regime is sufficient.

Because of the fundamental clash between Israel and Egypt, ACRS has not held a formal plenary meeting since September 1995. Still, the group continues to pursue informal activities and many regional parties attend Track II events as well.

Latin America, and more specifically the Argentine-Brazilian experience of nuclear rapprochement, is universally heralded as a successful example of reducing regional nuclear tensions through CBMs.1 Much will be discussed today and tomorrow on this region’s experience with bilateral inspections and historic commitments banning unsafeguarded nuclear activities, but what should not be left out of this discussion is the initial steps taken to begin this process—in other words, how the volatile politics of the two countries abated to allow this historic and groundbreaking process to proceed.

Argentina and Brazil fought just one war in its history, and that was in the 1820s. Afterwards, the two countries had periodic flare-ups, but nothing that came close to war again. However, rivalries between the two countries plagued their relationship.

In September 1962, Brazil, which was then under a civilian government, proposed the idea of a Latin American NWFZ. At the time, Argentina was under a military government and was disinterested. But in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Latin American nations realized that the prospects for a nuclear war were too close. This concern became the catalyst for the negotiation of the Tlatelolco Treaty that took place in Mexico City between 1963 and 1967. The treaty was successfully concluded in 1967, but both Argentina and Brazil remained outside of the treaty for the next 25 years. Although neither nation was a party to the treaty, both agreed to take no actions contrary to the intent of the treaty.

University of Virginia Associate Professor John Redick has said that this commitment set the political context for their nuclear rapprochement. The process was groundbreaking, in that for the first time, the two rival nations began to talk about sensitive nuclear issues and develop common positions. Redick defines the Tlatelolco negotiations as the first step in the long confidence-building process between the two.

Several issues, however, prevented progress on nuclear issues. Former Argentine Ambassador Julio Carasales identified the last serious difficulty between the two countries occurred regarding the management of water resources on the River Parana, which flows from Brazil into Argentina. That dispute was solved by a 1979 agreement. Carasales points out that, “until that problem was solved, it was unrealistic to expect advances in any field, including the nuclear field.”

Progress on economics and trade also proceeded before the nuclear issue. However, at a certain point there was a realization that the nuclear issue had to be included on the agenda in order

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to proceed with the overall *rapprochement* process. Nuclear affairs were considered an important part of the entire political climate that encompassed a range of foreign policy issues. It was not a separate or isolated phenomenon. A nuclear dimension in any regional conflict will likely always be on the agenda, because nuclear concerns go to the heart of a country’s insecurities.

The first attempt to improve relations in the nuclear field took place in 1980 when the Brazilian President, General Figuereido, made a visit to Argentina, which was then also under a military regime led by General Videla. At that meeting, several agreements were signed, including an Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of Peaceful Nuclear Uses of Nuclear Energy. The underlying motivation for this agreement was a shared view that modern technology—a powerful symbol of an advanced economy and prosperity—was unjustly dominated by a few highly developed nations. Consequently, Brazil and Argentina viewed collaboration in the nuclear field, rather than competition, as the best means to surmount the barriers of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

However, the return of democracies in the mid-1980s was critical to resolving the nuclear issues. The militaries in each country mistrusted each other too much to make significant progress in this area.

As economic progress between the two countries increased, a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy was issued that stressed the exclusively peaceful purposes of both countries’ nuclear programs, and their intent to cooperate very closely in this area. This declaration also established a joint working group under the responsibility of the Argentinean and Brazilian foreign ministries to study and propose concrete measures to implement the declared bilateral nuclear policy. The nuclear *rapprochement* process was a gradual, step-by-step process that included seminars, scientific and economic cooperation, and joint work on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and on related topics.

There were frequent, reciprocal head-of-state visits to sensitive nuclear sites, which improved the climate of mutual trust and confidence between the two countries. Following each visit, a specific declaration of common nuclear policy was signed. Thus, the visits had important political meanings and objectives.

