http://isis-online.org/ en robertavag@gmail.com Copyright 2013 2013-03-27T15:07:34+00:00 http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/a-dangerous-nexus-preventing-iran-syria-north-korea-nuclear-and-missile-pro/http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/a-dangerous-nexus-preventing-iran-syria-north-korea-nuclear-and-missile-pro/#When:16:51:44Z Iran, Korean Peninsula, Syria, Non Proliferation Conferences and Testimonies 2013-04-15T16:51:44+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/stopping-an-undetectable-iranian-bomb/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/stopping-an-undetectable-iranian-bomb/#When:15:07:34Z Washington and its allies must insist that Tehran verifiably stop increasing the number and quality of its centrifuges. Iran’s nuclear program dominated last week’s meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A key challenge for both leaders: how to stop Iran’s rapid advance toward “critical capability.” Critical capability means the point at which Iran could dash to produce enough weapons-grade uranium or separated plutonium for one bomb so quickly that the International Atomic Energy Agency or a Western intelligence service would be unable to detect the dash until it is over. Mr. Obama has implicitly threatened to use force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from “obtaining” nuclear weapons. But once Tehran is perched at critical capability, it could use the threat of an undetectable breakout to enjoy many of the strategic benefits of having a bomb without crossing Mr. Obama’s red line. Once Iran has produced sufficient fissile material—weapons-grade uranium or separated plutonium—it will be much more difficult for the West to stop Iran from completing the process of actually building nuclear weapons. Producing fissile material is the most technically demanding step in building a nuclear bomb, and the hardest to hide. According to IAEA officials, Iran already knows enough to create the non-fissile parts of a basic nuclear bomb. With this knowledge, a country such as Iran could manufacture nuclear weapon components, or even assemble complete bombs, in small, secret facilities. That is one reason why U.S. intelligence was surprised by how quickly China, India, North Korea, Pakistan and the Soviet Union obtained nuclear weapons—and underestimated Iraq’s progress in 1990 and overestimated it in 2002. How short would Iran’s fissile-material dash need to be so as to be undetectable? Currently, the IAEA inspects two Iranian enrichment facilities on average once a week, and a third facility every two weeks on average. With this rate of inspections, Iran would need to produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium (enough for one bomb) from its stockpiles of lower enriched uranium in less than one week. The window might be widened to two or three weeks if Tehran blocked one or two inspections on the pretext of an “accident” or a “protest.” This brings us to the critical component for a fissile-material dash: the quality and quantity of Iran’s centrifuges. Tehran has in the last year installed about 5,000 additional IR-1 centrifuges, the biggest increase in years. It has also begun installing IR-2m centrifuges, which are reportedly three to five times as productive in enriching uranium as the currently standard IR-1 models. All of Iran’s centrifuge installation- and uranium enrichment-related activity violates multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, which since 2006 have required that “Iran shall without further delay suspend . . . all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” We estimate that Iran, on its current trajectory, will by mid-2014 be able to dash to fissile material in one to two weeks unless its production of 20%-enriched uranium is curtailed. If the number or efficiency of Iran’s centrifuges unexpectedly increases, or if Tehran has a secret operational enrichment site, Tehran could reach critical capability before mid-2014. The date could be delayed, however, if Iran encounters unexpected difficulties in centrifuge operation or can no longer import centrifuge equipment and materials from China and elsewhere. At nuclear talks in Kazakhstan in February, Western negotiators reportedly focused on persuading Iran to curtail its production of 20%-enriched uranium and to export some of its existing stock. These goals are important but insufficient. As Iran increases the quality and quantity of its spinning centrifuges to the point of critical capability, a moratorium on 20%-enriched uranium will matter less and less. It will become easier for Tehran—after using some pretext to renege on a 20% moratorium—to rapidly make up for lost time in accumulating enough 20% enriched uranium that, if further enriched to weapons-grade (or about 90% enriched), would be enough for a bomb. Once Tehran had enough 20% material for a bomb, it could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for that bomb in a week or two. Given Iran’s current course, the U.S. and its allies should immediately impose maximum pressure on Iran, including by intensifying economic sanctions and cracking down on Tehran’s illicit imports of centrifuge equipment and materials. In addition to curtailing Iran’s production and stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium, any interim deal must verifiably prohibit Iran from upgrading the type and increasing the number of its operational centrifuges. More frequent IAEA inspections at key Iranian sites are also essential. Mr. Obama warned last fall that Iran could eventually achieve “breakout capacity, which means that we would not be able to intervene in time to stop their nuclear program.” If Iran achieves breakout capacity, the United States, by President Obama’s admission, would not have sufficient insight into Iran’s progress to intervene “in time” to prevent it from completing the process of obtaining nuclear weapons. Washington and its allies must insist now that Iran verifiably stop increasing the number and quality of its centrifuges. Anything short of that will leave Iran far too close to an undetectable breakout capacity. Mr. Albright is president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Dubowitz is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Kittrie is a law professor at Arizona State University. Read the op-ed on the Wall Street Journal website at: Stopping an Undetectable Iranian Bomb Iran 2013-03-27T15:07:34+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/preventing-the-suppression-of-uncomfortable-truths-on-irans-nuclear-program/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/preventing-the-suppression-of-uncomfortable-truths-on-irans-nuclear-program/#When:14:23:02Z Yousaf Butt’s recent op-ed in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists about the February 13, 2013 ISIS ring magnet report and a related Washington Post article contains false information, assumptions, innuendo, and distortions of what the ISIS report states. As a scientific and technical organization ISIS welcomes independent analysis of its conclusions, and adjusts its analysis accordingly.  However, Butt’s work offers no rigor. Worse, his conclusions seem predetermined based on his preoccupation with devaluing ISIS’s work and now the Washington Post’s reporting. His writings do not affect ISIS’s conclusions about Iran’s attempt to acquire 100,000 ring magnets, undoubtedly for its gas centrifuges.  Moreover, Butt’s op-ed follows a long line of faulty and biased op-eds, e-mails, and blog postings, in which he airs untenable analysis and engages in personal attacks. His efforts seek to silence those who disagree with him. However, the public needs to know the facts about Iran’s nuclear program, even when uncomfortable, in order to design a responsible reaction to Iran that avoids war.  Critique Some of the mistakes in Butt’s op-ed are: Butt stated: “The ISIS report neglects to explain the many other applications for such ceramic ring magnets and jumps to the conclusion that the inquiry is surely related to Iran’s nuclear program.” Fact: The underlying analysis, which incorporated the assessments of centrifuge experts, considered other uses for the ring magnets.  However, the evidence overwhelmingly supported that these ring magnets were for the IR-1 centrifuge. Butt insinuates that because we did not mention other uses, we did not consider them.  Other uses, including in loudspeakers, were amply considered.  Moreover, we did not jump to any conclusions; we evaluated the ring magnets carefully for many months after obtaining the copy of the internet enquiry about 100,000 ring magnets.  Butt:  “Assuming that the request to buy 100,000 magnets is genuine, it would be consistent with, for instance, an Iranian loudspeaker company interested in obtaining such ceramic ring magnets. That is just one possible hypothesis, of course, but it seems a better explanation of the alleged inquiry than the suggestion of an overt attempt by Iran’s nuclear program to source 100,000 of the wrong-sized ceramic ring magnets.” Facts: Butt’s speculation about the use of the ring magnets is driven more by his predetermined beliefs than any knowledge of gas centrifuge ring magnets or, for that matter, loudspeaker magnets.  Our conclusion about their use in IR-1 centrifuges was determined by a range of factors. For example, the dimensional match between magnets described in the enquiry and the IR-1 centrifuge magnets is remarkable, so much so that we took out the actual numbers to address the concerns of one centrifuge expert who believed the numbers should be treated as sensitive and not published.  The following table shows the matches in dimensions with the values removed.  The “.” is the decimal point.  Each entry represents a number in millimeters (e.g. 15.32 millimeters): IR-1 Enquiry Match Inner diameter ab.cd ab.cd Exact to all four digits given Thickness f.gh ef.gh Exact to all four digits given Outer diameter mn.op mn.qr Exact to two digits, differ slightly in digits op and qr In two of the three dimensions, the match was in all four digits.  In the outer diameter, the match is in two digits and close in the last two.  It is highly unlikely that an innocent company would specify by chance ring magnets matching in two dimensions to one-hundredth of a millimeter and in the third to a millimeter.  Thus, the match is too close to be coincidental, and the use of these ring magnets in anything but an IR-1 is extremely doubtful.  