

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND NONPROLIFERATION

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT,
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Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today.

I would start by saying that the case against the members of the A.Q. Khan network is not closed. There is considerable work to do to investigate and prosecute the members of the network.

I would like to submit my prepared testimony for the record and summarize two specific points from that testimony: First, a need for Pakistan to do more and, second, the need for the United States to do more; in particular, to provide assistance to the Swiss prosecution of three key operatives of the Khan network, Urs, Marco and Friedrich Tinner.

As you have laid out, there are many questions that remain about what Khan and his associates supplied other countries, particularly Iran. Specific questions involving Iran include the extent of centrifuge assistance, the logistics of that assistance, and the possible supply of entire nuclear weapons designs. These areas remain especially troubling as we try to determine exactly how close Iran could be to building nuclear weapons and what sensitive information may remain in circulation around the world that could fall into the hands of other enemies of the United States.

In addition, the information shared by the Pakistani Government with the International Atomic Energy Agency and other governments appears so far to be incomplete. Unraveling the activities of the network and ensuring that it remains shut down require the Pakistani Government to provide more assistance to investigators, including giving the IAEA and affected governments direct access to question Khan—and I would add his associates—verbally. Greater cooperation from Pakistan would allow the agency, the IAEA, and affected governments to conduct more thorough investigations, to pursue more effectively the criminal prosecutions of individuals involved in the network, and to recover physical remnants of the procurement network that have not yet been found and provide the seeds for future nuclear weapons programs.

Although Pakistan has taken steps to create a national export control system and to place additional controls over its nuclear scientists, Islamabad has not faced up to the difficult task of actually implementing an effective import control system. One necessary step is to prosecute Pakistani members of the network to send a clear signal that Pakistan will

punish illegal exporters severely, and thereby reduce the likelihood that someone will step into Khan's shoes. The fact that no prosecutions appear to be planned serves to increase suspicions that the Pakistani Government is hiding information about the network's activities, particularly information that could further embarrass itself or its military.

I would like now to turn to the second point. Although the focus today is on Pakistan's unanswered questions about the Khan network, the United States has been remiss in assisting the overseas prosecution of key members of the Khan network. The United States has ignored multiple requests from Swiss prosecutions for cooperation that have extended over a year. The Swiss Attorney General sent requests to the United States for legal assistance in its case against three key members of the Khan network, the Tinners, and those requests came in over—the first ones came in over a year ago. So far the prosecutors have not received a reply or even a confirmation that the U.S. Government received the request.

Last fall I assisted the prosecutors in contacting Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, writing him a letter requesting his assistance. In particular, the letter asked for help in obtaining information and documents about centrifuges and centrifuge-related equipment relative to the Swiss prosecution, and arranging a visit to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to examine certain items removed from Libya by the United States. This letter, which was sent last February, has also remained unacknowledged and unanswered.

The Office of Attorney General in Switzerland is certainly disappointed over this matter. It is difficult to understand the actions of the U.S. Government. Its lack of assistance needlessly complicates this important investigation.

In contrast, Libyan authorities have greatly assisted Switzerland in its legal request, allowing a visit to Tripoli to interview witnesses in April 2006 and promising documents that are expected to aid in the case against the Tinners. Law enforcement agencies in the Far East and in South Africa have also cooperated with Swiss prosecutors.

I believe the United States should respond to the Swiss request for assistance as quickly as possible. To continue to ignore these requests undermines the vital prosecution of key members of the Khan network and risks undercutting support for Swiss cooperation in nonproliferation matters.

While historically Switzerland has been a problem on nonproliferation, in the last several years it has dramatically improved its record, and I would say is vital to achieving certain U.S. goals on nonproliferation even as we speak today.

In addition, I find this lack of cooperation frankly embarrassing to those of us who believe that the United States should take the lead in bringing members of the Khan network to justice for arming our enemies with nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.