The process was first and foremost designed to address indigenous and bilateral concerns. Once those had been addressed, the time was ripe to address regional concerns, as well. When those were addressed, the concerns of the international community could be satisfied.

The prospect of new momentum in inter-Korean dialogue has brought renewed calls of inter-Korean CBMs. In 2000, the Korean peninsula witnessed dramatic shifts in the North-South relationship. After the historic June summit, which concluded with a Joint Declaration, the two Koreas have held family reunions and ministerial talks. Perhaps soon there will be a reciprocal visit by Chairman Kim Jong-il to Seoul. It remains to be seen whether a true inter-Korean *rapprochement* may be consolidated, but it is certain that an inter-Korean peace process will not go far without serious efforts to tackle inter-Korean arms control, transparency, and verification issues through the application of CBMs.

A particular value of CBMs is that they can be small steps that pave the path for more elaborate, formalized agreements. Yet, on the Korean peninsula, the process has often been reversed. In several cases, the approach to confidence building has started with calls for the establishment of
broad, “top-down” political agreements among the respective political leaderships, to be followed by an implementation process in which the parties themselves will simply change their behavior in accordance with a new political understanding. A more productive approach often involves confidence building from a “bottom-up,” incremental, approach in which progress in implementation builds further confidence among the parties concerned, and stimulates additional CBMs.

Two broad and ambitious agreements were initiated in December 1991, but implementation has been delayed by competing visions of reunification and suspicions over North Korea’s nuclear program. The first agreement signed by the two Koreas was the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges, and Cooperation. It committed the two Koreas to build confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade, and other areas. It specifically states that both Koreas “shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission…shall discuss problems and carry out steps to build up military confidence and realize arms reduction…mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the DMZ, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.”

The Basic Agreement is comprehensive in that it lays the foundation for not only inter-Korean tensions reduction, but also sets the stage for the process of confidence building that would ultimately lead to integration and eventual political reunification.

On December 31, 1991, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The ultimate purpose of the Joint Declaration was to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and to create an environment favorable to peace. With this in mind, North and South Korea agreed to a detailed list of actions, including: a ban on the possession and use of nuclear weapons, including any testing, manufacturing, production, storage or deployment of those weapons; a commitment to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and a ban on the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. The two Koreas also agreed to establish and operate a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), which would be responsible for conducting inspections of “particular subjects chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides”; and implementing the declaration as soon as South and North Korea exchanged the “appropriate instruments” of ratification.

The Joint Declaration entered into force on February 19, 1992, followed by the establishment of the JNCC one month later. The JNCC was tasked with matters “related to the exchange of information for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” as well as organizing the composition and operation of inspection teams. Despite the optimistic beginning, the meetings did not last long. The two sides had little experience in defining an adequate bilateral inspection regime, particularly given that their basic relationship was still one of suspicion and mistrust. While the Joint Declaration appeared all-inclusive, the delegates never settled the issues of mutual inspections before signing it.

The South insisted on three elements for an effective inspection regime: an equal number of inspections; no sanctuaries, which meant it could gain access to the North’s military bases; and “challenge” inspections, which could take place on 24-hour notice. Pyongyang resisted Seoul’s
demand for short-notice inspections and stated that inspections should be limited to verifying that no nuclear weapons existed on the peninsula. JNCC discussions further soured and the group has not convened since 1993.

The impasse of the JNCC should not be viewed as a failure, but nonetheless, one must recognize that attempting to implement reciprocal inspections without prior confidence-building measures in place was trying to do too much. The Argentinian-Brazilian experience shows the importance of a step-by-step process in enhancing nuclear cooperation between two hostile parties through strong and extensive cooperation, and finally leading to bilateral inspections. That is, countries should implement CBMs at the beginning, and thereby foster a politically favorable environment for negotiating bilateral inspections. Some analysts have suggested that, as part of the confidence-building process, it will be necessary to educate North Koreans about the practical necessity of Western concepts of arms control and confidence building prior to pursuing a step-by-step implementation process.