There is also a match in the magnetic properties between the enquiry and IR-1 ring magnets.  This match only strengthens the assessment. The ring magnets are not the “wrong size” as Butt claims. That the outer diameter of the ring magnet differs very slightly from the original is not unusual.  A ring magnet’s dimensions can vary slightly and still be fine for the same centrifuge.  In fact, this has happened before.  The A.Q. Khan network, Iraq, and Iran changed the dimensions slightly but the ring magnets they used were for the same centrifuge.  Changes such as this one in the outer diameter lead to trivial design modifications that are made periodically, as the ISIS report stated, citing centrifuge experts’ assessments.  A trivial design in the upper bearing which holds the magnets is just that.  It does not involve the redesign of 50,000 centrifuges, as Butt has falsely stated elsewhere and insinuates in his Bulletin op-ed. The centrifuge would not need redesigning, and the ISIS report did not say that it would need to be.  Moreover, this type of dimensional analysis of ring magnets has uncovered secret centrifuge activity before.  Such analysis of the ring magnets ordered by Iraq in the late 1980s in Europe were part of the evidence that Iraq had a secret gas centrifuge program based on an early German centrifuge called the G1, which contained a single rotor tube.  Similarly, analysis of Iranian orders of ring magnets revealed evidence of a centrifuge program in the early 1990s. Butt tries to cast doubt that Iran is expanding its IR-1 centrifuge program and equates such assessments as equivalent to charges that Iran is building nuclear weapons. Facts: Quarterly safeguards reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency plainly show that Iran has been installing many new IR-1 centrifuges—about 5,000 of them in the last year for a total of about 15,800 IR-1 centrifuges, or an increase of 50 percent.  Since the ring magnet enquiry appeared in late 2011, Iran has installed over 2,000 IR-1 centrifuges at the deeply buried Fordow enrichment site.  Early in 2012, it installed 6,000 empty IR-1 centrifuge outer casings in the underground Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.  As of early 2013, Iran had installed over 3,000 IR-1 centrifuge rotor assemblies in these outer casings—2,255 in the last three months.  These data demonstrate that Iran has rapidly expanded the number of its installed IR-1 centrifuges in 2012, and could only be capable of doing so if it acquired the necessary equipment for their construction.  In the past, Iran has also stated that it plans to build several tens of thousands of IR-1 centrifuges. This ring magnet enquiry was an early indicator of what Iran in fact did in 2012—greatly expanded its numbers of IR-1 centrifuges.  The enquiry also suggests this expansion will continue, in addition to Iran’s deployment of up to 3,000 advanced centrifuges.  Why Butt is surprised about IR-1 centrifuge deployments is a mystery, as is his rush to equate the enquiry with an Iranian nuclear weapons effort. Our report did not address the subject of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programs.  Butt: “This value is substantially less than the 10 MGo trigger level given for centrifuge applications in Annex 3 of the Notifications of Exports to Iraq mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996).” Fact: Butt cannot be faulted for not knowing that IR-1 ring magnets have values that are far below 10MGo as he admittedly knows little about gas centrifuges or their manufacture.  However, Butt fails to mention that U.N Security Council resolutions sanction goods that Iran could use in its gas centrifuge program. The ring magnets in the enquiry would fall under these sanctions. He points to a 1990s U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq while ignoring the relevant one issued a few years ago on Iran. Butt insinuates that this case is similar to 2003 ring magnet cases about Iraq, a charge by the Bush Administration that ISIS criticized at the time as unjustified. Facts: Butt’s reference to Iraqi magnet cases is not applicable in this case and contains innuendo.  Butt does not mention that a key U.S. argument on Iraq seeking a manufacturing plant to make ring magnets in 2003 was based on the faulty analytical comparison of their mass being similar to the ring magnets Iraq ordered for its centrifuge program in the late 1980s (the Iraqi centrifuge ring magnets are discussed briefly in an April 1992 article by Mark Hibbs and me about Iraqi centrifuge procurements, “Iraq’s Shop-Till-You-Drop Nuclear Program,” in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 3, and in more detail in Iraq’s Full, Final, and Complete Declaration issued in 1996.  The former head of the Iraqi centrifuge program, Mahdi Obeidi, who was questioned by IAEA inspectors about this magnet plant before the start of the Iraq war in 2003, stated in a recent interview with me that the magnets’ dimensions were very different from the ones used in the Iraqi centrifuge program up to its halt in 1991.  Comparing masses is not a credible methodology and certainly not one used in the assessments underlying the ISIS report on ring magnets sought by Iran. Moreover, between 1991 and the 2003 invasion, there was no indication that Iraq had attempted to procure ring magnets that IAEA centrifuge experts judged matched closely with the dimensions of Iraq’s centrifuge ring magnets. Iran on the other hand has a well-documented history of attempting to procure ring magnets, as well as scores of other dual-use goods, that would be applicable to its centrifuge program. Although Iraq’s centrifuge program concentrated on more advanced ring magnets, Mahdi Obeidi also reminded me that Iraq’s centrifuge program had by its halt in 1991 demonstrated that ferrite ring magnets would work in its single tube centrifuge based on the German G1 centrifuge.  He told me: “Why go with the more advanced ring magnets when one can manage with ferrite ring magnets instead?”  If Iraq had reconstituted its centrifuge program after 1991, he added, the overseas purchase of ferrite magnets for its centrifuges would likely have attracted much less scrutiny from authorities. Butt tries to discount that the Iranian trading company could have been involved in breaking sanctions or procuring illicitly for Iran.  Facts: Butt fails to mention that the Iranian trading company seeking the ring magnets, Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars Company, had already been sanctioned by the Canadian government and this fact was in the ISIS report. The reason is related to its procurement of goods for Iran that could be used for nuclear or missile purposes.  According to the Canadian government, “this company was listed under paragraph 2(a) of the Special Economic Measures Act (Iran) Regulations: “a person engaged in activities that directly or indirectly facilitate, support, provide funding for, contribute to, or could contribute to, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to Iran’s activities related to the development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such weapons, including when the person is an entity, a senior official of the entity.” Conclusion The above discussion shows that Butt’s op-ed in the Bulletin has a substantial number of errors and distortions.  He has little, if any, expertise in evaluating centrifuges, their subcomponents, or the smuggling methods Iran uses to acquire necessary goods abroad.  He has certainly demonstrated those deficiencies in his writings on the ISIS ring magnet report and the related Washington Post article.  Although ISIS welcomes and values differing assessments, the public must be aware of facts about Iran’s nuclear program and efforts to suppress them should be resisted as we search for remedies to the Iran nuclear issue while avoiding military options. Iran 2013-03-07T14:23:02+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/basic-attack-strategy-of-stuxnet-0.5/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/basic-attack-strategy-of-stuxnet-0.5/#When:16:56:27Z Symantec has recently established that an earlier attack strategy of the malware Stuxnet involved the secret closing of a set of valves in six of 18 cascades in a module at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). 1  This attack strategy was apparently active by late 2007, when Iran was setting up and operating its first module of about 2,952 IR-1 centrifuges.  The reason for attacking only one third of a module’s cascades is unclear. But this attack could have damaged many centrifuges without destroying so many that the plant operator would have become suspicious.  The code takes over the monitoring system, keeping the operator unaware of the attack. The attack involves singling out a set of centrifuges in the cascade.  Figure 1 lists the Natanz cascade of 164 IR-1 centrifuges organized into 15 stages and the 110 centrifuges that are isolated during the attack. None of the affected centrifuges are in the feed stage, which is stage 10 in the table and includes 24 centrifuges.  In total, 54 centrifuges are not affected.  By themselves, these 54 centrifuges form a cascade of 11 stages, the stages of which are all very narrow except for a very wide feed stage. Based on an analysis of the code and the Natanz cascade, the most likely valves closed are the three fast acting valves on the three thin pipes for feed, product, and waste (or tails) that pass through the top cap of an IR-1 centrifuge (see figure 2).  The three fast-acting electronically-controlled valves are part of an emergency response system of the cascade aimed at protecting the remaining centrifuges in the cascade from the effects of a crashing centrifuge. If a centrifuge crashes, or there is an imminent risk of one crashing, the computer monitoring system closes the valves of the affected centrifuge rapidly, effectively isolating it.  The kinetic energy of a rotating centrifuge is huge.  Because this energy is converted mainly into heat, a crashing centrifuge produces a large pulse of hot uranium hexafluoride gas and other gases that must be contained. Otherwise, this pulse travels down the cascade, taking out additional centrifuges in its path. Thus, the emergency system is designed to act within milliseconds in the event of an anticipated crash and isolate the centrifuge from the cascade. The Natanz cascade emergency response system appears to rely principally on a vibration sensor, an accelerometer, on each centrifuge. Many pressure transducers are also in each cascade to measure pressure, but the most important sensor to detect crashing appears to be the accelerometer.  