Press Release

To order a copy of the report.

Challenges of Fissile Material Control, a report published by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), offers a unique, across-the-board critique of the ways in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), or "fissile materials," are managed in both civil and military programs.

The report identifies and evaluates 19 separate policy objectives and awards letter grades ("A" through "F") to each objective. According to the report, "this approach offers a coherent and realistic vision of how the international community is addressing the threats posed by inadequately controlled fissile materials, and can identify those controls that are the most urgently in need of improvement."

Overall, the report concluded that fissile material control efforts deserve a grade of "C", "an uninspiring mark given the threat posed by these materials and the expectations of the early 1990s" that controls would proceed more rapidly. The report awarded its highest grade, an "A-", to unilateral initiatives by the five recognized nuclear weapon states to end the production of fissile materials for weapons. Efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen its safeguards in the non-weapon states also received an "A-". A failing grade of "F" was awarded to efforts to establish acceptable nuclear waste repositories.

Results of the Scorecard

The 19 initiatives identified in the report were grouped into categories related to seven broad policy objectives. Overall grades for each category were derived by averaging the grade of the initiatives in the group. For averaging purposes, an "A" corresponds to a numerical grade of 4, and an "F" corresponds to zero.

See table summarizing the scorecard results.

Ending the Production of New Fissile Materials for Weapons (overall grade: C).

Policy initiative: Unilateral Initiatives by the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states to end the production of fissile materials (grade: A-). The five acknowledged nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) have made great progress in halting the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Only China has not formally declared an end to production, though unofficial reports indicate that it is no longer producing weapons materials.

Policy initiative: Ending the production in other states (grade: D). India, Israel, and Pakistan, the three the non-weapon states that are not party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, are believed to be producing new materials for weapons. Although Pakistan has not formally renounced a 1991 moratorium on the production of HEU, it is believed to have resumed production. India and Israel are also believed to be adding to their military fissile material stocks. No other country other than the above eight states is known to be producing fissile materials for weapons. Suspicions, however, remain about activities or intentions in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

Policy Initiative: Obtaining a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (grade: B-). Prospects for achieving a fissile material cutoff increased following the decision by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in August 1998 to begin negotiations on a "treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." However, the negotiations are expected to be long and complicated.

Protecting and Reducing the Military Stocks of Fissile Materials in the Nuclear Weapon States (Overall Grade: C).

Policy Initiative: Declaring Military Stocks to be Excess (grade: C-). Britain, Russia and the United States have declared one-third of their military fissile material stocks to be excess, although much larger quantities could be declared. It is estimated that as much as 75 percent of the military inventories in Russia and the United States are not contained in weapons. China and France have not declared any excess military stocks.

Policy Initiative: Placing Excess Materials Under International Safeguards or Verification (grade: B). Only a small fraction of excess materials have been placed under international controls, and existing commitments to do so are not legally binding. However, an effort by Russia, the United States and the IAEA to devise procedures to verify excess materials without revealing classified information has made substantial progress. This effort is also seeking a model agreement that would commit a state not to reuse excess fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to place them under IAEA verification.

Policy Initiative: Disposing of Excess HEU (grade B-). The United States and Russia are currently blending down excess HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) that is suitable for use as nuclear fuel. Although these efforts are making progress, they are periodically threatened by commercial interests. An agreement by Russia to blend down and sell 500 tonnes (metric tons) of HEU to the United States over a 20 year period needs constant attention to ensure that it is not derailed.

Policy Initiative: Disposing of Excess Plutonium (grade: D+). While the United States and Russia have identified options for disposing of their excess plutonium stocks, proposed options remain the subject of intense political controversy and face difficult political, technical and financial obstacles to completion.

Policy Initiative: Establishing Verifiable Warhead Dismantlement (grade: C-). Technical talks between U.S. and Russian scientists have started to identify the information and procedures needed to verify nuclear warhead dismantlement. However, there is no political motivation to begin negotiations on warhead dismantlement until the Russian Duma ratifies the START II treaty.

Protecting Fissile Materials From Theft (Overall Grade: C+).