Successful efforts at more modest confidence building have been conducted on the multilateral and sub-regional level. Multilateral settings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes approximately 20 ministers from the ASEAN states, including North Korea. The ARF participants commit to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern in order to make significant efforts toward confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.” The ARF has facilitated bilateral dialogue among nations and their official representatives who, for a variety of reasons, would be unable or ill-prepared to make arrangements with one another. Just last year, the foreign ministers of North and South Korea were able to meet on the sidelines of ARF.

Another important reminder is that symbolic measures should not be underestimated. It can be as simple as a head of state visit. Likewise, a humanitarian gesture can be just as worthwhile. The inspirational walk by both Koreas in the 2000 Olympics under one flag was a small but significant act.

Yet, regardless of these established institutions and South Korea’s willingness to pursue reconciliation with North Korea, significant progress is not possible without North Korea’s constructive participation. Nor can there be progress without North Korea’s willingness to become more transparent, whether it is on food aid distribution, the energy sector, the economy, or its nuclear program.

Negotiation and implementation of CBMs is tough work, compounded by the fact that the initiatives are often subject to outside political tension, which forestall their progress. Success often depends on the foresight of national leaders, who recognize the benefits of CBMs and work vigorously to pursue them, despite criticism or risk. The need for sustained dialogue to address issues of regional security is likewise important.

In reflecting on the Korean peninsula, one thing stands out. The Korean peninsula is a unique case in that the ultimate goal for both countries is already in concert: peaceful reunification. With that understood, the agreements and CBMs that will propel the two countries forward seem somehow closer to attain than for some other regions.

Thank you for your attention. I am ready to answer questions.
Participant: Thank you very much for your overview. Since this is a descriptive overview rather than an analytic argument, I don’t see any reason to object to it or find fault with it. However, I have several comments.

First, you emphasized the importance of “trust” in the case of India and Pakistan: confidence-building measures have not been successful because there is no mutual trust. I have some objections to this analysis. I believe that it is mistaken to understand India’s path to nuclearization or Pakistan’s path to nuclearization as a consequence of mutual mistrust or regional conflict.

India actually tried to become a superpower, and it still has that kind of political ambition. When we take a look at the policies of India, India always thought of China, not Pakistan, as its rival country. For example, when China exploded its first nuclear devices in 1964, Indian public opinion was really supportive of an Indian bomb, but the government constrained itself and waited. At that time, if I am correct, India didn’t follow the Chinese path because it didn’t have delivery vehicles. So India waited until later, when the Agni missiles came about in 1980.

This is a different type of politics than the one you described. There is an entirely different story between what we can see versus what is really going on. I don’t think that the problem is one of “trust.” India has its own national goals.

Coincidentally, on the day Pakistan exploded its nuclear devices in 1998, I was having dinner with the Indian ambassador. At that time, CNN announced that Pakistan had exploded its devices. I smiled, and I shook hands with the Indian ambassador and said: “Congratulations, Mr. ambassador. Now you are free to do what you want to do.” He smiled and was very happy. I think the reality may be more complicated than what you portrayed in your paper. That is my comment on that case.

I also have a comment about the Egypt and Israel case. It is an oversimplification to argue that both Egypt and Israel are really interested in CBMs, but differ only over the procedures. Recall the survival strategy of Israel and its nuclear development: Prime Minster Ben-Gurion was impressed by the Hiroshima bomb, and let his people search in the Negev to find fissile materials.

If we think about that story of Israel’s struggle, I really don’t think that Israel is interested in bilateral inspections. As I told Mr. Albright over lunch, the Israelis may say: “Yes, we are interested,” but they won’t accept it—at least for the time being, particularly after the September 2000 uprising of the Palestinians. They may need more time to see what is going on.