This sensor sends a shut-off signal to the computer monitoring system if the vibration level exceeds a certain, dangerous value. This earlier version of Stuxnet appears to exploit this emergency response system.  The attack closes 330 fast-acting valves of 110 centrifuges in the cascade while leaving the valves on the other 54 open. 2  As Symantec has explained, the attack lasts for a fixed period of time or until certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the pressure near the feed stage registers five times its normal value.  Based on a theoretical analysis, the wall pressure in an IR-1 centrifuge could be about 20-30 torr. Uranium hexafluoride condenses at about 130 torr at a temperature of 300 Kelvin. Thus, raising the pressure five-fold would raise the wall pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas to near its condensation point.  If the uranium hexafluoride gas reaches a pressure exceeding 130 torr, it will condense and form a uranium solid, likely uranium hexafluoride.  This solid will attach to the wall of the rapidly spinning rotor. A non-uniform buildup of solid material could cause an imbalance in the rotor, causing it to wobble, possibly damaging the bearings or causing the rotor to strike the side of the outer casing. Both would destroy the centrifuge. Alternatively, the solid would add extra mass to the rotor wall, causing it to fail.  So, the analysis suggests that an attack aims to raise the pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas sufficiently to damage or destroy the centrifuges.  Attack Effect on Centrifuges with Open Valves How could this happen in practice?  The code continues the flow of uranium hexafluoride gas into the feed stage while secretly monitoring the buildup in pressure.  We looked at two scenarios, based on discussions with Symantec. The first is that the code also closes the valves in the product and tails piping close to where these connecting pipes leave the cascade. In this case, the gas flows into this cascade but has no way to exit, slowing building up pressure throughout.  The second is if the valves at the end of the cascade in the product and tails lines are not closed by the attack scenario.  In this scenario, the uranium hexafluoride gas would continue to flow through a smaller cascade, as described above.  Product and Tails Valves Close If the code closes the valves in the product and tails lines, then the cascade is a semi-closed system with gas flowing into it but unable to exit. The result would be a relatively rapid increase in pressure in this modified cascade.  The pressure would build up sufficiently to cause the gas near the wall to condense and cause damage to the centrifuges, including their possible destruction.  The pressure would be expected to build up in the non-feed stages faster, causing them to fail first.  The attack ends when the pressure increases five-fold, as measured near the feed stage. Thus, the attack may spare the centrifuges in the feed stage. In this scenario, all non-isolated centrifuges could be destroyed, or one third of the total number in the cascade. However, if the centrifuges in the feed stage survived, up to 30 centrifuges would be destroyed, or up to about 18 percent of the total number of centrifuges in the cascade. Product and Tails Valves Open If the valves in the product and tails end remain open, the attack would seem not to have much impact. However, a transient phenomenon may cause significant damage.  As the attack proceeds, the gas flow in the cascade would reach a new equilibrium, producing less enriched uranium and a product with a lower enrichment level.  This state may be slightly disruptive but not destructive.  However, right after the valves are closed, a transient situation develops that could be destructive of these centrifuges.  In this initial period, the rate of uranium hexafluoride gas entering into the non-feed stages of this modified cascade would greatly increase, as the fraction of closed centrifuges in the non-feed stages is often 70 to 80 percent (see figure 1). Based on a preliminary estimate, the feed rate going up would increase the wall pressure quickly and significantly. Preliminary calculations show that an increase in the feed rate by four to five times would likely cause an increase in the wall pressure to near or above the condensation point of uranium hexafluoride. Any condensation could cause the centrifuge to crash. In this case, the feed stage is unlikely to be affected.  The number of centrifuges that could be destroyed would be up to 30, or about 18 percent of the total number of centrifuges in the cascade. Effect on Centrifuges with Closed Valves Our analysis suggested another type of damage may occur in the 110 centrifuges with the closed valves.  After the three fast-acting valves close, the centrifuge will still contain a small amount of gas.  After closure, the uranium hexafluoride gas will continue to circulate in the centrifuge.  Typically, an operator does not want to keep these valves closed for more than a few minutes.  In an emergency shutdown during regular operations, the valves on the good centrifuges are normally reopened relatively quickly, typically within a few minutes.  However, if these valves remain closed and the gas continues to re-circulate, the centrifuge can be damaged. This case is not well understood, since it does not occur in normal operation.  But our analysis suggests that this internal flow could cause the gas to heat up from impinging on the centrifuge scoops with no method to remove that heat. The small opening into the aluminum scoop could be choked off by by-products of dissociation.  This damage could impact the centrifuge’s performance negatively after the attack. So, the attack strategy could damage the centrifuges with closed valves as well as those with open valves. Opening of Valves at End of Attack According to Symantec, near the end of the attack, the code opens almost all of a set of 25 valves.  Most of these valves could be in the “dump” line piping of the cascade, where each stage has a connecting pipe to the main dump line that contains one valve.  The dump line allows the gas in the cascade to be emptied, in the event of an unusual occurrence.  The main effect of opening these valves may be to empty the cascade of uranium hexafluoride gas via the dump line, which ends in a cooled tank.  Afterwards, after some delay, the code returns the system to state 0, as defined in the Stuxnet code, and waits for the right conditions to launch another attack.  In addition to the 15 valves between the stages and the dump line, there are also two dump valves at the ends of the dump line, three feed, product, and tails valves (in the connecting piping near the cascade), and five valves at the tails and product end of the stages to allow the taking off of product and tails at varying enrichment levels.  Effectiveness of the Attack? Did this attack scenario work? Clearly, it was replaced by a strategy that attacked the frequency converters, causing the rotors to speed up to the point of rotor material failure.  Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that the operators of Stuxnet wanted to destroy more centrifuges than this initial attack strategy appeared capable of doing. ISIS found one data point that may be relevant.  During the initial phase of operations of Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, the number of crashed centrifuges was up to 20 percent, far higher than expected by the Iranians, who had expected occasional centrifuge failures.  This failure rate is approximately the same as discussed above in those non-feed stage centrifuges whose valves remained open.  Given that the first module started in about 2007, the intent of the code writers may have been to keep breaking a limited number of centrifuges in sets of six cascades.  However, the 20 percent failure rate could have also resulted from incompetent operations. To explore the effectiveness of the code further, ISIS evaluated centrifuge operation data from the quarterly International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards reports on Iran. This data is presented graphically in a series of ISIS reports. Two of the graphs are presented here as figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 tracks the relationship between feed and product.  Typically, the feed to product ratio should be about 10 to 1.  In this graph, if this ratio is achieved, the two lines track directly on top of one another.  As can be seen, during most of 2007, the feed to product ratio exceeded ten. This extra feed may have reflected extra uranium going into the dump line and not going to the product tank, which would contain uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent, or the tails tank.  Similarly, starting in late 2008 and continuing into 2009, this phenomenon occurred again.  It is known from the IAEA reports that several tonnes of enriched uranium have ended up in the dump tanks at the FEP. It is unlikely that all this waste uranium resulted from Stuxnet, given the operational problems the FEP also encountered.  However, some of it may have been due to this earlier version of Stuxnet.  Figure 4 plots the enrichment output, in terms of average separative work units (swu) per year per centrifuge. The data start after 2007, so the initial period cannot be studied with this data.  This graph provides a measure of how well the cascades are enriching. It can be affected if many centrifuges crash, but Iran, and subsequently the IAEA, include them in the total number of operational centrifuges.  In that case, the average value would decrease accordingly.  Starting in late 2008 and continuing into early 2009, the average enrichment output decreased sharply, before rising again. This could imply many centrifuges crashing but not being reflected in the total number of enriching centrifuges stated by the IAEA in its reports. This could occur for example if the crashed centrifuges were not removed until later.  In addition, during this time period, the number of enriching centrifuges remained relatively flat, so this decrease in enrichment output does not appear to result from a ramping up of newly installed, but poorly performing, centrifuges. Thus, based on the IAEA data, the initial attack strategy could have had an impact in 2007 and again in late 2008 or early 2009.  