Policy Initiative: Improving Protection and Accounting Systems in the Former Soviet Union (grade: D+). Despite recent efforts, systems to protect and account for plutonium and HEU in former Soviet states remain far below international standards. Hundreds of tonnes of fissile materials in the former Soviet Union remain insecure and vulnerable to theft or diversion. Should states, such as Iraq, or terrorist groups acquire these materials illicitly, the threat of proliferation or nuclear terrorism would significantly increase.

Policy Initiative: Improving Physical Protection Worldwide (grade: B+). States have cooperated to develop an internationally recognized set of standards for the protection of fissile materials. Physical protection systems in many states, notably the United States, many European countries, and Japan, have significantly improved over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, these standards are not applied universally and need improvement. Civil HEU stocks may require special attention.

Creating Inventory Transparency (Overall Grade: C+).

Policy Initiative: Military Stocks of Plutonium and HEU (grade: D+). The United States and Britain have started releasing information about their military stocks of plutonium and HEU and about the production of these stocks. Russia has agreed to share information about its fissile material stocks with the United States, but has failed to so. Russia also lacks a reliable national accounting system for its fissile materials. China and France have failed to release any information about their stocks.

Policy Initiative: Civil Stocks (grade: B+). Civil fissile material stocks are much more transparent than military stocks. In 1998, nine states with large civil, separated plutonium inventories or reprocessing programs agreed on a common set of guidelines governing the management of civil plutonium stocks, which includes annual declarations of their separated civil plutonium holdings. Civil HEU holdings should be subject to similar guidelines.

Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Overall Grade: C+).

Policy Initiative: Strengthened IAEA Safeguards (grade: A-). Under a five-year effort, the IAEA has strengthened its safeguards and inspection procedures in the non-weapon states party to the NPT. Key aspects of this effort, which aim to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, await ratification by individual member states before they take effect. In particular, strengthened safeguards in Iran could provide a credible method to address suspicions surrounding that country's nuclear program. IAEA safeguards are increasingly accepted by the nuclear weapon states, although coverage in Russia and China remains fragmentary.

Policy Initiative: Working Towards Universality and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (grade: B-). Key states, including Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, have joined the NPT in recent years. However, Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan remain outside the treaty. The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) was recently strengthened by the end of a potential "peaceful nuclear explosive" race between Argentina and Brazil. An African NWFZ currently awaits ratification by its members and the nuclear weapon states to take effect. An additional zone is being negotiated for Central Asia, while a Middle East NWFZ awaits that region's "comprehensive peace."

Policy Initiative: Dealing with Violators of International Nonproliferation Agreements or Inspections (grade: D). The international community is uneven and inconsistent in responding to those states which break agreements banning the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Efforts to address North Korean and Iraqi nuclear weapons-related activities show how varied these responses are. No consensus about how to deal with treaty violators currently exists.

Policy Initiative: Improving Export Controls (grade: C+). Export controls on fissile material production technologies, including "dual use" technologies, were improved following the Persian Gulf War. However, export control systems in Russia and China are perceived to be particularly weak.

Reducing the Threat Posed by Civil Stocks of Fissile Material (Overall Grade: C-).

Policy Initiative: Minimizing Stocks of Separated Civil Plutonium (grade: D+). Separated civil plutonium stocks are growing rapidly, primarily in Europe, Japan, and Russia, as civil reprocessing continues to outstrip the ability to use this plutonium as nuclear reactor fuel. Steps must be taken to reduce this trend, or else stocks of separated civil plutonium will soon be larger than military plutonium stocks.

Policy Initiative: Eliminating Civil HEU (grade: C). Efforts to eliminate the use of HEU in civil research programs have encountered resilient opposition in many states, especially Belgium, China, France, Germany, Russia, and South Africa. Russia has emerged as a potential long-term supplier of HEU to France, Germany, and possibly the Netherlands, setting back U.S. efforts to convert several research reactors in these states to use LEU fuels. Russia also has not taken back spent, Russian-origin HEU fuel from civil reactors in Eastern Europe.

Establishing Nuclear Waste Repositories (Overall Grade: F). Not a single state has built and successfully operated a geological repository to store spent fuel or high-level waste. The lack of repositories significantly complicates efforts to reduce incentives to continue the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the accumulation of large civil plutonium stocks. Efforts to dispose of excess military plutonium are also hampered by the lack of a final resting place for these materials.