You also mentioned that the democratization of Brazil and Argentina was a critical reason for the success of bilateral arrangements. I appreciate that and I fully agree with that. During the 1980s, I read many articles on the Brazilian-Argentinean nuclear competition. Fortunately Brazil and Argentina were in better shape than we are. We have to think of that.

On the Korean front, you may think the 2000 summit was historic and surprised the whole world as well as Koreans. You may think that Kim Jong-il suddenly became an internationally responsible and sensible man, and shed his old image of a mentally disrupted leader. Perhaps, you think that North Korea is no longer a closed country or a hermit kingdom, now that it is showing active gestures toward the world. This kind of interpretation was inefficient right after the summit meeting.
Even in South Korea, the majority of South Koreans are suspicious of North Korean motivations. Even though we want unification, we have to think about North Korean motivations. We have a lot of things to discuss. Foreign experts who do not live in South Korea have a tendency to over-simplify the complex dynamics at work on the Korean peninsula. Conclusively, I just want to say that the nuclear solution on the Korean peninsula may be much more difficult than outsiders believe.

Thank you very much.

Holly Higgins: If I can steal a line from former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who recently went to North Korea, in order to address your comments: When asked if Kim Jong-il was a responsible leader, and whether he had changed in light of the increased diplomatic activity between the two Koreas, and between the United States and North Korea, Madeline Albright replied: “The glasses I’m wearing are not rose-colored.” Despite the fact that I believe the North-South summit was historic and did a great deal to break the ice on the Korean peninsula, I acknowledge that there is far more work to be done.

As an American analyst, I am aware that I do not have the benefit of seeing and listening to the pulse of the South Korean public. I rely a great deal on the Korean press for my understanding of Korean news. However, I also use many other sources and work with people both in and outside the government to gain a better understanding of these issues.

The perception of Kim Jong-il did change, but only for a small portion of people. At least, many world leaders believe he is now a man they can work with. I think that is one positive step. Again, I am under no illusions that this process will be quick or easy. The summit was historic and I hope for a second one.

Over lunch you said that if nothing is agreed to concretely at these summits, then what’s the point? I would argue that if more family reunions can occur, or if the summit provides a brief time of relative calm on the peninsula, then that is a benefit.

Under the Clinton administration, ISIS could never persuade officials to raise nuclear issues because these issues would stir up too much controversy or create ill will. Now, perhaps the idea of putting more modest nuclear CBMs on the table can happen.

You pointed out some relevant comments on my discussion of the Middle East and India-Pakistan. Perhaps my talk did gloss over these issues quickly, but that is because I tried to cover so many nuclear CBMs from other regions. My intention was to bring out some of these ideas.

Thank you for your comments.

Participant: This is a very interesting story. When Selig Harrison and his colleagues wrote a paper on India-Pakistan nuclear competition, I read that very carefully. I actually attacked it severely. I asked Mr. Harrison: “India was thinking of nuclear bombs because they didn’t trust Pakistan. You are defining this problem as a regional problem, then what about your own bombs?”

Actually, there is a kind of causal linkage between nuclear powers and the non-nuclear powers. The United States detonated its first nuclear explosive in 1945. This was followed by
Russia in 1949, then Britain, France, and China. We should talk about the reasons and prescription for nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapon states should be responsible for their own actions, before they talk about something region-specific or country-specific.

Selig Harrison couldn’t reply properly. So he said: “You are right.” Personally, he and I became very close friends even though our thinking is very different. What I’ve read of nuclear articles, oversimplification is the tendency. Our thinking should be complex and multifaceted, otherwise we are likely to make mistakes.

**Participant:** I have a comment about the cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. I think the most difficult step is to have cooperation in sensitive areas. In the European example, there is multilateral cooperation for uranium enrichment between three countries. I never saw any suspicion about the behavior of these three countries. Cooperation in sensitive areas is the best way to have openness. I think that is one step Argentina and Brazil must strive for in the future.