Without more data, this conclusion remains preliminary. The damage from the second attack strategy was more systematic, destroying most of the centrifuges in each cascade. As such it was more noticeable, in that the Iranians would remove many centrifuges at one time and the IAEA would record this removal.  As such, the crashed centrifuges would not affect the average enrichment output.     Figure 1 IR-1 cascade and the number of valves closed.   Figure 2, IR-1 cascade in the Natanz Pilot Fuel Plant, showing the pipework above the centrifuge.   Figure 3 Cumulative uranium feed and product in the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.   Figure 4 The total number of centrifuges claimed to be enrichig compared to the average enrichment output in the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.     1. This report should be read in conjunction with Symantec’s report, Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link, version 1: February 26, 2013 by Geoff McDonald, Liam O. Murchu, Stephen Doherty, and Eric Chien. 2. According to Symantec, the particular centrifuge valves closed per stage are randomly chosen. The code will randomly choose a starting centrifuge valve and then close the next one in order until the last centrifuge valve in the stage. If the total desired number of valves to close for that stage has not been reached, the code will continue from the first centrifuge valve in the stage until the maximum valves to close are reached. Iran 2013-02-28T16:56:27+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-analysis-of-iaea-iran-safeguards-report2/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-analysis-of-iaea-iran-safeguards-report2/#When:22:38:50Z Iran 2013-02-21T22:38:50+00:00 http://isis-online.org/iaea-reports/detail/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-in-iran-for-february-21-2013/http://isis-online.org/iaea-reports/detail/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-in-iran-for-february-21-2013/#When:16:50:39Z Iran 2013-02-21T16:50:39+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/flawed-bloomberg-article-on-iran-nuclear-sanctions/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/flawed-bloomberg-article-on-iran-nuclear-sanctions/#When:18:30:55Z Jonathan Tirone of Bloomberg published on February 15, 2013 an article titled “Iran’s Nuclear-Technology Gains Suggest Sanctions Are Backfiring.”  The article is flawed, however, and offers no proof that sanctions have backfired in the case of Iran. An evaluation of the goods Tirone lists shows that sanctions are indeed hurting Iran’s ability to acquire these items abroad, creating shortages in vital goods and forcing the indigenous manufacturing of substandard replacements unsuitable for use in gas centrifuges.  Sanctions have proven to offer an efficient method to slow the development of capabilities that support Iran’s sensitive nuclear programs. In an e-mailed explanation of his article, Tirone wrote: “The story threshed out a well-placed tip that was supported by many non-proliferation observers.” However, the nonproliferation observers made general statements that offered no evidence of the article’s specific assertion that sanctions have backfired in the case of Iran nor did they discuss the specific goods Tirone mentions, leading to several mistakes and exaggerations. The article states that Iran has the capability to make carbon fiber, a difficult-to-make material which is vital to Iran’s manufacture of advanced centrifuges. Iran did launch in recent years a carbon fiber production plant to much domestic fanfare.  However, the Bloomberg article fails to note that experts who evaluated Iranian carbon fiber manufacturing judged that Iran’s capabilities are at best rudimentary, according to the 2012 report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Iran. 1  A video showing the carbon fiber produced in the facility was assessed by carbon fiber production and manufacturing experts as “not to be suitable for use in Iranian centrifuges.”  Not surprisingly, governments and companies often detect Iran trying to acquire higher quality carbon fiber abroad, according to open source reporting and a European intelligence agency that closely monitors Iran’s attempted procurements. The article also singles out Fomblin oil and states that Iran has developed an indigenous manufacturing capability.  It states: “The country manufactures and sells Fomblin oil, a lubricant used inside centrifuges, on world markets.” No proof is offered to support the claim about indigenous manufacturing, or the author’s reasoning for focusing on this particular dual-use good which is not strategically significant in the case of Iran’s centrifuge program.  Moreover, an examination of the Iranian web site the article links to the selling of Fomblin oil undermines the central claim of the article.  The web site is that of a trading company that buys goods overseas and sells them in Iran.  Fomblin is a registered trademark of Solvay Solexis, which is one of the few companies in the world that manufactures perfluorinated polyether (PFPE) oils. This Iranian company advertises specific Fomblin products, although ISIS could find mention of only Fomblin greases that are not used in gas centrifuges. A specific Fomblin oil is used in centrifuges and thus this oil is banned for sale to Iran under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. There is no indication that the company has in stock any of these specialized Fomblin oils used in centrifuges or in vacuum pumps used in centrifuge cascades. The site indicates that the company does not manufacture PFPE oils but is instead a trading company engaged in importing goods. Its web site does not advertise any Iranian-made PFPE oils. Additional evidence supporting that the company imports goods for sale in Iran is available on a related web site.  The English name of the Iranian trading company is Aras Nour Nasr, and clicking on its web site address, www.arasnour-co.com, leads directly to a page in Farsi that states it is a representative of ROCOL, a British company. Whether it is still a representative of ROCOL is unclear given the strengthening of European Union sanctions.  Moreover, the websites of Aras Nour Nasr may be out of date with respect to its products, or the company may depend on a stock of Fomblin products obtained before UNSC sanctions were implemented.  There is no evidence that Aras Nour Nasr is currently engaged in smuggling PFPE oils into Iran, which a cursory reading of the Bloomberg article suggests.  ISIS has encountered this company before in its work with Western suppliers.  Within the last few years, Aras Nour Nasr sent an enquiry to a Western manufacturer seeking another type of oil that is not suitable for use in gas centrifuges.  As such, it did not cause any special concern. There are many Iranian trading companies that still list for sale goods that are now sanctioned.  Advertising a sanctioned item for sale is not in itself alarming. Today, Iranian companies would have a difficult time acquiring PFPE oils abroad suitable for use in centrifuges. The article makes a reasonable point about Iran having the capability to make nuclear fuel indigenously for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), but few foreign countries would want to buy this fuel.  It is not clear that the fuel is reliable or safe.  Thus far, Iran has not transferred much of its near 20 percent low enriched uranium into fuel, so it is not yet known if the fuel works as a substitute for imported fuel. The article fails to recognize that Iran continues to seek a wide range of goods abroad for its gas centrifuge program, signifying a lack of indigenous capabilities to manufacture gas centrifuges and their associated equipment. Its claims about indigenous carbon fiber manufacture are flawed and its claims about Fomblin oil manufacturing are not supported.  Many cases detailed by ISIS show persistent and ongoing Iranian efforts to obtain a wide range of goods for centrifuges such as vacuum pumps, pressure transducers, maraging steel, carbon fiber, valves, and specialty oils. 2 The aim of sanctions is to delay these programs by creating supply bottlenecks, compelling substandard indigenous production, and forcing undesirable changes in the technical direction of these programs. There are no doubt problems with this strategy and it has not worked perfectly, as illustrated by Iran’s increased deployment of IR-1 centrifuges at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), renewed deployment of IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and its stated intention to deploy advanced IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz FEP.  The solution is better enforcement of nuclear-related sanctions and the implementation of stricter ones. This path is the best alternative to help stifle growing calls for use of military options against Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities.     1 Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), S/2012/395, June 4, 2012, annex 6, p. 61. 2 For ISIS case studies on Iranian illicit nuclear procurements, see: http://isis-online.org/studies/category/illicit-trade/ Iran 2013-02-20T18:30:55+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/ring-magnets-for-ir-1-centrifuges/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/ring-magnets-for-ir-1-centrifuges/#When:22:58:17Z Iran, Illicit Trade 2013-02-13T22:58:17+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-korean-miniaturization/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-korean-miniaturization/#When:16:51:28Z “North Korean Miniaturization” by David Albright. Published on 38North.org February 13, 2013. Korean Peninsula 2013-02-13T16:51:28+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-statement-on-north-korean-nuclear-test/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-statement-on-north-korean-nuclear-test/#When:18:32:58Z On Tuesday, February 12 at 2:57 GMT/UTC, North Korea claims that it tested its third nuclear device.  The official KCNA news agency stated: “It was confirmed that the nuclear test, that was carried out at a high level in a safe and perfect manner using a miniaturized and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force than previously, did not pose any negative impact on the surrounding ecological environment.”  