April 6, 1998
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
For more information, contact: Corey Gay (202) 547-2696

Issues to be Considered for Addition to the Chairman's Working Paper

Note: This paper is comprised of proposals which are not included in the Chairman's Working Paper from the 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting of the States parties to the NPT. This should in no way imply support for, or opposition to, the specific points included in that document.


Middle East
* Recognize that confidence building measures taken by states in the Middle East are important steps toward the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region, an initiative called for in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Examples of confidence building measures include: mutual visits to safeguarded facilities, information sharing, and cooperative technical evaluations of a regional verification regime.

* Recognize that Iraq's full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715 represents a significant step towards achieving a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

* Recognize the value and lessons of progress in other regions on achieving nuclear weapon free zones or greater universality of the NPT.

* Support regional cooperation on nuclear safety and/or nuclear waste management issues as a step toward the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.

* Encourage creation of a safeguards clean laboratory in the Middle East as a step toward the creation of a regional verification system.

* All parties hope for renewed progress on the Middle East peace process.

* Recognize that the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) process is a useful forum to discuss the achievement of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

* Regrets that states in the Middle East still view possession of weapons of mass destruction as elements of their security.

* As part of the peace process, countries with unsafeguarded facilities should take steps to unilaterally halt production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive purposes.