I think that the best situation will be when the confidence building is complete and when Argentina and Brazil have projects in the nuclear area. I think that would be the definitive step. It is very difficult to have scientific cooperation in the nuclear area. Something that has commercial meaning is very hard to work out. I am very glad to know that maybe in the months ahead there will be formally installed agents to cooperate between Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear field. If the process is open, I think that will be the definitive step and the best way to establish confidence between the two countries.

**Participant:** I agree with the previous participant that Argentina and Brazil already have a lot of cooperation and confidence in the nuclear area, but that we need to have a common project involving the nuclear fuel cycle. It will be the best way to finally consolidate this mutual confidence, because both countries will be involved.

**Participant:** Concerning this issue of oversimplification, Holly was asked to look at confidence-building measures in India and Pakistan, not to analyze their nuclear weapons programs. The CBMs between India and Pakistan are aimed at India and Pakistan, and have nothing to do with China. The reason is simple: India and China do not risk war on a daily basis. The CBMs were attempts by those countries to reduce the chance of mistakes that could escalate into war.

I’m sure you are familiar with the military exercise of the late 1980s, where there was a lot of confusion and there was some concern that escalation could happen. The CBMs are really tailored for that particular potential for crisis between India and Pakistan. In that sense they are not oversimplified at all. They are just accurately stated as what they are. If you want to discuss the roots of nuclear weapons in South Asia and how to get rid of them, then of course you would have to talk about China, the five nuclear weapon states, and so on. But I do not think that we should lose sight that these were CBMs that had a particular purpose, and the lack of trust prevents India and Pakistan from achieving even those limited goals. That is the heart of Holly’s talk.

On the Middle East, Israel went into ACRS thinking that it would be a 50-year process. Egypt was very frustrated with that perspective. Holly did not cover this in her talk, but they sat down and tried to negotiate a WMDFZ. The conflict that she talked about was in that context.
Egypt and Israel couldn’t get their clocks set anywhere close to each other. Then they stalled out on that particular agreement. The paper was meant to be very specific to the ACRS process and the breakdown of the ACRS process. It broke down before Netenyahu was elected; it was independent of the Palestinian situation, and what Netenyahu then did as Prime Minister. It was a very fundamental clash.

Participant: I also have a comment and question. Our central question is on CBMs. How do we start CBMs on the Korean peninsula? Based on your example and others, the lack of trust or lack of confidence prevailing today in the two Koreas is worse than in Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s – 1990s. As we can see at this very workshop, Carlos Feu and Alfredo Biaggio are sitting side-by-side. They talk with each other, and they even work for the same organization. They came from these old confrontational neighboring states where you must have a lack of trust or lack of confidence in nuclear matters.

Today, it is unthinkable that a North Korean nuclear expert and someone like myself will sit side by side and talk to each other. That is unpractical. That cannot be done. We ask why. Why is it not possible? If India and Pakistan can do it, and Israeli and Arab neighbors can do it, why not North and South Korea? That is why we are here. What could trigger the North and South to sit down?

Participant: Technology has developed and advanced in exponential order, but political affairs are still lagging. So, when we talk about the issues from the 1990s in the year 2001, you have a technical basis that is a completely different phenomenon.

In the 1990s, if anybody had the capability of making even the crudest nuclear weapons, it didn’t matter if they are deliverable or not, it was taboo. People had real concerns about it. How about now? Do you think that if anybody, any country, has a capability of making one or two nuclear weapons, do you think that they make a big fuss? They may, from the political point of view, but not from the technical point of view.

We are capable of flying missiles and shooting them down and making them unusable. That is the technology that we have developed since the 1980s. But in the 1990s we didn’t have that technology. From the perspective of nuclear weapons, it is so different from ten years to right now. That is something that we have to think about and we will have to put things in the proper perspective and analyze it. Otherwise, we will never get any closer to solving the wide gaps in a political sense, which can be done and resolved technically.

Chairman: Thank you, Holly. We will take a short break and then return to our next speaker.