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization recorded a seismic event 5.0 in magnitude and the U.S. Geological Survey recorded a shallow earthquake of 5.1 in magnitude.  The test occurred at Punggye-ri, site of its 2006 and 2009 tests, which recorded magnitudes of 4.1 and 4.52, respectively.  ISIS assessed on February 3 that North Korea was likely preparing for a third nuclear test based on preparations at the site visible in overhead satellite imagery.  While much information is still unknown about the nature of North Korea’s nuclear test, several key points should be made: North Korea’s stated miniaturization capability, if true, should not be a surprise.  It should not come as a surprise to the international community that North Korea may now have the capability to explode a miniaturized nuclear device.  ISIS (and key members of the U.S. intelligence community) have assessed for some time that North Korea likely has the capability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon for its 800 mile range Nodong missile.  Although more information is needed to make a sound assessment, this test could, as North Korea has stated, demonstrate this capability. ISIS has also assessed that North Korea still lacks the ability to deploy a warhead on an ICBM, although it shows progress at this effort. North Korea would need to conduct missile flight tests with a re-entry vehicle and mock warhead, increase the explosive yield of the warhead, possibly requiring its further miniaturization, and improve the operational reliability of the warhead and missile. North Korea does not appear to have detonated a more sophisticated nuclear device, such as a thermonuclear device. Before the test, concern was expressed by some analysts that North Korea could test a more advanced nuclear weapon. The data from this test so far indicate that this is not the case. One important question is whether the nuclear test used only plutonium or involved highly enriched uranium either alone or in combination with plutonium. It is time to accelerate efforts to stop North Korea’s foreign procurements for its nuclear programs and increase efforts to halt its proliferation financing efforts.  North Korea’s efforts to procure nuclear and dual-use goods and raw materials for its nuclear programs must be addressed by targeted countries through improved United Nations sanctions resolutions and domestic trade control laws and the enforcement of those measures.  North Korea continues to improve its nuclear programs through its access to such goods and materials, particularly through trading companies and citizens located in neighboring China. The United Nations Security Council should incrementally increase proliferation financing sanctions on North Korea as a result of this test.  The international response to the test should be measured and should circle back to engagement.  Despite the likely demonstration of an improved North Korean nuclear capability, the international response to the test should be carefully constructed.  Ironically, North Korea’s previous nuclear tests, despite being followed by sanctions and international condemnation, eventually paved the way for engagement.  North Korea’s historical use of brinkmanship to gain concessions is well documented.  A new formulation is necessary to break this cycle of provocation/engagement that has too often ended with a more advanced North Korean nuclear weapons program.  A strategy of engagement that does not reward the test but seeks to moderate the regime’s behavior through sustained dialogue may be most productive going forward.  A key element is for the United States to deepen cooperation with China and resist seeking renewed bilateral U.S./North Korean dialogue.  There are signs that China is listening more to U.S. concerns about North Korea’s nuclear provocations.  A goal must be the United States developing common positions with China, along with South Korea and Japan, making it harder for North Korea to play China against the United States. A response must not provoke even worse behavior.  Faced with a draconian response to this third nuclear test, it is possible that North Korea could retaliate by causing minor military skirmishes with its neighbors, conducting another test, or even deploying nuclear-tipped Nodong missiles.  Remaining cognizant of the need to prevent and mitigate worse behavior by North Korea should be the goal of any international or regional response. This again argues for seeking solidarity among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Korean Peninsula 2013-02-12T18:32:58+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/monitoring-activity-at-punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/monitoring-activity-at-punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site/#When:17:15:37Z On January 24, 2013 North Korea released a statement claiming that it intended to conduct a third nuclear test.  The North Korean statement coincided with reports from several government, media, and nongovernmental sources that activity at a site in the Punggye-ri test complex indicated increasing readiness for testing. The test complex is the location of North Korea’s two previous nuclear tests, conducted in 2006 and 2009. An August 2012 report by Frank Pabian and Siegfried Hecker published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists combined several studies using seismic data and satellite imagery analysis to closely approximate the geographic locations of the previous tests and predict the location for a potential third test as suggested by a new tunnel excavation started in the spring of 2012.  ISIS obtained Digital Globe satellite imagery from January 28, 2013 which confirms reports of activity at both the site of the new tunnel, designated as the “south portal” in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article, and the tunnel used in the 2009 test, designated as the “west portal” in the article (see figure 1). Although the images do not reveal whether a test is imminent, the on-going activity at the site justifies concern that a test will soon occur. South Portal Activity at the site of the new tunnel, the south portal, has been consistently documented by the 38North website reports and the latest imagery obtained by ISIS suggests no obvious change in the level of activity portending an imminent test (see figure 2).  The fact that the grounds of the compound and nearby roads are cleared of snowfall, however, indicates continued activity.  A few buildings have no snow on their roofs, suggesting that the buildings are actively being used. A building located approximately 150 meters from the south portal tunnel entrance appears to be shielded by a berm making it the likely location for a bunker (figure 2).  The exact purpose is not known. However, it could contain instrumentation to record the effects of a nuclear explosion and communication equipment that would relay the data to a center located at a safe distance from the test site (figure 2). An instrumentation bunker was located similarly in the case of Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test (see figure 3), and prior to the test, personnel were evacuated to a safe distance from the test site. 1  In the Pakistani case, the instrumentation bunker, or forward recording site, was camouflaged and located approximately 120 meters from the tunnel portal (figures 3 and 4). The site layouts of the 1998 Pakistani test site and the North Korean south portal site have similarities, despite the greater camouflaging by Pakistan (compare figures 5 and 6 with figure 2). 2 In the 1990s and early 2000s, Pakistan and North Korea closely cooperated on gas centrifuges and missiles. North Korea may have benefited from Pakistan’s nuclear testing experience and data.  The firing control center for the test site could not be located. However, it is likely located several kilometers away from the south portal in order to adequately protect personnel from earth accelerations produced by the explosion and in the event of any accidental releases of radioactivity after the explosion. ISIS identified what could be a cable run in images extending from the direction of the south portal tunnel entrance southward for many kilometers (see figure 7). The suspected cable run could be for electricity or communication. West Portal At the west portal, the January 28, 2013 image shows activity at the tunnel entrance. It suggests that some kind of traffic has been going in and out of this tunnel.  The road leading to the 2009 test tunnel site shows signs of consistent traffic as suggested by the lack of snowfall within the perimeter of the site and connecting access roads (figure 8). North Korea has also taken steps to keep both the west and south portals accessible; it has not tried to keep accessible the site of the 2006 test, the east portal, which in the latest satellite imagery appears inactive (figure 9).  Extensive flooding damaged bridges leading to the west and south portals during a September 2012 storm, but North Korea quickly rebuilt them. The purpose of the activity at the west portal is unclear from the image, and the reuse of the tunnel for a full-scale nuclear test cannot be dismissed.  It should be pointed out that the west portal compound has a complete security perimeter, and the south portal does not.  The existence of this security perimeter suggests the possibility that sensitive activities could be occurring inside the west portal tunnel.  Another unknown is where North Korea would prepare its nuclear test device for subsequent detonation in the south tunnel.  It could be in a secure facility, perhaps located a distance from the portals.  Alternatively, nuclear device preparation could occur in the tunnel at the west portal prior to transport to the south portal for detonation. In that Pakistani 1998 Ras Koh test site case the final device assembly occurred in “zero rooms” within the tunnel itself in which case detection from overhead imagery would be unlikely unless the delivery and unloading process were to be captured. 3    For licensing and use of the DigitalGlobe satellite imagery presented below see the following links: South portal image January 28, 2013 West portal image January 28, 2013 East portal image January 28, 2013   Figure 1. October 2009 GeoEye and DigitalGlobe satellite imagery from Google Earth showing the locations of the three test tunnel portals based on the latest satellite imagery analysis and the August 2012 study by Pabian and Hecker.   Figure 2. Satellite imagery from January 28, 2013 of the south portal tunnel believed to be the location for a potential third North Korean nuclear test. The grounds and roads of the nearby compound show evidence of recent activity. A building likely to be the instrumentation bunker used to record and relay test information can be seen approximately 150m from the tunnel entrance.   Figure 3. Camouflaged instrumentation bunker.  Images obtained from a Pakistan television video purchased by ISIS in 1998 showing the tour of the Pakistani Ras Koh test site by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif shortly after the May 28, 1998 nuclear tests.  Courtesy Pakistan TV and ISIS. The full video of the Prime Minister’s June 19, 1998 visit is available on the ISIS website here.   Figure 4. Concealed tunnel portal, supporting equipment, and support sturctures at Pakistan’s first test site soon after the May 1998 tests. Image obtained from Pakistan TV video. Courtesy: Pakistan TV and ISIS. The full video is available on the ISIS website here.   Figure 5. Overview of Pakistan’s Test Site at Ras Koh Nuclear Test Site, where Pakistan reportedly detonated five nuclear weapons simultaneously on May 28, 1998.  The image is from a Pakistan television video available on the ISIS website here.   Figure 6. ISIS annotated 1998 KVR-1000 image of Pakistan’s first nuclear test site, showing several similarities with the south portal area at the North Korean test site at Punggye-ri.  Source:  ISIS.   Figure 7. Google Earth imagery by GeoEye dated October 9, 2009 showing the approximate path of what could be power and communication cables stretching from the south portal site southward for many kilometers.   Figure 8. DigitalGlobe imagery from January 28, 2013 showing the site of the west portal believed to be the access point for the tunnel used in the 2009 nuclear test conducted by North Korea. The bridge destroyed in autumn flooding has been rebuilt and the roads and site grounds indicate that the site is active.   Figure 9. DigitalGlobe imagery from January 28, 2013 showing the site of the east portal believed to be the access point for the tunnel used in the 2006 nuclear test conducted by North Korea. Unlike in the case of the west and south portals, the access road and site grounds of the east portal appear to be inactive.     * ISIS would like to thank DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center for their assistance. 1. ISIS, “New Details Emerge on Pakistan’s First Nuclear Test Site,” EOM (Earth Observation Magazine), December 98/January 99. 2. It should be noted that the Pakistani test site in the Ras Koh was a secret site while the North Korean test site is not. Nonetheless, a comparison of the two test sites is instructive.  North Korea does take steps to camouflage some of its activities there but not the site itself, as Pakistan did with its nuclear test sites up to its 1998 tests.  The following is a description of the camouflaging at the Pakistani site by Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, Where Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai: “All the installations including the tunnel portals and the instrumentation and fire control cables leading into the tunnel shafts were camouflaged using canvass and net. The facilities were made to look like a small hamlet using adobe huts so as to deceive satellite surveillance. The tunnel portal itself was located inside an adobe hut. Barbed wire was placed around all the facilities so as to minimise the number of tracks and to keep pedestrian and vehicular movement on designated tracks. Vehicle tracks caused by incoming and outgoing trucks and jeeps were continuously erased by a team of soldiers assigned to the task. Support camps were established a few hundred yards away from Ground Zero at both the sites. These included lodging, food and water, restroom, shelter and communications facilities. These too were camouflaged. At Ras Koh, these support facilities were located directly south of the mountain in which the shafts had been bored.” Found at http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/nuclear/wheremountainsmove.html 3. Ibid Korean Peninsula 2013-02-03T17:15:37+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/day-after-alleged-sabotage-at-fordow-hardly-the-expected-emergency-response/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/day-after-alleged-sabotage-at-fordow-hardly-the-expected-emergency-response/#When:21:35:42Z On January 25, 2013, news website WND published a report claiming that on January 21, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near the Iranian city of Qom was the target of a major explosion, thought to be an act of sabotage.  The website claimed the explosion partially destroyed the site and trapped 240 people underground.  ISIS obtained from Astrium commercial satellite imagery of the site taken the day after the explosion (figure 1).  The imagery shows no exterior signs of an explosion or major damage.  Although an underground explosion may not leave visible exterior signs of damage, ISIS observed no intensified activity in the form of emergency or cleanup vehicles that one would expect to see around the site in the wake of an incident of this magnitude (figure 1).  The lack of clarity at very high magnification does leave some doubt about whether a set of three white marks near one of the entrances of the southernmost tunnel could indeed be three vehicles. However, an emergency response would be expected to have been prompt and to have involved many more vehicles, particularly given the national importance of the gas centrifuge site and especially of the personnel working underground. During the last few days, Iranian, Israeli, and U.S. officials denied that sabotage or a major incident occurred and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concurred.      Figure 1. Satellite imagery of the Fordow fuel enrichment site from January 22nd, one day after the reported explosion that caused major damage to the site. The imagery shows no damage to the outside and no discernible signs of emergency vehicles or activity at the tunnel entrances.   Figure 2. GeoEye imagery from Google Earth of the Fordow site two months before the alleged underground explosion at the site.  Iran 2013-01-30T21:35:42+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/taking-stock-and-moving-forward-on-the-issue-of-the-parchin-high-explosives/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/taking-stock-and-moving-forward-on-the-issue-of-the-parchin-high-explosives/#When:21:33:15Z For almost a year, international attention has focused on Iran’s Parchin military complex.  This site is where Iran is suspected to have conducted in the early 2000s high explosive compression tests pertinent to the development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons.  The experiments are alleged to have occurred inside an explosive chamber located in a compound in the north of the sprawling military complex.  As far as can be determined, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor the U.S. government has alleged that the experiments continued after 2004. Iran’s goal of using this chamber would likely have been to hide its activities from overhead observation by foreign intelligence agencies and minimizing the chance that material used in testing would be dispersed off-site, increasing chances of detection. Western intelligence agencies have historically devoted considerable resources via ground and air-based methods to detecting nuclear related facilities, activities, and material at Iranian sites suspected of having been involved in nuclear weaponization and enrichment work. According to IAEA information, the chamber was constructed in 2000 and designed to contain explosions involving up to 70 kilograms of high explosives. The IAEA has not published a detailed rationale for its request to Iran to visit the Parchin site. However, it reported in its November 2011 safeguards report that Iran used the test chamber to conduct high explosive tests in the early 2000s, possibly related to nuclear weapons development. A senior U.S. official told CNN (and the same official independently stated to ISIS), “We know explosive compression was done at this chamber.” The use of such chambers was pioneered by the Soviet nuclear weapons program; the Soviet, U.S., and British nuclear weapons programs have each used chambers for high explosive compression work related to nuclear weapons development. Based on its information and assessments, the IAEA requested a visit to this building in early 2012 to verify the chamber’s existence and evaluate whether high explosive tests were conducted that are relevant to developing nuclear weapons.  So far, as of the January 2013 high-level negotiations with the IAEA in Tehran, Iran has refused access while at the same time conducting major demolition and construction on the grounds of the site. Tests Conducted? The IAEA has not provided complete information on which tests it believes Iran could have conducted inside the Parchin chamber.  It has provided partial information and the media have reported on additional types of possible tests.  As best as can be determined, three types of tests could have been conducted, each with appropriate diagnostic equipment, although the IAEA has never confirmed such a list and still other types of tests are possible.  The three most commonly discussed tests have been:  A test of the initiation components of a nuclear warhead, which could have involved up to 50 kg of high explosives. This test would not contain any uranium.  The November 2011 safeguards report noted that the explosive chamber at Parchin would be suitable for carrying out this type of test. A test to ascertain the symmetry of an imploding hemispherical shell of high explosives, surrounding a uranium metal hemisphere, in a scaled down experiment. A technical advisor to ISIS with decades of involvement in the experimental study of nuclear weapon mock-up explosions evaluated this case.  He assessed that based on the constraints of this chamber and the use of powerful high explosives, the explosive shell would contain about 50 kilograms of high explosives, an amount within the constraints of the chamber. A test of a uranium deuterium neutron initiator used in a nuclear weapon. The initiator is located at the center of a compression system involving a sphere of high explosives and possibly a non-nuclear surrogate material for the weapon-grade uranium core.  The goal of the experiment is to compress the initiator, causing the fusion of the deuterium and a spurt of neutrons.  This test would involve only a few grams of uranium and deuterium with variable amounts of explosives. Update on Current Activities at Parchin A reconstruction phase continues at a steady pace at the alleged Parchin high explosives test site, as shown by recent Digital Globe commercial satellite imagery acquired by ISIS. The site underwent a demolition phase from April to August 2012 and entered what appears to be a reconstruction phase in late September or early November. In satellite imagery from January 17, 2013, several activities at the site appear to be almost complete and there is also evidence of new construction work (figure 1). In a May 30, 2012 report ISIS published satellite imagery showing the demolition of two buildings located near the building suspected to contain the high explosive test chamber (figure 2). ISIS was not able to establish the purpose for why the buildings were demolished. Debris from the larger of the two was completely cleared from the site but some debris from the smaller building was left. As seen in the January 17 satellite imagery, the smaller building has now been reconstructed (figure 1). The new imagery also shows what appears to be the foundation of a new building not far from where the second demolished building was located. The size and layout of the excavation, however, do not suggest that the same building is being reconstructed. Construction of the new security perimeter also appears to be nearing completion.  The new perimeter resembles the previous layout except its southern section has been visibly extended and it now runs much closer to the buildings on the western side of the site (figure 1). There is also new construction of what appears to be a small building located outside the northern side of the security perimeter. Earth piles initially visible in early November 2012 are still visible in the northern part of the site as are heavy machinery and materials indicating the likelihood of further construction. There is also earth displacement nearby the two support buildings located just south of the suspected chamber building although at this stage it is impossible to determine its origin. IAEA at a Crossroads ISIS has consistently called for strong diplomatic measures to be taken in support of IAEA inspectors gaining access to the Parchin site. The legal justification for IAEA access is well established. The IAEA is seeking to fulfill its mandate to determine both the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declaration under its traditional comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). However, Iran’s continued refusal to allow access and the degree of alterations made to the site may have severely undermined the possibility of the IAEA reaching a conclusion about allegations that Iran conducted nuclear weapons related research at this site.  The IAEA has also reached this conclusion. What should the IAEA do now? It could continue asking for a visit or it could call for a special inspection, which it can use in circumstances where there is sufficient suspicion of undeclared nuclear weapons related activities and insufficient cooperation from a member state that would allow for inspections. At this point, neither option is attractive. The IAEA has asked to visit the Parchin site as opposed to calling for a special inspection.  In the case of a visit, Iran would need to grant it on a voluntary basis.  Iran could impose limitations on inspectors’ access during a visit, which is not the case under a special inspection. During the IAEA’s first visit to Parchin in 2005, Iranian conditions for allowing the visit forced IAEA inspectors to choose between one of several sections of the sizeable complex. As a result, the 2005 visit, while helpful, did not resolve the IAEA’s questions about the activities in other areas of the Parchin military complex. In the case of an IAEA visit to the building containing the alleged high explosive chamber, Iran could likewise limit inspectors’ access and the quality of sampling they could carry out. 1  It is conceivable that the original tests and considerable earth displacement at the site more recently could have spread incriminating radioactive material beyond the immediate area of the buildings. In the scenario of a visit, Iran could legitimately prevent IAEA access to areas of interest, thus limiting access to only those areas that have been heavily sanitized, such as those inside the newly reconstructed perimeter of the site.  The example of the IAEA’s visit to the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran shows that extensive excavation and removal of dirt can prevent effective sampling.  During this visit, Iran refused the IAEA access to extensive rubble and debris removed from the site. It could also do so in the case of Parchin. Finding incriminating evidence inside sanitized or reconstructed buildings is challenging and often impossible.  One of the inspectors’ key tools in uncovering undeclared nuclear activities is environmental sampling, but such sampling can be thwarted by the types of actions Iran has taken at the Parchin site.  The Kalaye Electric site in Tehran is often rightly given as a major success story of environmental sampling, despite extensive Iranian efforts in 2003 to hide evidence of secret, undeclared enrichment of uranium in two buildings at the site.  But this case should also be a cautionary tale.  Although required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement to declare the site as enriching uranium, Iran chose to hide its activities in violation of its CSA. In early 2003, when the site was exposed, Iran took major steps to hide its past centrifuge related activities at this site. 2  It refused the IAEA access while it reconstructed the building that had held a small cascade of centrifuges and undertook significant renovations at another building that had conducted single centrifuge testing.  Subsequent IAEA environmental sampling of the building that held the small cascade discovered no enriched uranium particles, although Iran later admitted to significant enrichment in that building.  The reconstruction effort successfully thwarted such sampling.  But Iran had not sanitized the building containing the single centrifuge tests, and inspectors took a sample in the unsanitized ventilation system above where a single machine test stand had been located.  The collected sample showed evidence of enriched uranium particles.  The Kalaye Electric case shows that the reconstruction or sanitization of buildings can prevent environmental sampling from detecting uranium or at least make it difficult to uncover undeclared work.  In the case of Parchin, given Iran’s history of hiding its undeclared activities, the IAEA cannot depend on Iran again making a mistake. The IAEA could call for a special inspection of Parchin and probably should have done so early last year. However, today, Iran would be expected to defy a call for a special inspection, especially since such an inspection would place the IAEA in charge of establishing the inspection procedures and methods used at the site.  Pursuing a special inspection would likely force a showdown with Iran at the Board of Governors meeting.  Furthermore, such an action taken now would focus the conflict between the IAEA and Iran on this one facility. The controversy over Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts is considerably larger than one facility. Most of the criticism of the IAEA’s call for a visit to Parchin has offered few recommendations for a constructive way forward.  Many criticisms have focused on undermining the IAEA’s rationale for asking to visit Parchin and have presented faulty, alternative interpretations of the IAEA’s legal authority, satellite imagery of the site, and technical details related to the site.  Some have urged an acceptance of Iran’s denials of any nuclear weapons related work at Parchin; still others claim that Iran has done nothing suspicious at the site but was deliberately modifying it as part of a clever negotiating strategy. Iran has shown little interest in successful negotiations and its actions at the site have significantly increased suspicion throughout the world that it is actually removing evidence.  One critic recently recommended inspections of Parchin, although he recommended they be carried out by a group other than the IAEA.  No formula was offered for how to establish such a group or how to achieve agreement among the many stakeholders involved in that decision. Furthermore, the IAEA is accepted by the vast majority of the world as the legitimate, credible nuclear inspection authority and a non-IAEA inspection would undermine its authority. Going to the Board With little hope for a meaningful IAEA visit and recognition of the risks of calling for a special inspection, what should be done next?  The IAEA cannot close the case on Parchin without a visit.  And as long as the IAEA cannot settle the Parchin issue, it will remain a source of suspicion that undermines any effort to establish confidence or achieve a negotiated outcome.  The best way forward is likely for the IAEA to take the entire issue of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program to the Board of Governors.  The IAEA has tried for several years to negotiate an umbrella agreement with Iran aimed at resolving the evidence of Iran’s past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons and a past parallel, military fuel cycle program. This effort has likewise reached an impasse. The Board of Governors should now pass a resolution condemning Iran’s refusal to allow an inspection at Parchin and to answer the IAEA’s questions about possible military dimensions, noting that such actions thwart the IAEA’s ability to answer the fundamental question of whether Iran’s nuclear declaration is complete.  This resolution should then refer the entire set of issues to the U.N. Security Council for further discussion and action.   For licensing and use of the DigitalGlobe satellite imagery presented below please see the following links: - High resolution imagery without annotation - Image presented in Figure 1, including full annotation Figure 1. Satellite imagery from January 17, 2013 showing a new security perimeter, reconstruction of one of the demolished buildings, and the possible foundation of a new building at the Parchin site. [Not for commercial or media use]   Figure 2. Imagery from May 25, 2012 showing the debris from the demolition of two support buildings located near the building suspected to contain the high explosive test chamber. [Not for commercial or media use]     1 For example, during the IAEA visit to the Al Kibar (Dair Alzour) reactor site in Syria in 2008, the IAEA was allowed to collect sandy soil at the site but could not include any rubble mixed in with that soil.  In fact, the IAEA sample tubes were checked at least once by a Syrian official, who removed a piece of rubble from one sample.  These soil samples still yielded a significant number of uranium particles. Particles were also found in a changing room in a building associated with the reactor. The IAEA reported that analysis of the samples taken in June 2008 at the Dair Alzour site indicated the presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material.  The IAEA’s assessment was that there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles since the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles were all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions. [From IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2009/9, February 19, 2009.] The analysis suggested that the uranium originated in a metal form, which is consistent with the type of fuel used in a North Korean gas-graphite reactor of the type alleged to have been built by Syria. 2 Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010). Iran 2013-01-25T21:33:15+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/case-study-chinese-salesman-arrested-in-pressure-transducer-case/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/case-study-chinese-salesman-arrested-in-pressure-transducer-case/#When:14:16:27Z Illicit Trade 2013-01-18T14:16:27+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/steering-iran-away-from-building-nuclear-weapons/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/steering-iran-away-from-building-nuclear-weapons/#When:18:29:50Z   Without past negotiated outcomes, international pressure, sanctions, and intelligence operations, Iran would likely have nuclear weapons by now. Iran has proven vulnerable to international pressure. It now faces several inhibitions against building nuclear weapons, not least of which is fear of a military strike by Israel and perhaps others if it breaks out by egregiously violating its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and moves to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. —Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining Future Nuclear Options, ISIS Report to the United States Institute of Peace, March 5, 2012 The content of this statement was challenged in a recent report, Weighing the Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions against Iran, 1 released in September 2012 by The Iran Project. In the words of the authors, William Luers, Iris Bieri, and Priscilla Lewis: “Some have even argued that without sanctions and other pressures, Iran would already have a nuclear weapon. We disagree with this judgment, however, since U.S. intelligence officials have stated with a high degree of confidence that the decision to build a nuclear weapon has not yet been taken by Iran’s Supreme Leader.” While ISIS welcomes comments about its findings and analysis, we find that the authors have mischaracterized our statement and publicly available information about U.S. intelligence findings.  The report also appears to downplay a significant international accomplishment in preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons. ISIS’s assessment summarized in the quote above is not a categorical statement that without international pressure, negotiated outcomes, sanctions, and other measures Iran would definitely have a nuclear weapon, only that it likely would.  In addition, the actions that have deterred Iran from building nuclear weapons in the 2000s involved fear of a military strike in the period up to and after the 2003 Gulf War, a series of highly embarrassing discoveries of secret, undeclared nuclear activities and facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the negotiating skill of the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany in late 2003 to achieve a suspension to Iran’s sensitive nuclear programs.  In supporting their criticism of the statement in the ISIS report, the authors reference a March 2011 statement by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper before Congress expressing a high level of confidence that the Iranian regime had not decided to build nuclear weapons. This is a widely shared assessment by most Western intelligence agencies. However, this statement provides more support for ISIS’s statement than evidence against it. One important source of U.S. intelligence assessments is the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The unclassified NIE states:  We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program2; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. (emphasis added) The NIE states that “international scrutiny and pressure” were instrumental in Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program, which the NIE judges with high confidence existed in the fall of 2003. Although most Western intelligence agencies agree that the Iranian regime has not decided to build nuclear weapons since then, most would recognize that continued pressure, including that resulting from sanctions and the threat of military strikes, plays an important role in constraining the regime from making that decision today. That assessment is consistent with the Obama administration’s stated policy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Without such actions in 2003 and additional actions prior to and after 2003, there are many reasons to believe that Iran would have built nuclear weapons by now.  Other countries faced with little effective international pressure, such as South Africa in the late 1970s, Pakistan in the early to mid-1980s, and North Korea in the early 2000s, did build nuclear weapons. In 2003, there were strong proponents within Iran for building nuclear weapons.  Moreover, in 2003, Iran’s “structured” nuclear weapons program was making progress on building a warhead deliverable by the Shahab 3 ballistic missile, according to the November 2011 IAEA Iran safeguards report.3 Based on information from European intelligence officials, critical evidence that a determined nuclear weapons program had indeed been halted was intelligence showing the program leader protested the decision to cut back or halt the program. Moreover, in 2002, Iran was building and operating several secret gas centrifuge facilities; even today the full extent of its past and, for that matter, current centrifuge program is not known.  Although Iran maintained that it intended at some point to declare all of its secret enrichment facilities, it also may have in fact intended to keep key facilities secret.  The Western discovery several years later of the secret construction of the deeply buried Fordow gas centrifuge site further supports that view.  Iran was on a trajectory to produce enriched uranium in secret and complete a nuclear warhead. Assessing that Iran would likely have decided to build nuclear weapons absent international discovery and actions in 2003 and afterwards is both logical and defensible. One could argue that in the absence of all these actions, Iran would not have built nuclear weapons, but this point seems particularly difficult to justify. One could at best argue is that it is not known what Iran may have done if the pressure had not existed.  That would be a fair point.  In reconsidering our assessment, we could agree with the finding that we cannot know with certainty what Iran would have done with regard to building nuclear weapons.  However, ISIS still assesses that absent the long list of actions taken to deter Iran, it would have likely acquired nuclear weapons by today. Why does this debate matter?  It is important to point out that a collection of actions in the early 2000s, sometimes taken with little international coordination, managed to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. These actions led to sharp cutbacks in Iran’s declared and undeclared nuclear programs and worked surprisingly well. It took the U.S. intelligence community several years, until the preparation of the 2007 NIE, to realize and acknowledge these methods’ full effect in stopping Iran’s structured nuclear weapons program in 2003.  A key lesson is that the Iranian regime was not fully committed to building nuclear weapons and it was vulnerable to influence about its future decisions with regard to its nuclear program. Can such efforts work again? So far, they appear to contribute importantly to preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons, although the IAEA and European intelligence agencies have stated that some work on nuclear weaponization may continue.  When several Western intelligence agencies assess that the Iranian regime has not yet made a decision to build nuclear weapons, this assessment likely reflects Iran’s hesitation to do so out of concern of the consequences.  The future is more difficult to predict, particularly as Iran continues defying the IAEA and seeks to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities.  Today, compared to the early 2000s, there is more emphasis on ramped up and more effective sanctions aimed at pressuring the Iranian regime to change its nuclear positions, sanctions that interfere in Iran’s ability to procure from overseas the equipment it needs to expand and update its centrifuge and other sensitive nuclear programs, intelligence operations that better detect and disrupt Iran’s centrifuge program, and an overt U.S. policy of preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons.  The continuing use of these methods, albeit in a different configuration than in 2003 and 2004, is the best way to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons today and in the future and avoiding war.     1 The report itself appears to be undated. 2 Footnote 1 in the NIE:  For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment. 3 IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the National Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011. Iran 2013-01-16T18:29:50+00:00